
Contents
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
The Crisis The Crisis
-
The Sedition of Tiberius’ Rival L. Aemilius Paullus The Sedition of Tiberius’ Rival L. Aemilius Paullus
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Cite
Abstract
This chapter offers a political explanation for Agrippa’s abdicatio. A combination of crises in ad 5 and 6 led to popular anger at the government’s inability to manage. Revolutionary pamphlets spread across Rome. L. Aemilius Paullus, the husband of Augustus’ granddaughter Julia and a relative of Agrippa’s, is identified as the chief architect of the protest. It is proposed that Gaius’ supporters, and Tiberius’ enemies, lurked behind Paullus. They were trying to destabilise Tiberius’ relationship with Augustus and the people. Agrippa was ‘abdicated’ and sent to Surrentum because he displayed sympathy for the troublemakers. L. Aemilius Paullus was prosecuted for treason. This chapter contains a refutation of R. A. Bauman’s theory regarding covert defamation as treason; it is shown that the case did not involve covert defamation, but overt sedition.
The Crisis
The year ad 5 witnessed the antecedents of a crisis that would burden the years immediately following:
…per dies octo Tiberis impetu miseranda clades hominum domorumque fuit.
…for eight horrible days men and homes were destroyed as the Tiber attacked.1
Τότϵ δ’ οὐ̑ν ἐπί τϵ του̑ Κορνηλίου καὶ ἐπὶ Οὐαλϵρίου Μϵσσάλου ὑπάτων σϵισμοί τϵ ἐξαίσιοι συνέβησαν, καὶ ὁ Τίβϵρις τήν τϵ γέφυραν κατέσυρϵ καὶ πλωτὴν τὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ ἑπτὰ ἡμέρας ἐποίησϵ, του̑ τϵ ἡλίου τι ἐκλιπὲς ἐγένϵτο, καὶ λιμὸς συνηνέχθη.
And so at this time, in the consulship of Cornelius and Valerius Messalla, enormous earthquakes occurred and the Tiber washed away the bridge and made the city navigable for seven days; and there was also a partial eclipse of the sun, and a famine occurred.2
Low crop yields and the flood probably caused decreased supply.3 In ad 64 a food shortage occurred when fire, sweeping through the city, destroyed grain stores.4 Given that in ad 5 the city, which could just mean the Aventine, was navigable for a whole week, most stored grain was probably ruined, stores closest to the river spoiled first.5 Ostia was no doubt similarly inundated, preventing immediate relief. As with most major floods, nearly all stored products (not just produce) were probably destroyed, increasing demand and exposing residents to very high short-term prices. Jerome had evidence that in ad 5 the price of grain inflated to HS 110 for one month’s ration to a member of the plebs frumentaria, extraordinarily high when we consider that in the wake of the great fire of ad 64, the price was apparently HS 3.6 But very high short-term prices would not have been the only problem. Water-borne disease, caused by the presence of faecal matter and general decay, often accompanies the flooding of major population centres, and would certainly have caused death in a pre-industrial city of Rome’s size. In an unspecified period of Augustus’ reign, Pliny connects disease in the city (pestilentia urbis) with famine in Italy (fames Italiae). Famine and disease are obvious partners, but the effect was no doubt devastating when combined with large-scale flooding.7 Swan uses the solar eclipse to date these events to the beginning of the year, since an eclipse is recorded for 28 March ad 5.8 But another eclipse occurred on 22 September.9 There is no conclusive evidence for either date. A food shortage in the following year (ad 6) might suggest one long period of decreased supply from the end of ad 5 into ad 6.10 Winter generally slowed import rates, which may explain why low supply persisted despite the receding flood. Piracy in Sardinia and rebellion in North Africa would not have helped.11
The seriousness of the above situation was exploited by the armies, who demanded better conditions at the end of ad 5. As with most other governments, the senate decided not to test the patience and loyalty of a discouraged military. Members of the praetorian guard were to therefore recieve 5,000 drachmas upon completion of sixteen years’ service, while other soldiers were voted 3,000 drachmas upon completion of twenty years’ service.12 In ad 5 there were 28 legions, each containing on paper 5,500 men, and 9 cohorts of praetorians, each with 500 men.13 That gives us 154,000 legionaries and 4,500 praetorians. A very large number had evidently survived their years of service and expected immediate payment. A soldier’s severance package would consist of either cash or a plot of land, though land was more often provided as the government sought to minimize large money payments.14 Nevertheless, Dio believed that the amount of money required in ad 5 was enough to threaten the fiscus:
Δι’ οὐ̑ν ταυ̑τ’ ἀπορω̑ν χρημάτων, γνώμην ἐς τὴν βουλὴν ἐσήνϵγκϵ πόρον τινὰ διαρκη̑ καὶ ἀϵίνων ἀποδϵιχθη̑ναι, ὅπως μηδϵνὸς ἔξωθϵν μηδὲν λυπουμένου ἀφθόνως ἐκ τω̑ν τϵταγμένων καὶ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ γέρα λαμβάνωσι.
And so lacking money for this, Augustus put a motion in the senate for a sufficient and permanent revenue source to be established to ensure that soldiers should receive maintenance and rewards abundantly from fixed revenues, without injury to any other party.15
Augustus, sensitive to the issue of taxation and concerned about laying the burden on citizens and provincial taxpayers, delayed making a decision until the next year, ad 6, when a new treasury, the aerarium militare, was created. Dio explains the delay:
…ἐπϵιδὴ μηδϵὶς πόρος ἀρέσκων τισὶν ϵὑρίσκϵτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ πάντϵς ὅτι καὶ ἐζητϵι̑το ἐβαρύνοντο…
Since no source [of revenue] acceptable to anyone was found, rather absolutely everyone was distressed that one was even being sought…16
These must have been a difficult few months for Augustus, who was confronted with threats by legionaries and praetorians if he did not improve their conditions of employment, while also facing universal opposition to any further taxation. Augustus states that he donated HS 170,000,000 to the new treasury, and Dio adds that foreign kings and cities also made contributions.17 Revenue was nevertheless insufficient to meet expenditure, and so after much deliberation a 5 per cent tax on ‘inheritance and legacies left by the dying to anyone except the closely related or poor’ was initiated and earmarked for military severance pay.18 The catalyst for this somewhat courageous decision is not hard to find. In the winter of ad 5/6 parts of Illyricum became restless; in late January or early February restlessness became outright rebellion across the entire region. Augustus had no option but to decide in favour of the troops.
