12 Alternative Government

Was M. Scribonius Drusus Libo a problem for Tiberius in September ad 14? Suetonius thinks he was. Tacitus and Dio are ambiguous. Suetonius writes:

L. Scribonius Libo [sic] vir nobilis res novas clam moliebatur…Libonem, ne quid in novitate acerbius fieret, secundo demum anno in senatu coarguit, medio temporis spatio tantum cavere contentus; nam et inter pontifices sacrificanti simul pro secespita plumbeum cultrum subiciendum curavit et secretum petenti non nisi adhibito Druso filio dedit dextramque obambulantis veluti incumbens, quoad perageretur sermo, continuit.

L. Scribonius Libo, a nobleman, was secretly planning revolution…Not wanting to make things too difficult at the beginning [of his reign], Tiberius waited two years before attacking Libo in the senate; in the meantime, however, he was content to be on his guard; for, when sacrificing together among the pontiffs, he took care to substitute the sacrificial knife for a lead one, and when he [Libo] sought a private audience he [Tiberius] gave it only if his son Drusus was present and leaning, as it were, on his right arm as he walked, held it until the conversation had finished.¹

Tacitus writes:

Firmius Catus senator, ex intima Libonis amicitia, iuvenem inprovidum et facilem inanibus ad Chaldaeorum promissa, magorum sacra, somniorum etiam interpretes impulit, dum proavum Pompeium, amitam Scriboniam, quae quondam Augusti coniunx fuerat, consobrinos Caesares, plenam imaginibus domum ostentat…Ut satis testium et qui servi eadem noscerent repperit, aditum ad principem postulat, demonstrato crimine et reo per Flaccum Vescularium equitem Romanum, cui propior cum Tiberio usus erat. Caesar indicium haud aspernatus congressus abnuit: posse enim eodem Flacco internuntio sermones commeare. Atque interim Libonem ornat praetura, convictibus adhibet…

Firmius Catus, a senator and close friend of Libo’s, urged the short-sighted and stupid young man to resort to the promises of astrologers, the rites of magicians, and also dream interpreters, and to boast about his great-grandfather Pompeius, his paternal aunt Scribonia, former wife of Augustus, his imperial cousins, his house crowded with ancestral images…When he found enough witnesses and slaves who had the same information, he asked for access to the princeps, having indicated the charge and the defendant through Vescularius Flaccus, a Roman knight who was more intimate with Tiberius. Caesar, not rejecting the information, declined an interview: ‘it was possible for the information to be passed on via the same intermediary Flaccus.’ Meanwhile he distinguished Libo with a praetorship and invited him to dinner parties.²

Dio writes:

του̑τό τϵ οὐ̑ν οὐχ ὁμολογούμϵνον ἔπραξϵ, καὶ Λούκιον Σκριβώνιον Λίβωνα, νϵανίσκον ϵὐπατρίδην δόξαντά τι νϵωτϵρίζϵιν, τέως μὲν ἔρρωτο, οὐκ ἔκρινϵ, νοσήσάντα δὲ ἐπιθάνατον ἔν τϵ σκιμποδίῳ καταστέγῳ, ὁποίῳ αἱ τω̑ν βουλϵυτω̑ν γυναι̑κϵς χρω̑νται, ἐς τὴν γϵρουσίαν ἐσϵκόμισϵ…

And so he did this, acting inconsistently; likewise for Lucius Scribonius Libo, a young noble who appeared to be undertaking some revolutionary activity; as long as he was healthy, he did not bring him to trial; but when he was ill to the point of death, he had him brought into the senate in a covered litter, of the kind that the wives of senators use…³

Suetonius separates by two years the initial suspicion of Drusus Libo from his eventual demise, while Tacitus and Dio describe a time-lapse. Most scholars reject Suetonius’ account, preferring Tacitus instead. But Tacitus’ account does not necessarily invalidate Suetonius: dating Drusus Libo’s praetorship is the key. Three options are available to us: a praetorship in 15; a praetorship in 16; a praetorship in 17. Alternatively, Drusus Libo may have been a candidatus Caesaris for an election that had not yet taken place.⁴ I prefer a praetorship in 15, and hence election to the praetorship in ad 14.

