8 Novus Principatus: An Imperial Co-operative

The setbacks that began to pile up in ad 5 wore away at the government’s confidence, since only lack of confidence explains treating Cassius Severus’ public outbursts as maistas in ad 8. But Augustus’ frailty cannot have helped. He had withdrawn from attendance at the assemblies and senatorial investigations, and entrusted foreign embassies to a board of three ex-consuls.¹ Three years later, in ad 11, his already poor health deteriorated; a boon for those who claimed special knowledge of the future. In addition to cracking down on the activities of seers, Augustus also published his personal horoscope.² Publication of an official horoscope is evidence that ‘false’ copies were in circulation. People were obviously excited by the prospect of Augustus’ death and what it would bring. A passage from Dio concerning events concurrent with Augustus’ edict may be important. At the praetorian elections of ad 11, all 16 candidates were elected, though there were not 16 spaces to fill:

…Καὶ στρατηγοὶ ἑκκαίδϵκα ἠ̑ρξαν, ἐπϵιδὴ τοσου̑τοί τϵ τη̑ς ἀρχη̑ς ἀντϵποιήσαντο καὶ οὐδένα αὐτω̑ν λυπη̑σαι ὁ Aὔγουστος, οἱ̑α ἐν τοιούτοις ὢν, ἠθέλησϵν· οὐ μὴν καὶ τοι̑ς ἄλλοις τοι̑ς ἐφϵξη̑ς ἔτϵσι ταὐτὸν ἐγένϵτο, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ δώδϵκα ἐπὶ πολὺ κατέστησαν.

Sixteen praetors held office since that number had competed for the positions and Augustus, being in such difficult circumstances, was not willing to offend any of them. The same was not the case however for the years immediately following, but twelve [praetors] were appointed for a long time.³

How was this achieved? Augustus could not tell the centuries how to vote, nor were they compelled to follow his suffragia or commendationes.⁴ He must, therefore, have increased the number of vacancies for that year to 16, thereby allowing the election to continue without interference while ensuring that all were successful.⁵ The election was thus perfunctory. Striking is Dio’s belief that Augustus had no other option. What was so difficult about Augustus’ situation? The praetorian elections might usefully be linked to the decree on horoscopes. A widely held belief, or simply chatter, that Augustus would soon die would explain the pressure being exerted by candidates - they were unsure of support in the post-Augustan era. Beneath Dio’s account lies an implicit logic: Augustus was threatened by men who would only take yes for an answer, i.e. Augustus’ auctoritas was made to serve their selfish ends and not his own.⁶ The nature of the threat is not known, but it is surely not a coincidence that both Tiberius and Germanicus were away from Rome; they had missed the violent elections of ad 7 as well.⁷ Augustus’ solution was meant to arrest anxiety, made acute by the widely held belief that a succession was imminent. He was probably too weak to fight and felt that violence must be avoided at any cost. Still, it was made known that he was not ready to give up the ghost. A modern scientific mind has freed many from the bondage-like determinism of astrological charts, but in ad 11 a great part of the population believed in their predictions. The ‘official’ horoscope was no doubt unspecific about the time of death, highlighting instead his extraordinary destiny.⁸

The belief that Augustus was near death can also be linked to legislation passed in ad 12 concerning the regulation of exiles. Dio provides some details. Those who had suffered aqua et igni interdictio could no longer live on the mainland or any island within 50 miles; they could not cross the sea, possess more than one transport and two oared boats, employ more than 20 slaves or freedmen, and own more than HS 500,000.⁹ The decree provided for the punishment of exiles who infringed the new rules and, more interestingly, non-exiles who aided infringements. Some exiles, Dio says many, were evidently living outside their allotted districts in a manner that irked the government.¹⁰ A limit of HS 500,000 signals the social standing of those in question; the life of an exul seemed more like an extended vacation than a punishment, and by ad 12 was too paradoxical to ignore.¹¹ The development of these rules may have been in response to the discovery of plans to rescue a few high-profile exiles.

It must be significant that Augustus’ death triggered an attempt to rescue Agrippa Postumus from Planasia; it was probably always the plan. In ad 11 the declining health of Augustus provided individuals opposed to Tiberius with cause for concern. While Augustus lived, the supreme power of Tiberius was a potentiality only - albeit the likely one. The plan to rescue Agrippa in ad 14 is evidence that some were desperate enough to bet against the odds. I propose that a similar attempt was made in late ad 11 or early ad 12. Stress should be laid on the clause:

τιμωρηθήσϵσθαι καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐκϵίνους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τούς τι παρὰ ταυ̑τα συμπράξαντάς σφισιν ἐπαπϵιλήσας.