Velleius describes some of the early incidents:
Oppressi cives Romani, trucidati negotiatores, magnus vexillariorum numerus ad internecionem ea in regione quae plurimum ab imperatore aberat caesus, occupata armis Macedonia, omnia et in omnibus locis igni ferroque vastata.
Roman citizens were overpowered, merchants were massacred, a very large number in the special detachment in the region which was the furthest distance from the commander, were killed, Macedonia was taken by arms and everywhere and everything was destroyed by fire and the sword.19
This is followed by Rome’s response:
Quin etiam tantus huius belli metus fuit ut stabilem illum et formatum tantorum bellorum experientia Caesaris Augusti animum quateret atque terreret. Habiti itaque dilectus revocati undique et omnes veterani viri feminaeque ex censu libertinum coactae dare militem. Audita in senatu vox principis decimo die, ni caveretur, posse hostem in urbis Romae venire conspectum…Itaque ut praesidium militum 20 res publica ab Augusto ducem in bellum poposcit Tiberium.
For the war inspired such great fear that the spirit of Caesar Augustus, steady and firm from experience in so many wars, became shaken and terrified. Thus a levy was held, from every quarter veterans were recalled and men and women were compelled, according to the census, to give up some freedmen as soldiers. The voice of the princeps was heard in the senate to say that, unless precautions were taken, the enemy could come in sight of the city in ten days…and so the State demanded from Augustus the protection of the soldiers and Tiberius as leader in the war.21
According to Dio, and possibly an inscription found in Tuzla, the levy (dilectus) included freeborn citizens.22 We can date Rome’s response to the beginning of ad 6. Velleius states that he, as quaestor designate, was among those dispatched to the front lines.23 Quaestorian elections usually occurred early in the year, which means that the levied forces did not leave Rome until spring at the earliest.24 A terminus post quem is provided by Velleius, who seems to have reached camp shortly before summer.25 The senate’s decree should therefore be dated somewhere between March and May. The response was possibly a tumultus declaration. The mobilization of veterans and a dilectus are certainly suggestive, but Dio supplies evidence of a decree suspending inter alia the activities of the courts.26 Writing about an earlier period Asconius states:
Bello Italico…crebraeque defectiones Italicorum nuntiarentur, nanctus iustitii occasionem senatus decrevit ne iudicia, dum tumultus Italicus esset, exercerentur.
In the Italian war…news constantly arrived of rebellions among the Italians; on taking the opportunity to suspend public business the senate decreed that the courts should not remain in use for the duration of the Italic upheaval.27
It is nevertheless possible that the Illyrian rebellion and persistent famine caused successive emergency decrees with overlapping consequences. Under ad 6 Dio cites the following decisions:
Foreigners (excepting doctors and teachers), gladiators, and unsold slaves were evacuated to 100 miles distance;28
Senators were permitted to ‘travel wherever they wished’, and the decisions reached by those who stayed were considered valid, i.e. even if there was not a quorum; 29
Most members of Augustus’ retinue and the retinues of other high officials were dismissed;30
The courts were put into recess;31
Expensive celebrations were to be curtailed, particularly banquets on Augustus’ birthday;32
Two ex-consuls were appointed to watch over the grain and wheat supply and produce a fixed ration amount for sale; and33
Those listed on the grain dole were provided with a double serve of the new ration amount.34
These are certainly from senatus consulta. Evacuation shows that food was scarce and that people were on edge. At least some decisions belong to late August or September, since the effect of Augustus’ birthday (23 September) on food supply was anticipated. I propose that a tumultus declaration was passed between March and early May. Public business ceased until it became clear, perhaps by July, that Rome was in no immediate danger from an invasion. By then food supply had slowed dramatically, causing another emergency decree affecting, inter alia, celebrations for Augustus’ birthday. Extreme measures tend to harm a population’s general psychology. It could be that frustration and/or desperation fuelled deliberate acts of destruction. Dio states that fire destroyed parts of the city, but Ulpian provides more useful information: pluribus uno die incendiis exortis, ‘many fires had broken out in one day.’35 Lightning is a possibility, but arson is more likely.36 Coming not long after severe floods, with food supply still low, destructive fires must have further tested the patience of urban residents. People were not only exposed to damaged property and disease but inflated prices for staple produce. The government’s response evinces suspicion and anxiety: a massive fire-fighting force was mobilized.
Rome had hitherto relied on 600 slaves under the direction of the vicomagistri to fight fires.37 In ad 6 this organization was abolished and replaced by a force of either 3,500 or 7,000 liberti, directed by an equestrian prefect (praefectus vigilum).38 The nature of the task required officers to undertake policing duties in addition to the putting out/prevention of fires.39 As a night patrol, the vigiles could not help but witness a variety of crimes: arson, looting, opportunistic violence, etc.40 In time the praefectus vigilum could even pass sentence, but during our period criminals were probably handed over to the city prefect (praefectus urbi), who, unlike the praefectus vigilum, had use of a gaol.41
The relationship between fire and burglary was topical in Augustan Rome:
qui sive tectis iniectus est sive fortuitus, ruinae et incendia illa urbium excidia sunt; quippe non defendunt sua, sed in communi periculo ad praedandum ut hostes discurrunt appetuntque aliena, et in suis domini a validioribus caeduntur, accenduntur alia ipsaque cum maxume flagrantia spolium ex alienis ruinis feruntur.
