11 Germanicus: Successor to Tiberius or Augustus?

Three legions camped at Emona in Pannonia and four legions camped near Cologne in Lower Germany mutinied on hearing that Augustus was dead and Tiberius was in control of things.¹ Their respective locations vis-à-vis Rome indicate independent situations.² All seven legions none the less wanted the same things: an increase in the normal pay rate; better severance conditions; reduction in the length of service; and an immediate release from the standards for those who had served twenty years. Further to this, the legions in Lower Germany demanded immediate payment of the donatives left them by Augustus, while some troops even tried to co-opt Germanicus by declaring him Imperator and offering him supreme power. It was with this in mind that Tacitus wrote concerning Tiberius’ ‘hesitation’:

Causa praecipua ex formidine ne Germanicus, in cuius manu tot legiones immensa sociorum auxilia, mirus apud populum favor, habere imperium quam exspectare mallet.

The chief cause of fear was that Germanicus, in whose hands were so many legions, such large auxiliaries of the allies and such wonderful popular goodwill, might prefer to have the Empire, rather than wait for it.³

Connecting the mutinies—particularly mutiny in Lower Germany—with Tiberius’ behaviour in the senate is an ancient interpretation rejected by modern scholars.⁴ There are two reasons for this: one is chronological; the other is psychological. Wellesley and Levick posit that news of the mutiny, especially mutiny in Lower Germany, cannot have reached Rome before the first senatorial meeting, which must have occurred between 30 August and 4 September.⁵ But Wellesley’s placing of Tiberius’ acceptance of supreme power in early September is not supported by evidence, while Levick’s belief that Tiberius’ decision cannot have been affected by the mutinies, since his ‘hesitation’ ceased before they had settled down, ignores the possibility that unforeseen issues emerged hastening a final solution, despite the ongoing nature of the mutiny.⁶ In terms of psychology, it has been suggested that had Tiberius feared mutiny he would not have hesitated at all, but would have wrapped himself in power immediately.⁷ But this, too, is weak. Debate in the senate centred on Tiberius recognizing powers that already belonged to him, not his accepting them. Tiberius had, moreover, shown a propensity to retreat when threatened: to Rhodes when threatened with political irrelevance; and from Rhodes when threatened with his life. Equivocation was central to the exercise. Chronological and psychological objections can, therefore, be put aside. It can be shown instead that the mutinies did affect the political situation in Rome, and thus Tiberius’ performance in the senate on 17 September ad 14.

A belief that the situation in Lower Germany was reported in Rome only after 17 September is central to Levick’s argument that it had no effect on the succession debate.⁸ She cites Tacitus as evidence, but he implies the opposite:

At Romae nondum cognito qui fuisset exitus in Illyrico, et legionum Germanicarum motu audito, trepida civitas incusare Tiberium quod, dum patres et plebem, invalida et inermia, cunctatione ficta ludificetur, dissideat interim miles neque duorum adulescentium nondum adulta auctoritate comprimi queat. Ire ipsum et opponere maiestatem imperatoriam debuisse cessuris ubi principem longa experientia eundemque severitatis et munificentiae summum vidissent.

At Rome meanwhile, while the outcome in Illyricum was not yet known, and having heard about the mutiny of the German legions, the fearful citizen-body reproached Tiberius that while he was mocking the senate and people, elements lacking strength and arms, with assumed hesitation, in the meantime the troops were in mutiny and could not be put down by the immature auctoritas of two young men. He should have gone himself and confronted with the imperial majesty those who would have submitted once they saw a princeps with long experience and supreme in his ability to dispense severity and reward.⁹

Having left Rome on 17 or 18 September, Drusus reached the Pannonian legions, stationed at Emona, on 26 September, and the situation was already settled by the 27th.¹⁰ On the morning of the 27th Drusus promised to send a letter to Tiberius concerning the legions’ requests. It probably informed Tiberius and the senate that the situation was, for now, under control.¹¹ If dispatched on 28 September, Drusus’ letter, revealing the upshot of events in Illyricum, should have reached Rome no later than 3 or 4 October. The above attack on Tiberius therefore occurred between 17 September and 4 October. Tacitus places the episode after the delegation to Germanicus, which had left for Cologne on the 18th, had reached their destination and inspired further violence.¹² But the phrase et legionum Germanicarum motu audito cannot refer to the nature of their arrival. Fifteen days is insufficient for the delegation to reach Cologne and for news of their arrival to reach Rome.¹³ The phrase must instead mean something like: ‘and having heard (already) about the mutiny of the German legions…’. A clue is provided by the tense of the final sentence: ‘He should have gone…’. The clause ‘while the outcome in Illyricum was not yet known’ implies moreover that something was known about the outcome in Lower Germany, or at least the direction in which events were expected to run. Tacitus’ notice thus suggests the existence of an initial report by Germanicus on the situation in Germany, which probably arrived in Rome before 17 September; political manœuvring on 17September was the result.¹⁴