Having threatened to punish both these [exiles] themselves and others who had in any way assisted them in contravention of these [rules].¹²

It is possible that in response to a single catalytic episode, the government formed a broad sweeping policy to resolve a systemic problem in the treatment of exiles. I believe that this episode was the attempted rescue of Agrippa Postumus and his mother, Julia, by L. Audasius and Asinius Epicadus, irrespective of the fact that their places of exile had not been breached.¹³ Suetonius lists the men among those who had conspired against Augustus:

L. Audasi falsarum tabularum rei ac neque aetate neque corpore integri, item Asini Epicadi ex gente Parthina ibridae…Audasius atque Epicadus Iuliam filiam et Agrippam nepotem ex insulis, quibus continebantur, rapere ad exercitus…

L. Audasius, who had been accused of falsifying documents and was old and feeble, and Asinius Epicadus, a half-breed from the Parthini…Audasius and Epicadus [planned] to seize Julia, daughter [of Augustus], and Agrippa, grandson [of Augustus], from their islands, where they were being held, and rush them off to the armies…¹⁴

Levick dates the episode to ad 8, arguing that the younger Julia was instrumental in its planning and attempted execution.¹⁵ This is in part because Levick requires a political dimension to explain the exile of the younger Julia, and also because the younger Julia is not named by Suetonius as a target for the conspirators. Conspiracy, however, was not part of the younger Julia’s disgrace, nor is it necessary to believe that Suetonius has supplied, or even knew, every fact. The two men may have been arrested before they were able to leave Italy or Rome even. Nor would a subsequent investigation bring to light every detail. Much would have relied on the information of slaves and informants, and by the time the two were sentenced, all that could be said was that it was believed they were attempting to free Agrippa and his mother.¹⁶ There were others who might have been considered; L. Aemilius Paullus and the elder Julia’s lover, Sempronius Gracchus, being the most obvious candidates. Indeed, both - with Agrippa - died during the succession of Tiberius. Sempronius died perhaps towards the end of ad 14. He was put to death by milites on the island of Cercina, off the coast of Africa. Tacitus does not provide a date, supplying only the general eodem anno.¹⁷ Tiberius shifted blame for the execution onto L. Asprenas, proconsul of Africa. The execution was probably performed on hearing that Augustus was dead; as was the case with Agrippa Postumus. The demise of L. Aemilius Paullus is even more suggestive. Syme has shown that L. Aemilius Paullus is the same man who was replaced by Drusus Caesar as an Arval Brother on 12 May ad 14—three months before Augustus finally died.¹⁸ It reads: in locum L. […] Paulli.¹⁹ As Syme points out, membership was not extinguished by exile but by death alone.²⁰ Though L. Aemilius Paullus possibly died from complications arising from the nature of his exile, the timing is suspicious.

Asinius Epicadus had Illyrian heritage. Some connection to the Asinii is evident and Levick may be right when she suggests that Asinius Pollio took him in war.²¹ Of all the attested Audasii, the overwhelming majority come from the same 130 km stretch of highway in Cisalpine Gaul, including Mediolanum, Bergomum, Brixia, and Verona.²² Though excavations indicate the existence of Augustan veteran colonies in the area, there is also evidence for disaffection.²³ But Audasius’ criminal record is the most revealing: he was a forger. The conspirators were not planning to attack the prison on Planasia but to use falsified release documents instead. A parchment, with what appeared to be Augustus’ seal, containing instruction for Agrippa’s release, written in the princeps’ style and type and presented by an appropriate looking individual, is a necessary postulation. Rhegium, moreover, might have been a naval base, which would explain Augustus’ decision to send his daughter Julia there when attempting to appease angry crowds in ad 4.²⁴ It would also explain why the conspirators were not interested in causing a stir. It was believed, or argued in court, that the escapees were to be taken to the armies; no legions are specified. A clue is furnished if we take this conspiracy to have been the prototype for Clemens. In that case they were to be taken to the German legions; either way civil war was to be the result.²⁵