Whether it [fire] seizes on buildings by arson or accident, these collapses and these blazes are the ruin of cities. For men do not defend their own property, but amid the communal danger hurry like enemies to the loot, and take what belongs to others. In their own homes owners are killed by those stronger than they. Other things are set alight on purpose, and, still blazing, are carried as booty from the ruins of others’ houses.”42
An emergency force capable of maintaining order is obviously what Augustus had in mind.43 To sum up then: Illyricum was in rebellion; food supply was low owing to destroyed storage, piracy, and rebellion; the public corn dole was being rationed; public business had ceased; fires had broken out, causing destruction and looting; people were probably exposed to extremely high short-term prices; public shows had been cancelled until further notice; and a 5 per cent inheritance tax had been imposed. Dio had evidence that people held Augustus’ government accountable:
‘Ο δ’ οὐ̑ν ὅμιλος, οἱ̑α ὑπό τϵ του̑ λιμου̑ καὶ ὑπὸ του̑ τέλους τοῖς θ’ ὑπὸ του̑ πυρὸς ἀπολωλόσι κϵκακωμένος, ἤσχαλλϵ, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν καὶ φανϵρω̑ς νϵωτϵροποιὰ διϵλάλουν, πλϵίω δὲ δὴ βιβλία νύκτωρ ἐξϵτίθϵσαν. Καὶ ταυ̑τ’ ἐλέγϵτο μὲν ἐκ παρασκϵυη̑ς Πουπλίου τινὸς ‘Ρούφου γίγνϵσθαι, ὑπωπτϵύϵτο δὲ ἐς ἄλλους· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ‘Ρου̑φος οὔτϵ ἐνθυμηθη̑ναί τι αὐτω̑ν οὔτϵ πρα̑ξαι ἐδύνατο, τϵροι δὲ τῳ̑ ἐκϵίνου ὀνόματι καταχρώμϵνοι καινοτομϵι̑ν ἐπιστϵύοντο. Καὶ διὰ του̑το ζήτησίς τϵ αὐτω̑ν ἐψηφίσθη καὶ μήνυτρα προϵτέθη· μηνύσϵις τϵ ἐγίγνοντο, καὶ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐταράττϵτο.
And so the people, distressed by the results of the famine and of the tax, and by the losses resulting from the fire, were horrified, and were discussing many plans for revolution, even openly, and posted up even more as pamphlets by night. And it was said that all these things had come about from the planning of a certain Publius Rufus, but suspicion was directed against others, for Rufus could neither have concocted nor accomplished any of these things. But others, making use of his name, were understood to be planning revolution. On account of this a search for them was decreed and rewards for informants advertised. Information started to come to light, and because of this, the city was also in a state of commotion.”44
Ὅομιλος implies a very large group of people: a general dissatisfaction with the government’s effectiveness had transformed into a public show of anger and frustration.45 It is doubtful that the creation of the vigiles calmed angry crowds.46 Hungry, worn-out people who, of a sudden, face the loss of whatever possessions they have left are not prone to cool-headed reason. A tradition of resisting taxation, moreover, should not be lightly dismissed, especially since it was based on the principle of Rome as the ruling element in the empire.47 Most modern communities evidence anxiety when a new tax is imposed. Exaggerated fears set in even when the proposed rate is low, further fuelling popular resistance. Because the new earmarked tax was set at a flat rate for all classes in the census (aside from the very poor), complaints would have come from all sides. But even contemporaries believed that behind the general protest lay a more sinister motive with political dimensions. Some scholars view the episode as a single unique affair, while others place it within the larger theme of dynastic succession.48 Identifying the organizers of the protest will indicate if either interpretation is correct.
Dio states that a certain Publius Rufus was nominally responsible, and that others were in fact using his name. Publius Rufus is thought to be the same man referred to by Suetonius in his list of men who conspired against Augustus:
Lepidi iuvenis, deinde Varronis Murenae et Fanni Caepionis, mox M. Egnati, exin Plauti Rufi Lucique Pauli progeneri sui…
Young Lepidus, then Varro Murena and Fannius Caepio and soon after M. Egnatius, and next Plautius Rufus and Lucius Paulus, husband of his granddaughter.49
Suetonius has consciously paired conspirators who he believed worked together. Publius Rufus and Plautius Rufus are surely the same man, and Levick is probably right to name him Publius Plautius Rufus.50 But the reference to L. Aemilius Paullus has fuelled the most speculation. We have two other references to Aemilius Paullus’ disgrace. First from the Scholiast on Juvenal:
Dedit hunc Agrippa sorori: Iuliam neptem Augusti significat, quae nupta Aemilio Paulo cum [h]is [sic] maiestatis crimine perisset, ab avo relegata est. post revocata cum semet vitiis addixisset perpetui exilii damnata est supplicio.
Agrippa [Herod] gave this to his sister: He [Juvenal] means Julia, granddaughter of Augustus, who having been married to Aemilius Paullus, when he had perished under a charge of maiestas, was relegated by her grandfather. After being recalled, when she had abandoned herself to her vices, she was condemned to the punishment of perpetual exile.51
Next Suetonius, who refers to the cancellation of the future emperor Claudius’ betrothal to Aemilius Paullus’ daughter:
Priorem, quod parentes eius Augustum offenderant, virginem adhuc repudiavit…
He repudiated the former before their marriage, because her parents had offended Augustus…52
Suetonius’ quod parentes eius Augustum offenderant would seem to contradict his previous linking of Aemilius Paullus with Plautius Rufus, since we know that Julia was finally relegated in ad 8.53 But connecting the disgrace of Julia and Aemilius Paullus could be thematic.54 Needing to explain the failed engagement of Claudius and Aemilia Lepida, Suetonius decided to blame both husband and wife. The Scholiast poses the more difficult problem. He is commenting on Juvenal Satire 6.157, in which Juvenal mentions a diamond ring once worn by Queen Berenice:
Hunc dedit olim | barbarus incestae, gestare Agrippa sorori, | observant ubi festa mero pede sabbata reges | et vetus indulget senibus clementia porcis.