That Drusus Libo was praetor, or praetor-designate, when prosecuted in ad 16 is unlikely. Prosecution of a magistrate, or magistrate designate, is unusual, and usually commented on by the sources. Moreover, as Weinrib has shown, a prosecution would only go ahead once the magistrate had abdicated from office.⁵ In ad 21 two men brought a charge of maiestas against the praetor Magius Caecilianus.⁶ Tacitus, who, it should be added, does mention Magius’ praetorship, writes only that Tiberius charged the delatores with calumnia.⁷ Dio, who is similarly brief, adds that on hearing the charge, Magius ‘left the senate and having taken off his robe of office returned, demanding as a private citizen to have the complaint lodged at once’—i.e. Magius abdicated from office.⁸ Dio records many other instances of the phenomenon.⁹ That the sources, and especially Dio, do not mention Drusus Libo’s abdication or his being arraigned while praetor, or praetor-designate, is evidence, ex silentio as it is, that the first two options are unlikely. On the other hand, a candidatus Caesaris for a future election requires a relatively late date for the praetorian elections, and distorts the natural sense of our sources, especially Tacitus (it should be noted that a natural reading of the text also suffers from making Drusus Libo a praetor-designate).¹⁰ Weinrib supports his view that Drusus Libo was a candidatus Caesaris by suggesting that the praetorian elections in ad 16 occurred after Libo’s trial. The argument is based on the fact that elections in ad 14 occurred in late September/early October. But the elections of ad 14 should not be used to date elections in ad 16.¹¹ When Augustus died, his commendationes were already published, suggesting that the elections were to be held in late August or early September.¹² Augustus’ death and funeral caused public business to cease, a situation that would have affected the timing of the praetorian election as well. That the elections were overdue is perhaps also suggested by the fact that Tiberius turned his attention to their re-organisation immediately on accepting the principate.¹³ Moreover, Tacitus (who mentions dinner parties), Suetonius (who mentions religious ceremonies and informal meetings), and Dio (who suggests that Tiberius bided his time) all imply that more than a few weeks separate the initial entrapment by Catus and Drusus Libo’s final destruction.¹⁴ Indeed, Tacitus’ ‘origin, stages, and end of this affair’ (eius negotii initium, ordinem, finem curatius disseram…) seems to describe a lengthy process, the natural sense of which is seriously damaged by a chronology which places the whole episode inside a month or two.¹⁵ We are therefore left with a praetorship in ad 15 and, hence, election to the praetorship in ad 14.

Designation as a candidatus Caesaris in ad 14 accords with Velleius’ description of his own election to the praetorship in that year: proxime a nobilissimis ac sacerdotalibus viris destinari praetoribus contigit, ‘were together destined for the praetorship immediately after those from the noblest houses and those who had held priesthoods’.¹⁶ Both nobilissimus and sacerdotalis cover Drusus Libo.¹⁷ Velleius adds that he and his brother were ‘the last to be commended by Augustus and the first to be commended by Tiberius’.¹⁸ Tiberius, who limited himself to four recommendations, would not have repudiated or added to Augustus’ commendationes while they remained valid.¹⁹ Since Augustus would not have preferred a pair of Velleii to an important young aristocrat of impeccable family, Drusus Libo, like Velleius and his brother, was probably commended by Augustus and Tiberius.²⁰ He was possibly praetor suo anno. It has been argued, nonetheless, that a praetorship in 15 causes problems for our understanding of the affair.

Scholars seem to agree generally that if Suetonius is to be believed, and the praetorship is to be placed in ad 15, then one must hold that the plot which was discovered in September ad 16 was formed in ad 14.²¹ But opposition often seems consistent, even though its manifestations appear intermittently. That which is termed a ‘plot’ is very often nothing more than a collection of separate decisions (often reactive) artificially linked owing to a common theme. I believe the best solution is to treat Drusus Libo’s activities in ad 14 and ad 16 separately. On that reading, a tradition endeavouring to understand the final damnation of Drusus Libo, or, better, those trying to destroy him in ad 16, telescoped two separate incidents; a synthesis convenient and provocative. Suetonius’ clam is thus a device to explain the long delay; it reflects an interpretation not historical fact. When put this way, objections to a praetorship in ad 15 dissolve. What, then, occurred in September ad 14 to deserve Suetonius’ treatment, and in particular, his use of language appropriate to revolution (res novas clam moliebatur)?

Astrology is a key topic for the prosecution in ad 16. Drusus Libo’s accusers may have argued, or proved, that he had first consulted astrologers in ad 14. If this is correct, then Suetonius’ clam may, in fact, relate to the senate’s findings. It was in the prosecution’s interest to establish one coherent plan, rather than a mixed bag of offences. The story of Firmius Catus seems, however, authentic. Catus is said to have collected witnesses and slaves and taken their information to Vescularius Flaccus, Tiberius’ close friend.²² News that witnesses (who were not slaves) were being collected would spread quickly, especially within the senatorial class; notoriety that would prove useful to the prosecution in September ad 16, something like: ‘Two years ago Firmius Catus had evidence that Drusus Libo was plotting revolution; he was saved only by the clemency of our princeps…’ Catus could not construct a serious charge from ambitious spirit; maiestas was possible only once the necromantic parchment surfaced in ad 16. But the essence of Catus’ accusation is not entirely obscure.