In ad 11 Tiberius and Germanicus campaigned in Germany, dispatched for the purpose of re-establishing a northern defence weakened by the Varian disaster.²⁶ Both men celebrated Augustus’ birthday on 23 September while north of the Rhine, and Velleius adds that Tiberius later made winter camp.²⁷ Dio has both in Rome by January.²⁸ The conspirators would not have approached the legions while both Tiberius and Germanicus were present - they would have waited until the onset of winter, making their expedition to Planasia and Rhegium even more dangerous. A late date would explain why legislation was not passed until ad 12; the plan was discovered during the early stages of its operation, or was exposed before the conspirators had even left Rome. An inquiry was held, the names of Audasius and Epicadus were brought to light and both were sentenced at subsequent trials, though precise details never surfaced. As with the Clemens affair, the government was left with small-fry con–artists, rumour, and suggestive testimony.²⁹ Still it was supposed, or established in court, that at least Agrippa and his mother, Julia, were the targets of an attempted rescue. The government was left to wonder about other exiles. A sweeping review was held, exposing fundamental problems within the system. Those opposed to the coming succession kept up their attack regardless.

Dio records under ad 12 the distribution of vituperative pamphlets aimed at prominent members of the government:

καὶ μαθὼν ὅτι βιβλία ἄττα ἐφ’ ὕβρϵι τινῶν συγγράφοιτο, ζήτησιν αὐτῶν ἐποιήσατο, καὶ ἐκϵῖνά τϵ, τὰ μὲν ἐν τῃ̑ πόλϵι ϵὑρϵθέντα πρὸς τῶν ἀγορανόμων τὰ δὲ ἔξω πρὸς τῶν ἑκασταχόθι ἀρχόντων, κατέφλϵξϵ, καὶ τῶν συνθέντων αὐτὰ ἐκόλασέ τινας.

And learning that some pamphlets of an insulting nature were being written concerning certain people, he ordered a search be made for them; and those that were found in the city he ordered to be burned by the aediles, and those outside by the chief magistrates in each place, and he punished some of the writers.³⁰

The nature of the authorship and the extent of publication are unknown. The arrest of authors indicates overt authorship, but may also follow an extensive investigation condensed into a single paragraph by Dio.³¹ ‘Those outside’ is similarly ambiguous. The range of publication may have been a region of Italy, the whole of Italy, or perhaps even empire-wide. Obscurity, however, does not preclude contextualization. The reaction implies anger (searching for pamphlets, perhaps door-to-door, burning them, punishing authors) and anxiety. Anger presumably because the victims were important people; anxiety because the criticisms were widely held and/or believable. A combination of Augustus’ ill health with the prospect of succession is a plausible context. It was certainly the most pressing concern for Tiberius’ bitterest enemies. A relatio read on the first sitting day of the senate is evidence for such a connection:

ὁ δὲ δὴ Aὔγουστος ἐκϵι̑νόν τϵ ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ γήρως ὢν τῃ̑ βουλῃ̑ καὶ ταύτην τῳ̑ Τιβϵρίῳ παρακατέθϵτο. ἀνέγνω δὲ τὸ βιβλίον οὐκ αὐτός (οὐ γὰρ οἱ̑ός τϵ ἠ̑ν γϵγωνίσκϵιν) ἀλλ̓ ὁ Γϵρμανικός, ὥσπϵρ ϵἰώθϵι.

But Augustus, giving his old age as the reason, entrusted Germanicus to the senate and the senate itself to Tiberius. Augustus himself did not read the letter (since he could not make himself heard) but Germanicus did, as was usual.³²

Scholars have not considered associating the defamatory pamphlets with Augustus’ letter. The timeframe is, however, acceptable. In Dio’s treatment of ad 12, the pamphlets are placed after the letter of Augustus to the senate but before the Ludi Martiales, which occurred on 10 May. If Dio simply recounts events as they appeared in the senatorial acta, or a senatorial historian, the pamphlets were published sometime between January and May. The time between publication and senatorial inquiry may only have been a week; at most it was a month. The pamphlets could certainly have been written as early as January. Augustus’ central message would have certainly aroused protest and indignation from those already dissatisfied.

Entrusting Germanicus to the care of the senate is fair enough, but entrusting the senate to Tiberius is outrageous. Hammond translates παρακατατίθϵμαι as ‘to commend’, but he is mistaken.³³ Its literal meaning is ‘to place alongside’; its usual sense is to ‘entrust’, as when a father entrusts his son to the care of a guardian in a will. When Dio means ‘commend’, he uses συνιστάναι.³⁴ The treatment of Germanicus’ children Nero and Drusus in ad 23 is here instructive. In ad 20 Nero was commended (commendare) to the senate on taking the toga virilis; his brother Drusus followed suit at the beginning of ad 23.³⁵ After the death of Germanicus, the boys were placed in the care of their uncle, the younger Drusus. When Drusus died on 14 September ad 23, Tiberius approached the senate thus:

 Erepto Druso preces ad vos converto disque et patria coram obtestor: Augusti pronepotes, clarissimis maioribus genitos, suscipite regite, vestram meamque vicem explete. Hi vobis, Nero et Druse, parentum loco.