This was given long ago | as a present by the barbarian Agrippa to his incestuous sister | where kings observe the Sabbath festival bare foot | and ancient clemency indulges elderly pigs.55
Herod Agrippa, the Jewish king, is meant. The Scholiast has either made a terrible mistake and confused Herod Agrippa with Agrippa Postumus, or the manuscript has been garbled in transmission. But the information is not useless. The Scholiast evidently believed that the younger Julia was twice exiled. A minority have accepted the claim, but most reject it as confused, proposing instead that the Scholiast has conflated the relegation of the elder Julia and the younger Julia. But the solution is unconvincing. Reference to the younger Julia’s husband and brother indicate the possession of a correct profile, as does the phrase neptis Augusti. Norwood has put forward, in my opinion, the best solution: the younger Julia was sent away twice: the first a form of quarantine; the second full-blown relegation.56 An enforced ‘holiday’ is a logical assumption. In the wake of Aemilius Paullus’ condemnation and the abdicatio of Agrippa, it would have been sensible to remove the young woman from the centre of public attention, a policy easily mistaken for tough punishment by historians with an eye to her final disgrace. But even if Aemilius Paullus was exiled before his wife, we are left with a still more difficult problem. Dio does not mention L. Aemilius Paullus in connection with the affair.
Dio does not mention a trial in relation to the Rufus affair. Bauman therefore held that the senatorial investigation must have failed.57 If Bauman is right, then L. Aemilius Paullus’ conviction for maiestas cannot belong in ad 6. To return to Dio’s text:
But others, making use of his name, were understood to be planning revolution. On account of this a search for them was decreed and rewards for informants advertised. Information started to come to light, and because of this, the city was also in a state of commotion.58
That information was submitted to the senate is in fact evidence that the inquiry was not a failure. Much rests on Dio’s belief that the submission of information caused ‘commotion’ in Rome. Bauman supposes that the informants, being slaves, caused ‘commotion’. The inquiry thus collapsed under the weight of anxious criticism.59 But we do not in fact know what percentage of informants, if any, were slaves. It is just as plausible that unrest was caused by the fame of the personality exposed: i.e. L.Aemilius Paullus.
For Bauman, the episode’s only legal result was a senatus consultum, which allowed for the public investigation of future acts of anonymous defamation, and led eventually to the prosecution of Cassius Severus in ad 8 for maiestas.60 He argues that a decree cited by Suetonius is apposite:
Etiam sparsos de se in curia famosos libellos nec expavit et magna cura redarguit ac ne requisitis quidem auctoribus id modo censuit, cognoscendum posthac de iis, qui libellos aut carmina ad infamiam cuiuspiam sub alieno nomine edant.
And he did not even dread defamatory writings about himself scattered in the Curia, but refuted them with much care, and without searching for the authors he recommended after this that writing or speech which defames anybody and is produced under a false name should be investigated.61
I believe Bauman’s hypothesis is wrong. Dio does not describe the βιβλία disseminated in ad 6 as being defamatory; he refers only to their containing revolutionary messages. The solution requires examination of two relevant defamation cases: those of Cassius Severus and Titus Labienus.
Tacitus states that Cassius Severus was the first to be charged with maiestas for defamatory writings:
Primus Augustus cognitionem de famosis libellis specie legis eius tractavit, commotus Cassii Severi libidine, qua viros feminasque inlustres procacibus scriptis diffamaverat.
Augustus was the first to drag investigations concerning written libel under the law [of maiestas]; having been disturbed by the licence of Cassius Severus, who had defamed distinguished men and women in his shameless writings.62
The elder Seneca was similarly certain about another Augustan orator, T. Labienus:
In hoc primum excogitata est nova poena; effectum est enim per inimicos ut omnes eius libri comburerentur: res nova et invisitata supplicium de studiis sumi…Eius qui hanc in scripta Labieni sententiam dixerat postea viventis adhuc scripta conbusta sunt: iam non malo exemplo quia suo.
It was for him that there was first devised a new punishment: his enemies saw to it that all his books were burnt. It was a new thing that punishments should be exacted from literature…he who supplied this opinion on Labienus’ writings afterwards had his own writings burnt while still alive: no longer an evil penalty, once it became his.63
Bauman sidelined the problem of Labienus by tucking him away in a footnote: ‘It is probable that no formal charges were preferred against Labienus and that the burning of his books was the only penalty inflicted on him. An extra-forensic remedy such as this was known in the Republic.’64 Such extra-judicial remedies did occur during the Republic, but reference to a senatus consultum indicates a senatorial inquiry and the fact of a penalty implies that a quaestio followed.65 Labienus suffered the penalty of a lex and the obvious candidate is the lex maiestatis.66The decision to burn his books would have been discretionary, as was often the case when various forms of damnatio memoriae were implemented. But how can both Tacitus and Seneca be correct?
The most important evidence for Labienus comes from Seneca’s Controversiae. The first is a reminiscence:
Memini aliquando, cum recitaret historiam, magnam partem illum libri convolvisse et dixisse: haec quae transeo post mortem meam legentur. Quanta in illis libertas fuit quam etiam Labienus extimuit !