Drusus Libo is said to have meditated on his Pompeian ancestry and his imperial cousins, (consobrini Caesares).²³ Both are relevant to the political atmosphere of September ad 14. At Ann. 1.10 Tacitus purports to record criticisms of Augustus which surfaced in the weeks following his death. Though the structure is probably Tacitean, we need not reject the contents. Defamation concerned Augustus in his final years; criticism, of what was essentially authoritarianism, should not surprise us. Tacitus writes that people accused Augustus, inter alia, of having feigned a Pompeian spirit. If this reflects a contemporary idea, then Pompeism (an anachronistic but useful label), which had come to mean the principle of Republican government, was evidently topical in the weeks following Augustus’ death: ‘our leaders talk of a free Republic…etc.’²⁴ Tiberius’ use of the Augustan discourse of shared responsibility on 17 September is here apposite. As was the case in 27 bc, the rhetoric was necessary because the topic was relevant. The Principate was enacted as an emergency structure and this was not forgotten. As Velleius admits, people did not know what to expect of the post-Augustan era.²⁵ Tiberius was in a position of supreme power, but some probably wondered: ‘Do we really need him?’ It is conceivable that during these few weeks Drusus Libo was somehow made to represent a Pompeian position, a hypothesis supported by Tacitus’ belief that he had spoken out about something: cunctaque eius dicta factaque, cum prohibere posset, scire malebat…, ‘He [Tiberius] could have checked his every word and action, but wished instead to know them’.²⁶ Reference to consobrini Caesares is significant: Gaius, Lucius, Agrippa, Julia, and Agrippina (and thus Germanicus by marriage) are the most likely candidates, being second-cousins by blood.

Men who had formerly supported Gaius, Aemilius Paullus, and finally Agrippa embraced the politics of reform to destabilize a government moving firmly into Tiberius’ grasp. Perhaps they took up, or were already associated with, the Republican ideology earlier ascribed to the elder Drusus and later taken up by his grandson Caligula, but their aim was nevertheless to defeat Tiberius.²⁷ As recently as ad 12 libellous pamphlets had described Tiberius, probably, as a future ruler and suggested that Augustus had established de facto monarchy. Violent protests had been engineered to oppose the vicesima hereditatium on a principle grounded in city-state Republicanism: ‘We are not vanquished foreigners; we are Roman citizens!’ This approach had been advocated by Aemilius Paullus and artificially associated with Agrippa. Agrippa’s continued existence, in exile, had allowed his supporters to hope; his execution was a serious blow to them. I believe that these men now turned their attention to Drusus Libo, the prospect of which weighed on Tiberius’ mind as he approached the senate on 17 September ad 14.

My hypothesis depends upon dating (in relative terms) the praetorian elections of ad 14. Having discussed the debate on 17 September, Tacitus writes:

Candidatos praeturae duodecim nominavit, numerum ab Augusto traditum; et hortante senatu ut augeret, iure iurando obstrinixit se non excessurum. Tum primum e campo comitia ad patres translata sunt…

He nominated 12 candidates for the praetorship, the number handed down by Augustus; and when the senate pressed him to increase [that number], he bound himself by an oath that he would not exceed [it]. Then for the first time the elections were moved from the Campus to the senate…²⁸

Does tum mean ‘at that time’ or ‘next’? Velleius’ treatment of the same occasion is important:

Post redditum caelo patrem et corpus eius humanis honoribus, numen divinis honoratum, primum principalium eius operum fuit ordinatio comitiorum…Quo tempore mihi fratrique meo, candidatis Caesaris, proxime a nobilissimis ac sacerdotalibus viris destinari praetoribus contigit, consecutis quidem, ut neque post nos quemquam divus Augustus neque ante nos Caear commendaret Tiberius.

After heaven had received his father, and human honours had been paid to his body as divine honours were paid to his numen, his first imperial task was the organization of the comitia…At which time my brother and I, as Caesar’s candidates, were together destined for the praetorship immediately after those from the noblest houses and those who had held priesthoods and indeed, we were the last to be commended by Augustus and the first to be commended by Tiberius Caesar.²⁹

The first sentence refers both to Augustus’ funeral and his deification on 17 September. It was only afterwards (post) that Tiberius went about changing the electoral procedure. Scholars nevertheless hold that these occurred, along with Tiberius’ proclamation (as it is described at Ann. 1.14.6), on the one day: 17 September.³⁰ Velleius’ post and Tacitus’ tum thus refer to procedural progression: matter (a), was discussed, then (b), and (c), etc. But Velleius should not be read this way. He is clear that the rationalization of electoral procedure was Tiberius’ first task as princeps, i.e. Tiberius had by then formally accepted supreme power: this did not happen on 17 September. Rationalization of electoral procedure therefore occurred sometime after the 17th.