Drusus has been taken away and so I direct my prayers towards you and I implore you before the gods and the fatherland: take up and direct the grandchildren of Augustus, scions of most illustrious ancestors, and fulfil your duty and mine. Nero and Drusus, these men will take the place of your parents.³⁶

Since both Nero and Drusus had already been ‘commended’ to the senate, this occasion supplied an entirely different theme.³⁷ The senate, in a moral sense, adopted the boys. The terms suscipio, rego, and expleo are important.³⁸ They imply the moral authority of a father, and thus the immature and incomplete nature of a child. Treating the same episode Dio uses παρακατατίθϵμαι:

Ὁ μὲν οὐ̑ν οὕτως διώλϵτο, ὁ δέ γϵ Τιβέριος ϵἰς τὸ συνέδριον ἀφικόμϵνος ἐκϵι̑νόν τϵ ἀπωδύρατο καὶ τὸν Νέρωνα τόν τϵ Δρου̑σον τοὺς του̑ Γϵρμανικου̑ παι̑δας τῃ̑ γϵρουσίᾳ παρακατέθϵτο.

Thus he [Drusus] perished; but Tiberius, having arrived at the senate house, both lamented him publicly and entrusted Nero and Drusus, the sons of Germanicus, to the senate.³⁹

Treating Augustus’ letter of ad 12, Dio must mean that Tiberius was ‘entrusted’ with the senate as if he were a guardian exercising moral authority over an orphan.⁴⁰ This is a surprising approach by Augustus.⁴¹ The letter presented Augustus’ res publica as nothing less than monarchic, bringing into question his long-standing claim that the senate was supreme. Since Augustus remained princeps senatus until death, he evidently wanted the senators to extend to Tiberius the same level of respect he had himself received. Tiberius was to be treated as a pater! Curiously, this piece of evidence is absent from notable biographies of Tiberius and, more surprisingly, from the most important modern works on the ‘constitution’ of the early Principate.⁴²

Scholars look to senatus consulta in ad 12 and 13 that provided Tiberius with imperium equal to that of Augustus and reinstated his tribunicia potestas for another term.⁴³ But the emphasis is superficial. Augustus was, in fact, organizing his powers over time into a defined totality; on each occasion that Tiberius received a form of power a new aspect of the Principate was established: statio imperii.⁴⁴ Aside from Augustus’ personal charisma, which afforded the princeps a certain type of power, by ad 13 Augustus and Tiberius were equal; the position of pontifex maximus alone separated them. Augustus was manufacturing a structure with which to guide succession.⁴⁵ What, then, was he hoping to achieve in his address to the senate in ad 12? Keeping in mind the prospect of succession, the answer must lie in the distinction made between Tiberius and Germanicus.

At 26, Germanicus represented the long-term future. Tiberius was in his fifties and might be expected to last another decade or so, but Germanicus would potentially enjoy dominance for thirty to forty years, perhaps more. That Drusus was not named shows only that his position did not require definition.⁴⁶ The letter of ad 12 shows that interest in Germanicus caught Augustus’ and Tiberius’ attention; it was made clear who was to succeed. That people might have held positive expectations about Germanicus’ consulship is not surprising. A self-imposed exile on Rhodes from 6 bc to ad 2, interdiction from public activities from ad 2 to ad 4, and continual campaigning from ad 4 to ad 12 must have affected Tiberius’ relationship with the senate. Between ad 4 and ad 12 Tiberius could only have attended the senate from January to perhaps April. He would then leave Rome for the northern provinces, and would not return again until winter (sometimes late October, generally early December), by which time the senate was already in recess until January. If Tiberius attended the senate from January to April, and the senate met twice a month, then Tiberius attended approximately 64 out of a possible 216 senate meetings. If we take into account his Rhodian exile, then from 6 bc to ad 12 Tiberius attended 64 of a minimum 432 senate meetings (15 per cent); he probably attended even fewer. In Tiberius’ absence, senators would have formed alliances, friendships, cliques that did not include Augustus’ heir. Indeed, methods for transactiong senatorial business would have been developed that required very little imput from Tiberius, or none at all. Only his closest allies would have kept his interests alive. It is, therefore, very possible that senators became more comfortable around the young consul Germanicus than Augustus’ intended successor: this would have been a problem for Augustus, as well as Tiberius. Augustus’ letter prevented Germanicus from unintentionally fostering a relationship with the senate which could prove awkward for Tiberius, and parts of the senate from intentionally fostering such a relationship with Germanicus. Indeed, though we have highlighted a division between those who supported Agrippa and those who supported Augustus’ succession plan, political divisions are rarely symmetrical. We should not assume that men loyal to Augustus were happy to transfer support to Tiberius; some would have looked to Germanicus instead, while still others would have hoped for Drusus to succeed Tiberius at the expense of Germanicus. For those opposed to Tiberius, Germanicus and Drusus, the image of the domus Caesaris divided would be used to satisfy their own political agenda. Augustus’ letter was meant to right a faltering ship, but as the evidence is assembled here, the immediate result was the publishing of dissent.