Approximately 22,000 Roman soldiers were stationed in Lower Germany when mutiny broke out; that represents a formidable threat.¹⁵ Germanicus was somewhere in Gaul when informed.¹⁶ On arrival at the camp, Germanicus was apparently confronted by many soldiers, who persisted, in spite of Germanicus’ imperium, in their insubordination.¹⁷ Germanicus spoke immediately but his rhetoric failed to placate. Indeed, it incited further indignation:

Ut seditionem attigit, ubi modestia militaris, ubi veteris disciplinae decus…rogitans, nudant universi corpora, cicatrices ex vulneribus, verberum notas exprobrant.

But when he touched on the sedition and asked: where was the military composure? Where the discipline of ancient renown?…They all tore off their clothes and reproachfully exhibited the scars of battle and the imprints of the lash.¹⁸

By questioning the soldiers’ virtue he underestimated the prevailing psychology; these soldiers were not concerned with duty or loyalty, but justice. Nevertheless, during this exchange some proclaimed Germanicus ‘emperor’ and offered to support him against Tiberius.¹⁹ Wiedemann states: ‘we may be sceptical about how serious this offer was’, while Levick has: ‘the attempt to proclaim Germanicus was not seriously meant…’.²⁰ But it cannot have been a joke, or a half-hearted/lukewarm proposal. The men who shouted imperator and offered Germanicus supreme power were gambling with their lives; intended sedition and willingness for civil war is always serious business. Germanicus’ response, a threat to commit suicide to evidence loyalty, shows that he took the offer very seriously.²¹ Having retreated to his tent for consultation with advisers, Germanicus decided on a settlement:

Igitur…placitum ut epistulae nomine principis scriberentur: missionem dari vicena stipendia meritis, exauctorari qui sena dena fecissent ac retineri sub vexillo ceterorum inmunes nisi propulsandi hostis, legata quae petiverant exsolvi duplicarique.

Therefore…it was agreed that a letter should be written in the name of the princeps: those who had served 20 years were to be given discharge; those who had completed 16 years were to be released from duty and retained under the standard with immunity from everything else except holding off an enemy; the legacies which they had asked for were to be paid and doubled.²²

The letter was probably read out between 2 and 4 September. Germanicus cannot have wanted the legions to believe that Tiberius was responding to their demands; that possibility was beyond their technology. The letter must instead have been presented as arriving with those Tiberius had sent from Nola. Tiberius had meant to improve the conditions of employment even before the mutinies!²³ This evidences naivety and desperation; the soldiers, not surprisingly, were unimpressed.²⁴ If Tiberius had written the letter, why did Germanicus not refer to it immediately on arrival? The terms were nevertheless accepted and the legions were ordered to depart for their respective winter camps, but Legions V and XXI refused until Augustus’ legacy was paid to them: ex viatico amicorum ipsiusque Caesaris pecunia.²⁵ Germanicus then left for Upper Germany, where, perhaps for the second time in a matter of weeks, the oath of allegiance was administered to Legions II, XIII, XIV, and XVI.²⁶ The report from Germany, alluded to by Tacitus, was probably sent by Germanicus shortly after the troops in Lower Germany had left for their winter camp, i.e. once the situation was considered settled. If sent between 4 and 6 September, it would have reached Rome before the 17th. Hence, prior to 17 September, Tiberius and the senate were probably aware of the fact of mutiny, the legions’ demands, and Germanicus’ response. They were also aware that four legions had offered to support Germanicus against Tiberius.²⁷ Some in the crowd were reportedly hostile to Germanicus, but the image which formed in the minds of those in Rome lacked nuance.²⁸ Velleius, in Rome when Germanicus’ report arrived, understood that the soldiers: novum ducem, novum statum, novam quaerebant rem publicam, ‘wanted a new leader, a new order of things, and a new res publica’.²⁹ The situation was analysed in Rome to a high degree of sophistication.³⁰ The belief that legionaries wanted a dux, rather than a princeps, is telling. It implies a militarization of power. But the idea of ‘constitutional’ reform is best evidenced by the distinction made between status and res publica: a ‘state of things’ and the ‘State’. This is not Republican language. Dux signals instead the presence of a military dictator, in opposition to the civilian Principate then being enacted in Italy. Velleius, with his contemporaries, believed that the legions were aiming to dismantle the balanced structure built by Augustus—the optimus status in Augustus’ own words—and replace it with militant demagogy: a novus status and hence nova res publica.³¹ For Velleius, this was best evidenced by their approach to the legitimate organs of power: quin etiam ausi sunt minari daturos se senatui daturos principi leges, ‘they even dared to threaten to give laws to the senate and princeps.’³² Most senators and equestrians would share Velleius’ opinion, whether they supported Tiberius or not.