As Velleius suggests, Tiberius may have formally accepted the Principate on the same day that he sponsored a rationalization of the electoral procedure. Senators were then asked to vote on the candidates for that year. Velleius, his brother, and Drusus Libo were all successful.³¹ Their election required only ratification by the centuriae Caesarum and the people.³² The situation described by Tacitus at Ann. 1.14.6 and Velleius at 2.124.3–4 therefore occurred after 17 September but before the final election. Tacitus’ description of this event is a topic of great dispute. Leaving aside the contested term nominatio (a book in itself), I nevertheless accept the view put forward by Jones that men did not ask for more candidates, but more praetorships.³³ A tactic that had proved successful in ad 11 was now employed against the ‘new guy’ - Tiberius, unlike Augustus, stood firm: ‘Augustus intended 12 praetorships, and that’s how many you’ll get!’³⁴ Perhaps the empowerment of the senate as a prerogative body was offered as compensation: ‘You cannot have more praetorships. But how about determining the election results?’ The reforms would have enjoyed the support of many within the senatorial order, especially those lacking popular standing.³⁵ It was probably on this day that Tiberius published his recommendations, among them being Drusus Libo.

We do not know how many days, or weeks, separate the meeting on the 17th from Tiberius’ proclamation concerning praetorships. ‘Days’ are nevertheless more appropriate than ‘weeks’. Augustus published his commendationes for the praetorian elections in August; his death would have caused the elections to be postponed. Elections would remain in abeyance for Augustus’ funeral and then for his deification on the 17th. The senate’s failure to secure a positive declaration from Tiberius on the latter occasion would not, however, justify their continued suspension. Indeed, when Tacitus writes that Tiberius ‘ceased to refuse and to be asked’, he implies that the senate moved on with other business, leaving Tiberius’ situation unanswered. According to this interpretation, Tiberius turned his attention to the now overdue praetorian elections soon after the debate on the 17th. Catus thus began to supply information against Drusus Libo shortly before 17 September, i.e. Tiberius went into the meeting unsure of Drusus Libo’s support.³⁶ We need not speculate on a ‘real’ plot to commit violent acts against the State.

As was noted previously, Tiberius had relatively little experience in the senate from 6 BC to ad 13, a period of almost twenty years! He was, no doubt, well represented by friends and allies, but his absence would still have caused problems. Cliques, relationships, alliances, and factions would have formed by necessity in his absence: they are the hallmark of any deliberative body. Indeed, they are the mechanisms by which a great deal of work gets done. When Tiberius finally returned to Rome to lead the senate in ad 13, he may have found himself on the outside looking in. No doubt he could rely on a great number of senators, but there would have been many with whom he had no connection or familiarity: they may have found his presence an annoyance at best, and at worse a threat to the established order of things. Certainly, he would not have known which, and his skill in the senate betrays his lack of confidence. That an important aristocrat like Drusus Libo, who advertised Claudian, Scribonian, Julian, and Pompeian connections, might consider an alliance with Gaius’ old friends would have concerned Tiberius greatly—that is, it would have made him hesitate. It is thus naïve to think that only a ‘real’ plot could or would have worried Tiberius. A coalition of Drusus Libo’s supporters with those who had formerly supported Gaius, Aemilius Paullus and Agrippa posed danger to Tiberius, Germanicus, and Drusus, and would be seen as provocative. If the coalition were to solidify, then Tiberius’ position would destabilize. His control of the instruments of power would remain, but his legitimacy as princeps would be questionable. The future position of Germanicus and Drusus would be even less clear. Catus thus offered to supply information and prepared the way for future entrapment. But the information was tenuous at best and at worst unsubstantiated. In any case, there was no evidence of a capital crime. Tiberius could not destroy an important member of the aristocracy (who was not stuck on an island) without good evidence of serious wrongdoing, but nor did he wish to. Negotiation was the better approach.

Here is my proposed chronology: (i) in the final week of August, Tiberius is told about the execution of Agrippa; (ii) in early September, Agrippa’s execution is talked about in Rome, but not discussed in the senate; rumour circulates that Agrippa was murdered by Livia and Tiberius; (iii) Tiberius, meanwhile, is informed about the situation in Pannonia, and then, shortly before 17 September, the situation in Lower Germany; (iv) at this time Tiberius is also made aware of an emerging coalition between the aristocrat Drusus Libo and Agrippa’s known supporters; (v) on 17 September Tiberius deals successfully with the situation in Germany and its consequences in Rome, as well as the issue of Germanicus, but the situation concerning Drusus Libo remains unresolved; (vi) concerned by the prospect of a new coalition, Tiberius holds off accepting anything until the situation is made clearer; (vii) rather than provoke his enemies into action, Tiberius makes a deal with Drusus Libo, who agrees to accept Tiberius’ commendatio and by so doing, shows his support for the government;³⁷ (viii) Tiberius formally agrees in the senate to continue holding supreme power; he accepts the moral responsibility of empire, statio paterna: dum veniam ad id tempus, quo vobis aequum possit videri dare vos aliquam senectuti meae requiem, ‘Until I come to that time, in which it may seem right to you to give some rest to my old age’.³⁸ He was almost 56.