The government’s theatrical reaction evidences the seriousness of the criticism. Something like calling Tiberius a new dominus, or a rex even, would have been both defamatory and seditious.⁴⁷ The senate, along with the comitia and quaestiones, provided the appearance of continuity with the free past: as symbols they were central to Augustus’ new res publica. As with Labienus’ histories, the regime reacted because the pamphlets threatened to destabilize support for an insecure government sensitive to accusations of tyranny. Concerning senatorial freedom under Augustus, Suetonius writes:

Sententias de maiore negotio non more atque ordine sed prout libuisset perrogabat, ut perinde quisque animum intenderet ac si censendum magis quam adsentiendum esset.

Concerning more important business he asked senators to give their opinions not in the customary order but pretty well as he fancied, so that each man might direct his thoughts towards the business, as if he was using judgement more than acquiescing.⁴⁸

Dio provides an appropriate example when treating a debate that emerged in ad 13 concerning the vicesima hereditatium. Augustus sent a βιβλίον to the senate on the issue when an uprising seemed imminent (καὶ ἐδόκϵι τι νϵώτϵρον ἔσϵσθαι); he was evidently too weak to attend in person. Dio continues:

καὶ ὅπως γϵ μὴ του̑ Γϵρμανικου̑ του̑ τϵ Δρούσου γνώμην τινὰ ϵἰπόντων ὑποτοπήσωσί τϵ ἐκ τη̑ς αὐτου̑ ἐντολη̑ς του̑το γϵγονέναι καὶ ἀνϵξέταστον αὐτὴν ἕλωνται, προσέταξϵ μηδέτϵρον αὐτω̑ν μηδὲν ϵἰπϵι̑ν.

Also to keep the senators from suspecting that some view of Germanicus or Drusus was said on his instructions and from preferring it uncritically, Augustus instructed them both to say nothing.⁴⁹

Direct taxation was contentious, and for that reason alone Augustus was keen to include senators in discussions and make them share responsibility. Thus, as Suetonius points out, senators were given a say on the big issues. Concerning ordinary business, however, Augustus was happy to affect debate.⁵⁰ But Suetonius supplies evidence that his approach had critics:

In senatu verba facienti dictum est: ‘Non intellexi’, et ab alio: ‘Contra dicerem tibi, si locum haberem.’ Interdum ob immodicas disceptantium altercationes e curia per iram se proripienti quidam ingesserunt licere oportere senatoribus de re p. loqui.

Speaking in the senate, it was said to him: ‘I do not understand’ and by another: ‘I would speak against you, if I had the opportunity.’ Sometimes, while he was rushing out of the House in anger because of the excessive wrangling of the disputants, some shouted at him that senators ought to be allowed to speak on public affairs.⁵¹

De re publica does not refer to maius negotium, but all matters brought before senators. Offering a summation of Augustus’ Principate, in order to advertise an ideal mixed constitution, Dio has Tiberius say:

…οὔτϵ ἐν ται̑ς διαγνώμαις τὴν ἐξουσίαν τη̑ς διαψηφίσϵως κατέλυσϵν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἀσφάλϵιαν τη̑ς παρρησίας προσέθηκϵν.