I remember that once, when he was reciting his history, Labienus rolled up a good part of the book, saying: ‘The sections I pass over will be read after my death’ How great must have been their libertas if even Labienus was frightened of it!67
Seneca was impressed by Labienus’ reluctance, not simply because it was out of character, but because at least one other had already recited a politically sensitive history. Cremutius Cordus praised Cassius, Caesar’s assassin, without reprimand from Augustus: Labienus’ work must have been especially shocking.68 The subject of his history is unknown, but reference to a Pompeian spirit, a signpost for ideological opposition, is noteworthy.69
Yet a sympathetic Pompeian history does not sufficiently explain his fate. Such things were an accepted activity, and were openly encouraged by Augustus.70 Labienus must have gone well beyond sympathy and explicitly stated that the wrong side had won the civil war, and shown them as unworthy.71 That Labienus refused to recite parts of his work publicly does not stand in the way of my hypothesis, for they could have been seized after information was laid by a friend or slave, or even leaked after circulation among intimates. Either way, Labienus’ histories were not merely defamatory but were interpreted as an incitement to sedition. An intention to incite sedition would usually have come under the heading maiestas, though the penalty of having one’s literary works destroyed might still have been novel.72 Cassius Severus, on the other hand, was charged with maiestas for libel, but not, contra Bauman, for anonymous libel.73 Tacitus blames Cassius Severus’ ‘writings’; he makes no mention of them being anonymously written. Anecdotes of Cassius Severus show him to be openly vicious, to the point of enjoying his reputation as a slanderer.74 His ego would not submerge even in exile!75 Cassius Severus marked a far more insidious development because he was charged with overt defamation, action that had always been examined through a civil procedure under the lex Cornelia de iniuriis. The prosecutors probably argued that some people (alique) - a group of people who could be categorized - were subsumed under the maiestas of the Roman people.76 This interpretation better explains a quote attributed to Tiberius some years later:
Sed et adversus convicia malosque rumores et famosa de se ac suis carmina firmus ac patiens, subinde iactabat in civitate libera linguam mentemque liberas esse debere; et quondam senatu cognitionem de eius modi criminibus ac reis flagitante: ‘Non tantum’ inquit ‘otii habemus, ut implicare nos pluribus negotiis debeamus; si hanc fenestram aperueritis, nihil aliud agi sinetis; omnium inimicitiae hoc praetexto ad vos deferentur.’
But he was firm and patient even against insults, evil rumours and defamatory songs about himself and his own people; he sometimes let out that in a free society speech and thought should be free; and once, when the senate was demanding jurisdiction on crimes and criminals of that sort, he said: We do not have so much free time that we ought to get ourselves involved in extra business; if you open this window, you will leave room for no other business; the private enmities of everyone will be brought before you on this pretext.77
Fenestra shows that it is a question of interpreting the law. Clearly a ‘loophole’ was left which made prosecution possible; it is also obvious that overt libel is meant, especially omnium inimicitiae. It is not hard to envisage the evolution. Cassius Severus’ prosecution rested on subsuming specific classes (senators, priests, decurions, etc., i.e. those later termed honestiores) under the maiestas of the State.78 A window (fenestra) for senators to destroy personal enemies thus opened. Tiberius perceived the inherent dangers and in turn did not observe the precedent, with a ‘take your personal squabbles elsewhere!’79 That overt (or indeed anonymous) libel is never treated as maiestas in the juristic literature, but continued to be treated under the heading iniuria,80 is evidence that Tiberius’ position was sustained. Only seditious writings/speeches and the defamation of the princeps or a magistrate remained within the cognizance of the quaestio maiestatis.81 Bauman’s argument that events in ad 6 led to the lex Cornelia de iniuriis being extended to cover the publication of anonymous defamatory writings, and that, two years later, such writings were judged to have diminished the majesty of the Roman people is probably wrong. Events in ad6 were unrelated to the question of defamatory writing. They were related instead to the lex maiestatis in so far as it was the appropriate law for prosecuting acts of treason.
The Sedition of Tiberius’ Rival L. Aemilius Paullus
As with the interpretation of T. Labienus’ works, the βιβλία circulated by P. Rufus were held to be seditious (νϵωτϵροποιός), not defamatory.82 There was no need to pass a decree extending the scope of the lex de iniuriis, for the lex maiestatis already covered such behaviour. This approach better suits the mood. A highly stressed community will usually blame government when the conditions of life fail to improve. When Rome was gripped by famine in 40 bc, the triumvirs produced an edict establishing a tax on the sale of slaves and inheritance of legacies. People were furious. The edict was torn down amid violent protest. Octavian, while attempting to assuage an angry and bewildered crowd, was pelted with stones.83 Fierce, even violent, resistance to taxation is not unusual during or in the wake of an economic disaster. But Rome had a history of such resistance even during periods of economic prosperity. Roman citizens had been exempt from most forms of taxation since 167bc. Revenue was sourced instead from the taxation of provincials and the spoils of war.84 As with protestors in 40 bc, the authors of the βιβλία probably treated the implementation of the inheritance tax within a discourse of oppression. Augustus had already asked senators to find a sufficient revenue source for the aerarium militare. Dio then adds:
ἀμέλϵι ἄλλων ἄλλα ἐσηγησαμένων ἐκϵίνων μὲν οὐδὲν ἐδοκίμασϵ, τὴν δ’ ϵἰκοστὴν τω̑ν τϵ κλήρων καὶ τω̑ν δωρϵω̑ν, ἃς ἂν οἱ τϵλϵυτω̑ντές τισι πλὴν τω̑ν πάνυ συγγϵνω̑ν ἢ καὶ πϵνήτων καταλϵίπωσι, κατϵστήσατο, ὡς καὶ ἐν τοι̑ς του̑ Καίσαρος ὑπομνήμασι τὸ τέλος του̑το γϵγραμμένον ϵὑρών̇ ἐση̑κτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ πρότϵρόν ποτϵ, καταλυθὲν δὲ μϵτὰ ταυ̑τα αὐ̑θις τότϵ ἐπανήχθη.