I have here shown that a coherent picture can be produced to support Suetonius’ contention without rejecting other evidence or being, of itself, implausible. The situation in ad 15 is not clear, though Tacitus hints at economic turmoil, and we know that popular anger with the level of taxation was again an issue.³⁹ As praetor and pontifex, Drusus Libo socialized occasionally with Tiberius, as was appropriate for an important noble and a relative, and performed religious ceremonies. Suetonius and Tacitus hold that Tiberius remained suspicious of him for two years before feeling ready to move. The assertion cannot be tested. But since the government certainly sponsored his prosecution in ad 16, it is plausible. Suspicion, however, does not require the presence of a ‘real’ plot, the evidence for which emerged only in ad 16. Its appearance signalled Tiberius’ failure to convince important members of the aristocracy to support Augustus’ succession policy and, with it, his government.

The decision to leave obscure Agrippa’s execution left Tiberius vulnerable to suspicion. Plausible deniability was sacrificed and soon replaced by innuendo: ‘Augustus ordered it’; ‘I heard it was Livia’; ‘No, I have it on good authority that Tiberius is to blame’; ‘It was probably Livia and Tiberius'. Gossip is a natural habit but political opponents often make use of and encourage its dissemination. We have, for Agrippa’s supporters, two separate and mutually exclusive messages: (i) ‘Agrippa was murdered by Tiberius'; and, (ii) ‘Agrippa has been saved by the gods and is alive and well.' There are two possibilities: Agrippa’s supporters broke into separate factions after his death; or (i) occurred before (ii). The second postulate is the most plausible.

Tacitus implies that the government first became aware of a pseudo-Agrippa only in ad 16. Having described Clemens’ plan to rescue Agrippa from Planasia, Tacitus continues:

 Ausa eius inpedivit tarditas onerariae navis: atque interim patrata caede ad maiora et magis praecipitia conversus furatur cineres vectusque Cosam Etruriae promunturium ignotis locis sese abdit, donec crinem barbamque promitteret: nam aetate et forma haud dissimili in dominum erat. Tum per idoneos et secreti eius socios crebrescit vivere Agrippam, occultis primum sermonibus, ut vetita solent, mox vago rumore apud inperitissimi cuiusque promptas auris aut rursum apud turbidos eoque nova cupientis. Atque ipse adire municipia obscuro diei, neque propalam aspici neque diutius isdem locis, sed quia veritas visu et mora, falsa festinatione et incertis valescunt, relinquebat famam aut praeveniebat. Vulgabatur interim per Italiam servatum munere deum Agrippam, credebatur Romae; iamque Ostiam invectum multitudo ingens, iam in urbe clandestini coetus celebrabant, cum Tiberium anceps cura distrahere, vine militum servum suum coerceret an inanem credulitatem tempore ipso vanescere sineret.

‘The tardiness of the cargo-boat hindered his bold venture; in the meantime the execution [of Agrippa] was accomplished and so he turned to a more significant and hazardous scheme: he stole the ashes of the deceased, sailed to Cosa, a promontory of Etruria, and hid himself in unknown places until he had grown his hair and beard: for in age and appearance he was not unlike his master. Then, through suitable persons and friends who shared his secret, it was rumoured that Agrippa was alive, first in private conversations, as is usual with forbidden knowledge, and soon in vague rumour which found its way to the open ears of the most ignorant or, on the other hand, those who were trouble makers and consequently fomenters of revolution. He himself entered towns at dusk or dawn, and he was neither to be seen in open places or spending a long time in the same place, but since truth grows in strength by appearance and time and falsehood by haste and uncertainty, he left rumour behind him or preceded it. It was meanwhile rumoured throughout Italy that Agrippa had been saved by heaven, at Rome it was believed; already huge crowds greeted him at Ostia, already secret meetings were being held in the city, while the attention of Tiberius was distracted with conflicting concerns: should he put down his own slave by military means or allow idle credulity to vanish over time.⁴⁰

Dio places the whole affair in ad 16:

Κἀν τῳ̑ αὐτῳ̑ ἔτϵι Κλήμης τις, δου̑λός τϵ του̑ Ἀγρίππου γϵγονὼς καί πῃ καὶ προσϵοικὼς αὐτῳ̑, ἐπλάσατο αὐτὸς ἐκϵι̑νος ϵἰ̑ναι…

And in the same year a certain Clemens, who had been a slave of Agrippa, and who resembled him to some extent, pretended to be Agrippa himself…⁴¹

Tacitus understood his source to mean that news of Agrippa’s survival surfaced only after Clemens had taken refuge in some secret location near Cosa.⁴² Clemens surfaced looking, apparently, different. Dio writes only that in ad 16 Agrippa’s survival was publicized. Only Suetonius situates news of Agrippa’s survival in ad 14. He is mistaken. Commenting on the reasons for Tiberius’ hesitation he writes:

Nam et servus Agrippae Clemens nomine non contemnendam manum in ultionem domini compareret…

For a slave of Agrippa, Clemens by name, had collected a not contemptible force to avenge his master…⁴³