Nor did he abolish their [senators’] power of deciding matters by vote in their deliberations but in addition he gave them the security to speak frankly.⁵²

That senators were allowed to vote on issues is hardly worthy of praise. Dio would have us believe that senators voted by the grace of Augustus, who could have abolished the right altogether. Ἀϱσφάλϵια, moreover, does not mean that senators were merely allowed to give their opinion, but that they were allowed to speak frankly without worrying about recriminations, i.e. their careers and lives were safe from harm. As with the right to vote on issues de re publica, the implicit suggestion that this was a privilege offered by Augustus shows just how superficial the façade had become. Παρακατατίθϵμαι momentarily made visible the true autocratic nature of Augustus’ res publica, leaving some, perhaps many, shocked and disapproving. Such disapproval, or anger even, may have informed Tiberius’ future relationship with the senate. Tiberius’ performance in the senate between ad 14 and ad 20 is a topic of dispute precisely because his approach was ambiguous. It has been described in both ancient Rome and modern scholarship as hypocritical, naïve, sinister, or Republican. It was certainly awkward; awkwardness caused by, or perhaps made worse by, his infrequent attendance.⁵³ A brief examination of Tiberius’ relationship with the senate is here instructive.

We are told that as princeps Tiberius brought most matters, no matter how insignificant, to the senate, and that when a matter was being discussed he generally remained silent or gave his opinion out of turn.⁵⁴ Both Suetonius and Dio state that Tiberius lost debates, and Dio cites an instance in ad 16 when a tribune vetoed a motion that had been passed against Tiberius’ advice.⁵⁵ Tiberius’ style was distinctive, and perhaps disturbing.⁵⁶ He was not, however, ‘Republican’. He was inclined simply to let debate run its course by suppressing his opinion or else speaking out of turn. A senatorial inquiry into an allegation of treason against Granius Marcellus in ad 15 is a good example:

Ad quod exarsit adeo, ut rupta taciturnitate proclamaret se quoque in ea causa laturum sententiam palam et iuratum, ‘quo’ ceteris eadem necessitas fieret. Manebant etiam tum vestigia morientis libertatis. Igitur Cn. Piso ‘quo’ inquit ‘loco censebis, Caesar? Si primus, habebo quod sequar: si post omnis, vereor ne inprudens dissentiam.’

At this his fury blazed forth so that it ruptured his taciturnity and he proclaimed that in this case he would himself also give his opinion, openly and under oath, that the others might be under the same obligation. There lingered even then remnants of expiring freedom. And so C. Piso said: ‘In which place will you vote Caesar? If first, I shall have something to follow, if last, I fear differing from you unawares.’⁵⁷

Se quoque implies that his general policy was silence, but Piso’s interjection, itself telling, shows the inherent power of Tiberius’ opinion; senatorial freedom of expression relied almost solely on Tiberius remaining silent.⁵⁸ The strength of a Piso or an Asinius Gallus alone could defy the unwritten law. Though the policy seems to have been borrowed from Augustus, there was, in fact, a significant difference. Where Tiberius’ general policy was to be silent or speak out of turn, Augustus limited such behaviour to important business of the house only.⁵⁹ Tiberius’ approach was probably a reaction both to criticism of Augustus and to his own infrequent exposure to the senate from 6 bc to ad 12.⁶⁰ But for many, Tiberius’ policy was a façade, albeit with a milder complexion. Suetonius was not fooled:

Quin etiam speciem libertatis quandam induxit conservatis senatui ac magistratibus et maiestate pristina et potestate.

And he even introduced the appearance of liberty by maintaining the ancient majesty and power of the senate and magistrates.⁶¹

Species is loaded with cynicism, and may reflect contemporary opinion; the res publica was a contradiction, no matter how libertas was explained. Tiberius’ awkwardness, or guile, made the growing magnetism of Germanicus an issue. At the beginning of ad 13, a decision to reconfigure and strengthen one of the primary advisory councils, the semenstre consilium, should be interpreted, along with the letter of ad 12, as Augustus’ and Tiberius’ response to lingering doubt. Dio writes under ad 13:

Καὶ συμβούλους ὑπὸ του̑ γήρως, ὑφ̓ οὑ̑πϵρ οὐδ’ ἐς τὸ βουλϵυτήριον ἔτι πλὴν σπανιώτατα συνϵφοίτα, ϵἴκοσιν ἐτησίους ᾐτήσατο· πρότϵρον γὰρ καθ᾽ ἓκμηνον πϵντϵκαίδϵκα προσϵτίθϵτο. Καὶ προσϵψηφίσθη, πάνθ̓ ὅσα ἂν αὐτῳ̑ μϵτά τϵ του̑ Τιβϵρίου καὶ μϵτ’ ἐκϵίνων τω̑ν τϵ ἀϵὶ ὑπατϵυόντων καὶ τω̑ν ἐς του̑το ἀποδϵδϵιγμένων, τω̑ν τϵ ἐγγόνων αὐτου̑ τω̑ν ποιητω̑ν δη̑λον ὅτι, τω̑ν τϵ ἄλλων ὅσους ἂν ἑκάστοτϵ προσπαραλάβῃ, βουλϵυομένῳ δόξῃ, κύρια ὡς καὶ πάσῃ τῃ̑ γϵρουσίᾳ ἀρέσαντα ϵἶναι.

