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Journal Article
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Zhenqi (Jessie) Liu
Journal of the European Economic Association, jvaf018, https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaf018
Published: 01 May 2025
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Published: 12 April 2025
Figure 1. Main findings. Panel (a) shows the share of participants transferring nothing to the male falling behind and the female falling behind in the mixed-gender merit treatments. Panel (b) shows the share of participants who strongly or somewhat agree with the statement “I expect that the less productive
Journal Article
Alexander W Cappelen and others
Journal of the European Economic Association, jvaf016, https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaf016
Published: 12 April 2025
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Published: 12 April 2025
Figure 3. Choice experiment, heterogeneity, mixed-gender merit. Panel (a) reports, by subgroup, the estimated treatment effect for the standardized amount transferred to the low-productive worker with no earnings in the mixed-gender merit treatments (T1 and T2). Panel (b) reports, by subgroup, the estimated t
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Published: 12 April 2025
Figure 4. Main reasons. Person behind relatively undeserving. Panel (a) shows the share of participants who find the person falling behind less deserving than the person ahead, by the gender of the person behind, using hand-coded data. Panel (b) shows the same using data coded by a large language model (GPT).
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Published: 12 April 2025
Figure 2. Choice experiment. Panel (a) shows the distribution of transfers (in USD) to the worker falling behind, pooled for all treatments. Panel (b) shows the extent of agreement with the worker falling behind having exerted less effort than the worker ahead, pooled for all treatments. The two panel are bas
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Published: 12 April 2025
Figure 5. Survey experiment. Panel (a) shows the distribution of agreement with the statement “It is very important that the government provides support to males (females) who fall behind in education and in the labor market.” Panel (b) shows the distribution of agreement with the statement “When males (femal
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Published: 12 April 2025
Figure 6. Survey experiment, heterogeneity. Panel (a) reports, by subgroup, the estimated treatment effect for the standardized level of agreement with the government providing support for people falling behind in education and in the labor market (P1 and P2). Panel (b) reports, by subgroup, the estimated tre
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Published: 11 April 2025
Figure 1. This figure plots the welfare consequence of central bank communication when prices are flexible. The top left panel plots the total welfare loss, and the remaining panels plot the sub-components of welfare loss as functions of the degree of opacity . The model calibration is as follows: ,
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Published: 11 April 2025
Figure 2. This figure plots the welfare consequence of central bank communication in an economy that consists of one flexible-price sector ( ) and one sticky-price sector. The solid (dashed) lines correspond to the case in which ( ). The top left panel plots the total welfare loss, and the remaining p
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Published: 11 April 2025
Figure 9. This figure plots the total welfare loss as functions of the degree of opacity under alternative calibrations of nominal rigidities across sector —reducing by compared with its value in the data. The solid lines, dashed lines, and circles correspond to the cases under CPI stabilizatio
Journal Article
Shengliang Ou and others
Journal of the European Economic Association, jvaf017, https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaf017
Published: 11 April 2025
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Published: 11 April 2025
Figure 3. This figure plots the welfare consequence of central bank communication in an economy that consists of one flexible-price sector ( ) and one sticky-price sector ( ) under alternative monetary policy rules. The dashed lines, solid lines, and line with circles correspond to the cases under CPI sta
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Published: 11 April 2025
Figure 5. This figure plots the welfare consequence of central bank communication, via an endogenous signal , in an economy that consists of one flexible-price sector ( ) and one sticky-price sector. The solid red (dashed blue) lines correspond to the case in which ( ). The top left panel plots the
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Published: 11 April 2025
Figure 10. This figure plots the welfare consequence of central bank communication in a fifteen-sectors dynamic model under alternative monetary policy rules. The solid lines, circles, and dashed lines correspond to the cases under CPI stabilization, OII stabilization, and time-consistent optimal monetary poli
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Published: 11 April 2025
Figure 11. This figure plots the results in a fifteen-sector static model when central bank communication affects the precisions of public signals. The solid lines, dashed lines, and circles correspond to the cases under CPI stabilization, OII stabilization, and Ramsey optimal monetary policy. The top left pan
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Published: 11 April 2025
Figure 4. This figure plots the welfare consequence of central bank communication in a symmetric multi-sector economy under the optimal monetary policy. The black, blue, and red lines correspond to cases where , 0.2, and 0.75, respectively. The top left panel plots the total welfare loss, and the remaining
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Published: 11 April 2025
Figure 6. This figure plots the degree of inefficiency (welfare loss) against the degree of nominal rigidity in the economy under perfect information in a symmetric multi-sector economy under the OII targeting policy. The solid line plots the degree of inefficiency. The dashed line corresponds to the value of
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Published: 11 April 2025
Figure 7. This figure plots the welfare consequence of central bank communication in a fifteen-sector static model under alternative monetary policy rules. The solid lines, dashed lines, and circles correspond to the cases under CPI stabilization, OII stabilization, and Ramsey optimal monetary policy, respect
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Published: 11 April 2025
Figure 8. This figure plots the quantitative result using . The figure plots the welfare consequence of central bank communication in a fifteen-sector static model under alternative monetary policy rules. The solid lines, dashed lines, and circles correspond to the cases under CPI stabilization, OII stabil