In ultionem domini refers not to the attempted rescue of Agrippa but to Clemens’ own insurrection. Suetonius furthermore implies that in September ad 14 Tiberius was aware of this development. In contrast to his interpretation of Drusus Libo, which can be supported by the versions of Tacitus and Dio, Suetonius’ interpretation of the Clemens affair is impossible. Clemens did not have sufficient time to travel from Planasia to Cosa, hide for long enough to grow his beard and hair, and then gather enough men in Gaul and Italy to cause Tiberius concern by late September ad 14. Suetonius’ interpretation was probably his own. It was logical to make Clemens’ activities an extension of Agrippa’s execution, but in doing so Suetonius constructed an impossible chronology. A chronology must, therefore, be based upon Tacitus’ longer, and more consistent, narrative.

Speculating on the speed of hair growth is a futile exercise. It is better to ask: from the moment that the ‘first secret conversations' were held, how long would it take for the government to find out? Two sentences are important: (i) ‘Then, through suitable persons and friends who shared his secret, it was rumoured that Agrippa was alive, first in private conversations, as is usual with forbidden knowledge, and soon (mox) in vague rumour'; and (ii) ‘It was meanwhile rumoured throughout Italy that Agrippa had been saved by heaven, at Rome it was believed; already huge crowds greeted him at Ostia.' Mox in the first passage, though not meaning ‘soon’, necessarily suggests that a long delay between the first secret conversations (occulti primus sermones) and the spread of rumour (vagus rumor) is unlikely.⁴⁴ If Clemens was captured in the final few months of ad 16, then occulti primum sermones belong, probably, to the first half of that year.⁴⁵ This chronology supports the second postulation given above: in ad 14 it was said that Agrippa had been executed by order of Tiberius; later, in ad 16, it was held that Agrippa had, in fact, survived and intended to overthrow Tiberius. The second message obviates the first, which necessarily became counter-productive. On this reading, the decision to manufacture a pseudo-Agrippa, the recruitment of a few thousand fighters and the emergence of conspiratorial ‘cells’ within Rome all belong to ad 16.⁴⁶ Agrippa’s supporters obviously believed that their position was untenable.

Traces of rebel propaganda survive in Tacitus. Agrippa munere deum servatus is for the ears of a true believer, but secret ‘cells’ in Rome would discuss more than propaganda. Tacitus describes the attendees: ‘many (multi) from the imperial house, equestrians and senators were said to have supported [Clemens] with money and assisted with their advice'.⁴⁷  Multi equites et senatores would, at these meetings, discuss details of the plot: how will so-and-so be put-away? Who will the praetorians fight for? What about the urban cohorts? Who will take responsibility for the grain supply? These men, whose names remain unknown to us, stand at the centre of this reconstruction. They had supported Gaius, then Aemilius Paullus, and finally Agrippa. Reconciliation with Tiberius was impossible; he had been too often made to feel threatened and humiliated. Distrust was mutual and deep. While Augustus lived they rallied behind prominent members of the imperial family. Aemilius Paullus, consul in ad 1, could plausibly supersede Tiberius. His destruction in ad 6 is testimony to his potential. The use of Agrippa Postumus, young, uncultured, and inexperienced, was, on the other hand, an act of pure desperation. He provided only nomenclature, but the nomena were popular and powerful. The government responded accordingly.

The attempt in ad 11 to free Agrippa from incarceration evidences a political reality, i.e. those who opposed Tiberius could not ignore the public’s enthusiasm for members of Augustus’ family. In ad 14, with Agrippa dead, they allied themselves with an important aristocrat who placed a premium on his connection to the domus Caesaris by highlighting his own brand name. Drusus Libo, for his part, accepted Tiberius’ olive branch and succeeded to the praetorship (his brother was moreover designated consul in ad 15), but the seed was sown. Seneca, alive when Drusus Libo was arraigned, believed that he had desired the top job. A praetorship, or later a consulate, might temporarily satisfy the ambitious, but their power and influence was limited so long as Rome was dominated by a princeps. ad 16, so far as we know, brought no office or distinction, or military command; an unoccupied Drusus Libo was left alone to reflect on his situation. Others were also, at this moment, reflecting on their situation. Multi equites et senatores had come to view as untenable their participation in the current political milieu. The elder Julia, for whom crowds gathered to demand her restoration in ad 4, had starved to death within a year of Tiberius’ accession, while her alleged lover, Sempronius Gracchus, was executed; popular sympathy for another victim of Tiberius’ scheming might, with the right agent, mutate into violent support. In ad 16, at secret meetings in Rome, equites et senatores agreed that Agrippa was still the best agent for change, thus Agrippa munere deum servatus. A historical fiction soon emerged: Augustus and Agrippa had, in fact, reconciled, but the murder of Augustus prevented Agrippa’s full restitution. Tiberius, desperate for unrivalled domination, ordered Agrippa’s immediate execution, but, by the grace of the Gods, Agrippa escaped! The destruction of a suspected ally in the very same year is surely not coincidental.