Because of his age, on account of which he was no longer attending the senate except very rarely, he asked for twenty annual counsellors. For previously he would take fifteen every six months. It was also voted that all those measures—which were deemed right by him, in his consultation with Tiberius, and with those counsellors, and with the current consuls, and with the consuls designate, and with his own offspring (obviously the adopted ones), and with however many others he might include on each occasion—that these measures be valid, as if having been ratified by the whole senate.⁶²

The council was provisional. It is not attested after ad 14.⁶³ Where the original groups, both the consilium principis and the semenstre consilium, had been probouleutic, the new committee was invested with the authority to pass decrees. Evidently Augustus wished to remain intimately involved with the empire’s administration, not happy on the sidelines. But why make the change now? During the period ad 8–12 the two councils (which Tiberius must have participated in whenever in Rome) no doubt ensured that Augustus was kept informed, despite his absence from the senate, and indeed, was able to shape policy.⁶⁴ Dio’s belief that by early ad 12 Augustus was too weak to be heard, and seemed close to death, should be taken as evidence that his contribution was diminished, though certainly not abandoned. As was stated above, Tiberius spent the years ad 4–12 on campaign - his first full year in Rome was to be ad 13; the new consilium allowed a select group, led no doubt by Tiberius, to effect a smooth transition.⁶⁵ To sum up, then, in January ad 12 the senate was publicly placed in Tiberius’ care; in late ad 12 the senate and people invested him with imperium equal to that of Augustus; in October ad 12 he was allowed to triumph and offer a largess to the people (activity Augustus had jealously made his own); his period of tribunicia potestas was extended; he was given the right to hold a census with Augustus; and, finally, at the beginning of ad 13, he was provided with a machine with which senatorial debate, on most occasions, could be circumvented.⁶⁶ It is not coincidental that Augustus’ testament was finalized on 3 April ad 13; Tiberius was now armed for sole leadership.⁶⁷

In reformulating the consilia, Augustus exhibited a lack of faith, or outright distrust, in sections of the senate to ensure a stable political environment and he must have had good reason. That the re-organization of consilia coincided with a renewed opposition to the inheritance tax cannot be coincidental. Immediately after discussing the semenstre consilium Dio writes:

ἐπϵί τϵ ἐπὶ τῃ̑ ϵἰκοστῃ̑ πάντϵς ὡς ϵἰπϵι̑ν ἐβαρύνοντο καὶ ἐδόκϵι τι νϵώτϵρον ἔσϵσθαι, ἔπϵμψϵ βιβλίον ἐς τὴν βουλήν, κϵλϵύων ἄλλους τινὰς αὐτὴν πόρους ἐπιζητη̑σαι.

Since everybody, so to speak, was disturbed about the vicesima and it seemed there was about to be an uprising, he sent to the senate a letter urging it to look for some alternative sources of revenue.⁶⁸

Augustus asked Germanicus and Drusus not to provide an opinion but to report to him on the senate’s deliberations:

καὶ ἐλέχθη μὲν πολλά, καί τινα καὶ διὰ βιβλίων τῳ̑ Aὐγούστῳ ἐδηλώθη· καταμαθὼν δὲ ἐξ αὐτω̑ν πάντα μα̑λλον ἢ ἐκϵι̑νο ἐτοίμους σφα̑ς ὑπομϵι̑ναι ὄντας, ἐπί τϵ τοὺς ἀγροὺς καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς οἰκίας τὴν συντέλϵιαν ἤγαγϵ, καὶ παραχρη̑μα μηδέν ϵἰπών, μήθ’ ὅσον μήθ’ ὅπως αὐτὸ δώσουσιν, ἔπϵμψϵν ἄλλους ἄλλῃ τά τϵ τω̑ν ἰδιωτω̑ν καὶ τὰ τω̑ν πόλϵων κτήματα ἀπογραψομένους, ἵν᾽ ὡς καὶ μϵιζόνως ζημιωθησόμϵνοι δϵίσωσι καὶ τὴν ϵἰκοστὴν τϵλϵι̑ν ἀνθέλωνται.