It must be accepted that Tiberius cannot have known how many supported Germanicus before 17 September. As with modern parliamentary leaders, the true extent of support is often unknown until the day of a leadership ballot. Tiberius, of course, was not facing a leadership ballot, but the situation in Cologne, known to the public, made Germanicus’ situation topical.³³ As Tacitus notes, Germanicus’ performance in Lower Germany was attacked.³⁴ It was argued that Tiberius should have dealt with the matter instead. Despite the critical language, the theme is pro-Tiberian. Its essence no doubt appeared soon after Germanicus’ report reached Rome; Tiberius benefited the most whether the scene was orchestrated or not. Tiberius, of course, had nothing to fear from Germanicus. The latter needed only to wait. But attempts had been made as recently as ad 12 to destabilize Tiberius’ position by advertising Germanicus as a viable alternative. The troublemakers were not necessarily Germanicus’ friends.³⁵ From ad 4 to ad 14 Tiberius’ enemies consistently attempted to drive a wedge between Tiberius and Augustus: from ad 4 to ad 7 Tiberius was accused of fostering the northern legions in order to seize power; after ad 6 it was said that Augustus preferred Germanicus.³⁶ Tiberius’ awkwardness in ad 14 shows that persistent insinuation was effective. The moment lent itself to the Augustan discourse of shared responsibility. Suetonius’ decision to link the question of Germanicus’ position within the res publica with Tiberius’ ‘reluctance’ is telling:

Quem maxime casum timens, partes sibi quas senatui liberet, tuendas in re. p. depoposcit, quando universae sufficere solus nemo posset nisi cum altero vel etiam cum pluribus.

This, his greatest fear, caused Tiberius to require the senate to assign him a part in the res publica, to be looked after by him, since no one could bear everything unless with [the help of] another or even more.³⁷

Suetonius takes alter to be a veiled reference to Germanicus; I believe he is right. The senate might register under pluribus, but if the task were to be limited to one other, then Germanicus was the only plausible candidate.³⁸ In response, Tiberius’ supporters stacked the debate, praising Tiberius as the most fit to govern while insinuating that others were not qualified. Our sources record very little dissent. The most vehement comment attested is ‘Let him take it or leave it’, and it is inconceivable that anyone would have said: ‘Perhaps you should share power with Germanicus’, or ‘Germanicus could lead us, if you would prefer to retire from politics’.³⁹ The pro-Tiberian message swept away all before it, silencing critics while leaving heavyweights like Asinius Gallus floundering. Tiberius had thrown down a challenge, aware that no one would dare accept.

Once the possibility of having to share supreme power was eliminated, Tiberius was able to stop refusing it. Secure, Tiberius put the motion that imperium proconsulare should be conferred on Germanicus, advertising his trust and support but stopping short of granting tribunicia potestas.⁴⁰ Anyone hoping to use Germanicus to trip up Tiberius was thus confronted, wedged, and overcome. This marked the point at which Tiberius ceased actively to refuse supreme power. He felt, however, that he could not yet explicitly recognize his position and positively accept its moral consequences. With the ‘Germanicus question’ settled on the 17th, we need another factor to explain Tiberius’ ongoing behaviour in the senate. ‘Decent Papal reluctance’ is weak. It does not account for the subtle change in message on the 17th, nor adequately explain the long delay. Levick’s belief that Tiberius never formally accepted the Principate is contradicted by actual evidence; while Woodman’s position, that Tiberius did not in fact want supreme power, fails to account for the fact that Tiberius had immediately possessed and utilized the instruments of violent coercion, i.e. the praetorians and the armies.⁴¹ I propose that M. Scribonius Drusus Libo provides the solution.