Of course when other men had proposed different schemes, he approved of none, but he established the vicesima on inheritances and legacies left by the dying to anyone except very close relatives or the poor, as though he had found the tax written down in Caesar’s memoranda. For it had in fact been introduced once before, and having been abolished, was again introduced at this time.85
Senatorial submissions steered away from the taxation of citizens as a viable policy, as is evident from Augustus’ response. Establishing an archaeology for the tax is a defensive manœuvre; unnecessary if the solution was widely held to be reasonable. That Augustus was obviously responsible for initiating the policy could not be disguised, but his invocation of Caesar (now deified and so beyond criticism) shows an unwillingness to take full responsibility. The bolstering of legislation with forty-five-year-old credentials implies criticism. Senators with alternative revenue solutions and opposed to an inheritance tax on principle would be the most likely antagonists. At least one senator is linked to the critical βιβλία published a few months later: L. Aemilus Paullus.
In Dio’s narrative rumour alone implicated P. Rufus, and the rumour was considered to be implausible.86 ‘Others’ were thought to have been using Rufus’ name.87 If βιβλία were anonymous, then ‘others’ were evidently spreading the rumours. Nevertheless, as Suetonius makes clear, Rufus was unable to shake public suspicion.88 He fell either as a double-crossed conspirator or an innocent victim. The only way to fit L. Aemilius Paullus into the picture is to count him as one of the ‘others’. This would better explain the ‘commotion’ which followed the laying of information by informants. Allegations that an important member of the government had orchestrated the popular unrest would have been sensational, embarrassing many senators with close ties to the consul of ad 1.89 Prior objection to the inheritance tax (whether in senatorial meetings or the consilium principis) would lend credence to the testimonies of informants. On this reading, his opponents in the senate argued that, on the basis of information from witnesses and in consideration of his manifest sympathy with ideas present in the βιβλία, Aemilius Paullus should be condemned for intending to incite sedition. The quaestio maiestatis, again in operation, agreed.90 Most protestors probably wished only for a policy reversal and increased government assistance, but men like Aemilius Paullus had other motives.
Commotion in Rome apparently lasted until the food supply recovered and events to celebrate the memory of the elder Drusus were organized.91 All public spectacles had been cancelled in August/September: games (provided by the elder Drusus’ sons, Germanicus and Claudius) were probably supposed to alleviate general anxiety and restlessness.92 Games were followed by a dedication of the temple of Castor and Pollux by Tiberius.93 The dedication can be dated to 27 January ad 7, which, if correct, means that Tiberius returned to Rome from Illyricum to participate in some of the celebrations.94 Dio knew of a more sinister interpretation:
τά τϵ γὰρ τω̑ν πολέμων ἅμα διῴκϵι, καὶ ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ὁπότϵ παράσχοι, συνϵχω̑ς ἐσϵφοίτα, τὸ μέν τι πραγμάτων τινω̑ν νϵκα, τὸ δὲ δὴ πλϵι̑στον φοβούμϵνος μὴ ὁ Aὔγουστος ἄλλον τινὰ παρὰ τὴν ἀπουσίαν αὐτου̑ προτιμήσῃ.
And indeed, at the same time, Tiberius was carrying on with the business of war and was continually visiting the city, whenever he had the chance; this was partly on account of his business affairs, but mostly because he was afraid that, on account of his absence, Augustus would show preference to somebody else.95
Velleius returned to Rome late in ad 6 to enter the quaestorship, but was soon off to Tiberius in Illyricum as legatus Augusti.96 Quaestors designate were formally invested on 5 December, so that Tiberius must still have been in Illyricum when Velleius set out from Rome. Tiberius thus left camp for Rome no later than the first week of January. His policy in the years preceding is instructive. Velleius writes that in December ad 4: pietas sua Caesarem paene obstructis hieme Alpibus in urbem traxit, ‘piety drew Caesar to the city, though the Alps were almost blocked because of winter’; in December ad 5 Tiberius: eadem qua priore anno festinatione urbem petens, ‘sought the city with the same haste as the previous year’.97 Returning to Rome ‘with haste’ in December ad 5 is understandable. The city was in chaos and the soldiers were threatening to strike. Remaining in camp until late December–January ad 6, regardless of the situation in Rome, was, however, intelligent policy. The stability of north-east Italy was uncertain, with Dalmatians having recently invaded Macedonia a second time.98 Yet a contemporary opinion, surviving in Dio, shows that Tiberius’ position was a topic of dispute:
Μαθὼν οὐ̑ν ταυ̑τα ὁ Aὔγουστος, καὶ ὑποπτϵύσας ἐς τὸν Τιβέριον ὡς δυνηθέντα μὲν ἂν διὰ ταχέων αὐτοὺς κρατη̑σαι, τρίβοντα δὲ ἐξϵπίτηδϵς ἵν’ ὡς ἐπὶ πλϵι̑στον ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐπὶ τῃ̑ του̑ πολέμου προφάσϵι ᾐ̑, πέμπϵι τὸν Γϵρμανικὸν καίτοι ταμιϵύοντα, στρατιώτας οἱ οὐκ ϵὐγϵνϵι̑ς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξϵλϵυθέρους δούς…
And so Augustus having learned these things, suspecting that Tiberius could have quickly defeated them but was delaying deliberately so that he might be under arms as long as possible on the pretext of war, sends out Germanicus [to Illyricum] although a quaestor, having granted him not only freeborn but also freedmen soldiers…99
Tiberius’ enemies, who must have put forward this interpretation, were playing games.100 Far from destabilising Tiberius’ position, Germanicus was probably in the same boat as Velleius; both were quaestors attached to Tiberius as legati Augusti. To depict Tiberius as the new Salvidienus, desiring to possess the northern legions, was to assault his supporters in the senate and his relationship with Augustus.101 The accusation ought to be considered in relation to the circumstances of Tiberius’ power. Not even a year had passed since senators had voted him the command, citing a need to protect the commonwealth from a full-scale northern invasion.102 Augustus agreed, describing Tiberius in a letter as the ‘sole defence of the Roman People’ (unicum p. R. praesidium).103 Since Illyricum already had a governor, Tiberius’ maius imperium was extended to cover a larger region.104 He was put in charge of every legion engaged in the action, which numbered ten of a total for the empire of twenty-eight.105 Even if this extraordinary command was unanimously supported in the senate, Tiberius’ opponents would necessarily have harboured serious misgivings. I propose that the anti-Tiberian rumours, attested for the end of the year, result from these misgivings. People were given to understand that Tiberius planned to seize power in a throwback to the civil wars.