Many views were stated; while some were even communicated to Augustus through letters. Having learned from these that senators were ready to submit to all other forms of tax rather than that the one in force, he transferred the levy to lands and buildings and immediately, having said nothing about either how much or in what way they would pay it, sent different people to different places to register the properties of individuals and cities, in order that they should fear suffering even greater losses, and so be content to pay the five percent tax.⁶⁹

Dio understood his source/s to mean that discontent with the inheritance tax was developing into civil unrest. Since it was not in Augustus’ interest to exaggerate, or indeed invent, opposition, the reports are probably true. The tax had survived for almost eight years, and this is the first evidence we have for spirited opposition to its implementation since ad 7. Why the sudden outburst? Swan suggests that ‘it perhaps took some years for enough heirs to be affected to fuel a crisis.’⁷⁰ But the tax cannot have destroyed confidence in the economy; in principle oppressive, the tax was in reality a trifle. We should not suppose that losing HS 5,000 to the government seriously affected someone inheriting HS 100,000. Objections were politically rather than economically inspired, and the only plausible political explanation for the re-emergence of opposition to the tax is the permanent presence of Tiberius in Rome.⁷¹ Protestors were testing the future princeps.

Dio mentions only the attendance of Germanicus and Drusus at the relevant senatorial debate/s. Tiberius’ absence from the meeting, at first sight remarkable, makes sense. The presence of his two sons indicates how deeply Tiberius was affected, but his absence suggests caution. He was quarantined from the inevitable unpleasantness that would accompany an open defence of the government’s position. It is important to note that while debate ran its course in the senate, policy was being implemented by the reconstructed semenstre consilium, at which Tiberius was probably present.⁷² Communication between Augustus and the senate was conducted via letters, but Augustus must here refer to his consilium. It was the consilium that reacted to the threat of violence by bringing the matter before the senate. As was shown above, on sensitive issues such as taxation, the government advertised senatorial self-determination. But importantly, when it became obvious that senators ‘were ready to submit to any form of tax’ other than the inheritance tax, the consilium used its new power to decree an audit of land and buildings. We lose the full text of Dio at ἰδιωτω̑ν καὶ, but his epitomator, Xiphilinus, understood him to mean that the government’s strategy was to limit outcomes to two separate proposals. Xiphilinus writes only that Augustus wanted senators to fear even greater losses under the new tax, and so accept the 5 per cent tax on inheritances as the better option. He then adds ‘and this is what actually happened’.⁷³ Tenants, and not landlords, tend to bear such burdens, but landlords are usually held responsible.⁷⁴ The counter-proposal would, therefore, have attracted popular and elite resistance: it was much easier to pay 5 per cent on windfalls.⁷⁵

Despite the protest’s popular dimensions, dissent was none the less artificial. The initial protest in ad 6, though sponsored by persons within the imperial house like Aemilius Paullus, was understandable; resistance to taxation is attested in most societies. Resentment no doubt lingered, but passionate violence had given way to subdued indifference. The crescendo of discontent allegedly threatening Rome in ad 13 was surely manufactured. People certainly talked about the unfair nature of the tax and the possibility of large-scale riots- perhaps gangs of men were paid to cause unrest. The troublemakers, however, were not interested in new policy proposals. They wished to place Tiberius in an uncomfortable and unpopular position at a time when he was poised to succeed Augustus - Tiberius was kept away from the fight.

Tiberius was marked out as successor in ad 4, but the details were not secured until ad 13. Augustus’ death was the final requirement. It must have been clear to most observers that Augustus was close to the end. A popular tumult regarding the tax was, therefore, a reaction to the penultimate process of succession. Those opposed to Tiberius complained that the inheritance tax was unfit for Roman citizens, implying that they were being treated like subjects. Men on the street perhaps used the language of tyranny. The government, with Tiberius hiding behind the lines, reasserted its position. This is not a surprise. War was an expensive endeavour and required ever-increasing levels of public administration. Since Augustus did not want individual citizens to offer voluntary payments, thereby feudalizing the government, taxation was the only alternative. This is an area of tension for all governments, but especially authoritarian governments uninterested in private philanthropy. The government alone paid for public utilities and services, and costs soon blew out once the defence and organization of the entire empire was considered. The opposition was utilizing a philosophical doctrine relevant to city-state Republicanism to counter the pragmatic policy decisions of a government administering an empire. This contest is relevant to the final accession of Tiberius and his famous hesitation.