Men refused to defend Drusus Libo, not because he was a fool but because of his known connection to Agrippa’s supporters. Notorious relationships stick to politicians for life. Support could easily be mistaken for sympathy, as would any proposal that appeared lenient; the reaction to Julius Caesar’s proposal on 5 December 63 bc that Catiline’s associates not be put to death is apposite. Unlike Lentulus Sura and his associates, Drusus Libo was not put in gaol, but the effect was similar. A large group of praetorians would not guard a defendant because he dabbled in necromancy, nor would the government employ such resources to enhance the income of four delatores. Had Drusus Libo been considered not dangerous, it would have been in the regime’s interest to encourage voluntary exile. Indeed, voluntary exile would prove the case for the prosecution and ensure their full compensation. Instead, troops were used to separate Drusus Libo from suspected confederates. There was, of course, no smoking gun. That is clear from the trial. A parchment listing important figures required interpretation; its use was not manifest, though its existence was. The necromancer Junius, who had discussed the matter with Fulcinius Trio, supplied evidence of a vague but sinister question, something like: ‘What does my future hold should anything unfortunate happen to the men on this list?' It was enough to warrant a senatorial investigation and allow for the dismantling of a provocative coalition.

We can only speculate on Drusus Libo’s part in the conspiracy. He was an important individual, and so his participation ought to have been significant. But his decision to consult a necromancer demands our caution. It indicates an uncertain psychology rather than confident commitment to a cause, and it is therefore possible that he was still, even with the Pseudo-Agrippa bearing down on Rome, weighing his options. Regardless, Levick is surely right to suppose that the conspirators would have removed Clemens once Tiberius and his entourage were dead.⁴⁸ Levick further argues that Drusus Libo was to be nominated princeps and presented, by the people, to the senate.⁴⁹ This is unlikely. Drusus and Tiberius were present in Rome and would, therefore, have been put to death, along with their closest allies, but Germanicus, in Germany with thousands of troops, would pose a serious threat to the conspirators. His position was physically and morally superior to anybody who might occupy, or liberate, Rome as princeps. To neutralize Germanicus, the conspirators would require a device by which his position would appear untenable, unpopular, and illegitimate. The best way to counter Germanicus’ popularity while avoiding an unpopular war was the abolition of the Principate, which would effectively wedge Germanicus.⁵⁰ Aggression by Germanicus would be advertised as a repudiation of his father’s purported Republicanism, damaging seriously his popularity in Rome. It would also require the siege of Rome, now housing a free and emboldened senate and people. The invidia of tyranny could be avoided only by acknowledging the new res publica as legitimate, and, in so doing, mortally wound any claim to supreme power. Germanicus, of course, may have reacted differently, but I believe, that the conspirators in Rome would have had little option but to try and wedge him: a war would have been costly and difficult to win. Having deposed the tyrant and dismantled his government, the conspirators would, therefore, have organized immediately fresh elections in accordance with ancestral custom, i.e. the new electoral arrangements were to be abolished and the people would again determine the outcome of elections. It was with good reason that Tiberius presented his electoral reform as having been designed by the now deified Augustus.⁵¹ The equites who made up the centuriae Caesarum had no reason to support Tiberius’ electoral innovations, which were barely two years old, and may have been satisfied with anything other than the status quo. Nor should we assume that plebeians took to political impotence with satisfaction or indifference. As was noted above, aside from the right to vote according to ancestral custom, distress had remained topical, being communicated to the government via anti-tax protests. We know almost nothing about the sate of Rome's economy during these years, save Tacitus' note that people asked Tiberius to abolish the 1 per cent sales tax, and Tiberius' reply that the state could not function without it.⁵² Even without more information, it is safe to assume that things were not going well for a large group of people. On this reading, the Tiberian experiment was seen by many as a failure and they were now open to alternatives.That talk of libertas and Republican praxis resurfaced on the death of Tiberius, and more impressively after the death of Gaius Caesar, is evidence that my conclusion is not impossible, nor even improbable.⁵³ It certainly explains the presence or Concord. Augustus’ use of a discourse which implied the extraordinary, and temporary, nature of the supreme power, and Tiberius’ rambling about the eventual laying to rest of a heavy burden allowed people to question the legitimacy of the so called optimus status. The paradoxical nature of the Principate sustained interest in a truly free res publica.