The image of Tiberius the potentate was manipulated to insinuate a strained relationship with both Augustus and Germanicus. When Velleius described Tiberius’ return to Rome in December ad 4 as pious, we must have the counter-argument.106 Tiberius’ enemies portrayed him as dishonest and his position weak; his supporters countered by insisting on a close and loyal relationship with Augustus. The accusation that he was planning rebellion appeared in the winter of ad 6/7, to which Dio attached his general explanation for Tiberius’ behaviour: ‘he was afraid that Augustus might take advantage of his absence to show preference to somebody else’.107 Dio’s statement is born, I believe, from a contemporary account which held that Tiberius faced a serious political rival. But identifying the rival has proved difficult. Levick suggests Agrippa, but that is a stretch.108 Even with support he was too young, and others were above him in the pecking order, ‘viz’. Germanicus.109 But Germanicus was also too young and, as his position as a subordinate legatus shows, could not yet be described as a threat. We require instead somebody with an impressive pedigree, sufficient experience, and in opposition to Tiberius. The most obvious candidate is again L. Aemilius Paullus.
If Aemilus Paullus had been close to Gaius Caesar, and then sought out his brother-in-law Agrippa, the hypothesis makes sense. Faced with irrelevance and obscurity, oppositional groups often turn to the manipulation of public fear and excitement as a weapon. Thus Aemilius Paullus used general discontent with the new tax and the war to erode public support for the administration. Βιβλία were distributed in combination with talk that Tiberius harboured seditious intent and that Augustus no longer trusted him. This was a trap: if Tiberius stayed in winter camp it was because he desired supreme power; if he came to Rome it was because Augustus favoured another. Tiberius nevertheless returned to Rome to expose the rumours as baseless. This was probably at the instigation of Augustus. Suetonius writes that during the Illyrian rebellion Tiberius was often recalled (saepius revocaretur).110 Augustus probably decided to refute rumour with evidence; the people must see with their own eyes that Tiberius harboured no wicked scheme and that his relationship with Augustus was strong.111 Dedicating the temple of Castor and Pollux served to reinforce the happy picture. Dio writes that Tiberius inscribed the temple with his and his brother’s name. But he wrote his name as Ti. Iulius Augusti f. Caesar Claudianus.112 No other extant inscription or text attests the use of the former gentilicium by Tiberius.113 He was evidently keen, at this moment, to advertise his Claudian ancestry, believing it to be, or hoping to make it, popular with the people - a Claudian event, putting on show even the future emperor Claudius, the family embarrassment. The symbolism, it was hoped, would be unmistakable: Augustus had made his choice; the future of Rome would rest with Livia’s descendents, i.e. not Agrippa or, more importantly, Aemilius Paullus.114 The fall of Aemilius Paullus provides us with a plausible explanation for the abdicatio of Agrippa and his transportation to Surrentum.
When dealing with the abdicatio of Agrippa, Dio wrote:
Τὸν δὲ δὴ Γϵρμανικόν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸν ’Aγρίππαν ἐπὶ τὸν πόλϵμον ἐξέπϵμψϵν, ὅτι δουλοπρϵπής τϵ ἐκϵι̑νος ἠ̑ν καὶ τὰ πλϵι̑στα ἡλιϵύϵτο, ὅθϵνπϵρ καὶ Ποσϵιδω̑να ἑαυτὸν ἐπωνόμαζϵ, τῃ̑ τϵ ὀργῃ̑ προπϵτϵι̑ ἐχρη̑το, καὶ τὴν Λιουίαν ὡς μητρυιὰν διέβαλλϵν, αὐτῳ̑ τϵ τῳ̑ ’Aὐγούστῳ πολλάκις ὑπὲρ τω̑ν πατρῴων ἐπϵκάλϵι. Καὶ οὐ γὰρ ἐσωφρονίζϵτο, ἀπϵκηρύχθη, καὶ τϵ οὐσία αὐτου̑ τῳ̑ στρατιωτικῳ̑ ταμιϵίῳ ἐδόθη, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς Πλανασίαν τὴν πρὸς Κύρνῳ νη̑σον ἐνϵβλήθη.
