
Contents
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Introduction Introduction
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Defining “Morality” Defining “Morality”
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Theories of Morality Theories of Morality
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Moral Grammar/Organ Positions Moral Grammar/Organ Positions
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Conceptual Change Positions; The Moral Domain Positions Conceptual Change Positions; The Moral Domain Positions
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The Emotion-Based Positions The Emotion-Based Positions
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Claim #1: There Are at Least Three, Computationally Distinct Forms of Norm: Victim-Based, Disgust-Based, and Social Conventional. All Can Be Referred to as Moral Claim #1: There Are at Least Three, Computationally Distinct Forms of Norm: Victim-Based, Disgust-Based, and Social Conventional. All Can Be Referred to as Moral
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Victim-Based Norms Victim-Based Norms
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Disgust-Based Norms Disgust-Based Norms
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Social Conventional Norms Social Conventional Norms
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Summary of the Neurocognitive Architectures Summary of the Neurocognitive Architectures
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Claim #2: These Three Forms of Norm Develop Because of the Existence of Specific Emotion-Based Learning Systems. Claim #2: These Three Forms of Norm Develop Because of the Existence of Specific Emotion-Based Learning Systems.
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Claim #3: The Development of Specific Classes of Norm Can Be Disrupted if These Emotion-Based Learning Systems Are Dysfunctional. Claim #3: The Development of Specific Classes of Norm Can Be Disrupted if These Emotion-Based Learning Systems Are Dysfunctional.
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Claim #4: These Emotion-Based Systems Are Not Automatic but Instead Under Considerable Attentional Control. Claim #4: These Emotion-Based Systems Are Not Automatic but Instead Under Considerable Attentional Control.
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Claim #5: The Emotion-Based Systems Alone Cannot Lead to the Development of All Aspects of Morality. Claim #5: The Emotion-Based Systems Alone Cannot Lead to the Development of All Aspects of Morality.
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Theory of Mind Theory of Mind
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Conclusions Conclusions
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Acknowledgment Acknowledgment
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References References
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5 The Developing Moralities: A Cognitive Neuroscience Approach
Get accessR. J. R. Blair, Mood and Anxiety Program, National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD
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Published:16 December 2013
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Abstract
This chapter will make five claims regarding the development of morality. First, there are at least three, computationally distinct forms of social norm: victim-based, disgust-based, and social conventional. All three can be referred to as moral (although not all individuals place all of these categories of norm within their domain of morality). Second, these three forms of norm develop because of the existence of specific emotion-based learning systems (victim-based reliant on an emotional response to distress cues, disgust-based reliant on an emotional response to disgusted expressions, and social conventional norms reliant on an emotional response to anger). Third, the development of specific classes of norm can be disrupted if these emotion-based learning systems are dysfunctional. Fourth, these emotion-based systems are not automatic but instead under considerable attentional control. Fifth, these emotion-based systems alone cannot lead to the development of all aspects of morality. Specifically, they will not determine which norms the individual places within the moral domain—that is highly dependent on an individual’s culturally influenced theories of morality. In addition, judgments of morality require access to a concept of immorality to compare the action against. For most individuals, part of the concept of an immoral act includes its intentional nature. In short, full moral development requires the integration of mental state information provided by theory of mind with outcome information provided by the emotion learning systems.
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