The ancient belief that Drusus Libo desired the ‘top job’ is, therefore, a rejection of his Republican image. The prosecution presented evidence of supreme ambition: ‘Would he ever have enough money to cover the Via Appia from Rome to Brundisium with gold?'⁵⁴ The image was accepted by contemporaries: ‘He possessed higher ambitions than anyone could have been expected to entertain in that epoch, or a man like himself in any epoch at all.'⁵⁵ There were to be no Republican martyrs in the changed conditions of Tiberius’ succession. Drusus Libo, nonetheless, was no mere tool.⁵⁶ When Catiline entered the senate on 8 November 63 BC, not one of his associates would sit near him. Still, Catiline was no puppet.⁵⁷ Clemens’ conspiracy nonetheless continued despite Drusus Libo’s very public demise. Once a fighting force of thousands assembled, the conspiracy would remain active so long as Clemens was alive or a serious defeat was suffered. The multi equites et senatores were committed to new political order, not the inauguration of one particular aristocrat. Drusus Libo was one of many senators secretly behind Clemens. He was, however, closest to the ruling clique and therefore a major loss.

No manifest evidence existed to prove Drusus Libo’s involvement in the Pseudo-Agrippa conspiracy, but the political climate—affected by widespread speculation that Agrippa was marching towards Rome—demanded caution. As with many Romans at that time, Drusus Libo was evidently affected by fatalistic creeds; a strong temptation to know the future proved his undoing. Those most threatened by revolution pounced, while those with the most to gain were in no position to help. Tiberius, and to a greater extent Germanicus and Drusus, profited, but it is important to note Tiberius’ own behaviour. His satisfaction should not be doubted, but he wore on his public face signs of distress. Tiberius ostentatiously preferred reconciliation and clemency, while the senate demanded justice in the face of threats to the government. The result belied the nature of the Principate: the princeps should not impose his will on a free senate charged with the protection of the res publica, thus: responsum est ut senatum rogaret.⁵⁸ This is a complex approach to power. On the death of Augustus, Tiberius surrounded himself with the instruments of violent coercion. Praetorians accompanied him everywhere. But the maintenance of authoritarian power requires more than the tools for destruction; it involves public relations. Tiberius advertised moderatio and sorrow at the death of a rival whilst the senate was left to accept full responsibility. The irony concealed real tyranny, as the chief victims were made to wear the tyrant’s face.

In the process of showing that Tiberius’ position was threatened by the persistence of a ‘real’ opposition, a model for understanding Tiberius’ Principate has come to light which stands in contrast to those hitherto produced. Scholars who construct a Republican paradigm to interpret Tiberius and the unfolding of his Principate are shown to be seriously mistaken, as are those who insist that moral abstractions like dissimulatio or moderatio were the key principles by which Tiberius operated. I have shown that Tiberius responded to an actual fear, not simply discourse: anything less than supreme power would have meant his assassination. By grounding the Tiberian Principate firmly in Augustus’ Principate, contra Tacitus, the above approach is able to explain why this came about. But the benefits of the model advanced here extend well beyond ad 16.

Concerning the affair of Drusus Libo, Levick held that: ‘the genuine and remarkable concord between Germanicus and Drusus will have been cemented by the episode.’⁵⁹ We cannot be sure this was ever the case, but Tacitus possessed evidence that by ad 17 hostility between their respective friends and supporters had emerged:

Divisa namque et discors aula erat tacitis in Drusum aut Germanicum studiis…Sed fratres egregie concordes et proximorum certaminibus inconcussi.

For there was division and discord in the court with silent preferences to either Drusus or Germanicus…but the brothers were singularly united and unshaken by the struggles of those around them.⁶⁰

My approach explains this development. Since, as Tacitus writes, there was no public inquiry following the death of Clemens, the multi equites et senatores were left to reconsider their position. As I have shown, most could not be reconciled with Tiberius. They required therefore a new figurehead—someone, as we have seen, closely connected to the imperial family. I would suggest that they got behind Germanicus, or, more precisely, Germanicus and Agrippina. This would explain the emergence of hostility between the supporters of Drusus and Germanicus, but it also explains the later treatment of Germanicus’ sons following his death. Nero and Drusus were, following the death of their uncle Drusus, accused of conspiracy; both eventually died amid suspicion.⁶¹ The history of Germanicus and his supporters after ad 16 therefore deserves further analysis.

Finally, my approach allows for a new appreciation of the sources. By not grounding Tiberius’ Principate in Augustus’ Principate, Tacitus fails to comprehend Tiberius’ approach to power; we find ourselves reading Suetonius and Dio with relief! What did Aufidius Bassus, Servilius Nonianus, Cluvius Rufus, or Fabius Rusticus have to offer? A re-examination of Tacitus’ sources is required. Tacitus had before him more sources than is usually admitted. Indeed, Syme’s belief that Tacitus relied heavily on the acta senatus seems to me unlikely. A different approach must also be brought to the memoirs of the younger Agrippina. Tacitus’ treatment of the death of Agrippa Postumus and the conspiracy of Clemens suggests that Agrippina’s work was not well known and, therefore, had little impact in the first century ad. The absence of Sallustius Crispus in either Suetonius or Dio is suggestive, and weakens the belief that Tacitus seriously affected either historian. A better understanding of the historical works of the first century ad is essential.