He sent Germanicus and not Agrippa to the war because the latter was low minded and spent most of his time in fishing, on account of which he used to call himself Poseidon; and he used to give way to violent anger and insulted Livia as ‘stepmother’, and he often accused Augustus himself regarding his inheritance, and since he was not of moderate mind he was made an abdicatus and his property was handed over to the military treasury, and he was himself exiled to Planasia, an island near Corsica.115
Dio has telescoped Agrippa’s life from ad 5–7 into one episode, but, by reference to Germanicus’ commission as a legatus Augusti, Agrippa’s demise can be tentatively dated. If Germanicus was commissioned between December ad 6 and early ad 7, we can place Agrippa’s abdicatio towards the end of ad 6, i.e. about the time that Aemilius Paullus was exposed and prosecuted. A close relationship with his much older brother-in-law would explain why Agrippa was removed 200 km from Rome but not from patria potestas.116 Poor behaviour was declared the reason for abdicatio, but behind the pretext lay concern that Agrippa was a liability. He was almost 18, old enough to have strong political opinions, no matter how naïve. He was deemed unsuitable for a high profile public career. He could not be trusted in Rome, or, indeed, anywhere as a free man. It was soon evident to Augustus, however, that Agrippa posed an even more serious threat. He was relegated to the island of Planasia and placed under military guard.
Cass. Chron. 604.
Dio 55.22.3.
Jerome Chron. 170; Tac. Ann. 15.36.
Pliny NH 7.149.
P. M. Swan (2004), 155. Swan believed that the eclipse was either noticed in Rome or recorded in Roman Africa and communicated to Rome. It must be understood that the path of the eclipse began where the southern tip of Sudan intersects with the south-west point of Ethiopia, and stretched across the south of the Sahara to the southernmost tip of Morocco—a long way from Roman Africa.
Recorded by NASA, and can be verified at http://sunearth.gsfc.nasa.gov/eclipse/Secat/SE0001-0100.html. As with the eclipse of 28 March, this second eclipse could not be seen in Rome: it was a few hundred miles off the west coast of Indonesia. The most logical solution is to believe that eclipses were predicted. Indeed, this would seem to be supported by recent archaeological evidence in the shape of a time-measuring device that appears to have had a dial specifically associated with accurately predicting eclipses,
.Dio 55.26.1.
Vell. 2.116.2; Dio 55.28.1–4; Florus 2.31; Orosius 6.21.18. Dio writes that the Gaetulians ‘ravaged the neighbouring territory’ while an inscription (V. Ehrenberg, and A. H. M. Jones (1955), 63) testifies to war: Marti Augusto sacrum auspiciis imp. Caesaris Aug. pontificis maxumi patris patriae ductu Cossi Lentuli cos. Xxviri sacris faciundis procos. Provincia Africa bello Gaetulico liberata civitas Lepcitana. ‘Dedication to Mars Augustus by the city of Lepcis, for, under the auspices of Imperator Caesar Augustus, Pontifex Maximus, Pater Patriae, and the command of Cossus Lentulus, consul, XVvir Sacris Faciundis, pronconsul, the province of Africa was freed from the Gaetulian war.’ Rome had other suppliers, but overall supply would necessarily have been diminished, or at least interrupted; cf. G. Rickman (1980), 66–71, argues that Africa provided considerably more grain than did Egypt. Thus, for Rickman, events in North Africa had a great effect upon supply in Rome.
Dio 55.23.1–5. 5,000 drachmas equals HS 20,000, and 3,000 drachmas equals HS 12,000.
Dio 55.24.9.
Dio 55.25.1.
RG 17; Dio 55.25.3. Dio tells us that private citizens were forbidden to make private donations. Wealthy citizens were happy to part with their money, but not through taxation. Augustus, for his part, would not countenance wealthy individuals being identified as patrons of the armed forces: tension between traditional Republican concepts and new political realities.
Dio 55.25.5; ‘closely related’ probably means that heirs in the first degree and possibly even second degree were not taxed.
Vell. 2.110.6; Oros. 6.21.23 f.
Dio 55.31.1–2; and V. Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones (1955), 168; cf. Suet. Aug. 25.2; Pliny NH 7.149.
Vell. 2.111.3.
Dio 55.26.1.
Asc. 73–74C; A. Lintott (1968), 153–5. Augustus’ own words are suggestive, since tumultus was originally declared when there was a sudden raid of Etruscans or Gauls, Vell. 2.111.1: ‘The voice of the princeps was heard in the senate to say that, unless precautions were taken, the enemy could come in sight of the city in ten days.’
Dio 55.26.1; Suet. Aug. 42.
Dio 55.26.2. This represents a temporary suspension of the rules governing senators’ movements outside Italy, Dio, 52.42.6 = 29 bc, see R. J. A. Talbert (1984), 139–40. It may be inferred that much of Italy was subject in ad 6 to a low food supply. Augustus himself suggests that there was something wrong with agricultural production, Suet. Aug. 42.3: ut tandem annona convaluit, impetum se cepisse scribit frumentationes publicas in perpetuum abolendi, quod earum fiducia cultura agrorum cessaret, ‘He writes that when the grain supply improved, he was very much inclined to abolish the public supply of grain for good, because reliance on this had discouraged agriculture.’
Dio 55.26.1.
Dio 55.26.3; Suet. Aug. 41.2.
Dio 55.26.4–5; Dig. 1.15.1–3; Suet. Aug. 30.
Ovid (Trist. 2.267–268) provides us with a contemporary opinion: ‘What is more useful than fire? For whoever is planning to burn a house arms his criminal hands with fire.’ The intention of P. Lentulus Sura and his co-conspirators in 63 bc to deliberately to light fires across Rome is apposite. It was evidently the best method for causing widespread panic, while diverting public attention from other activities, in their case the assassination of members of the government, Sall. Bell. Cat. 42.
Suet. Aug. 25.2: Libertino milite, praeterquam Romae incendiorum causa et si tumultus in graviore annona metueretur, bis usus est, ‘Only twice were freedmen used as soldiers, except for use as fire-fighters in Rome and if he was in fear of riots when grain was scarce.’ The co-ordinating conjunction et need not imply two separate emergency forces. It could mean that the vigiles fought fires and controlled riots. Curiously, W. Nippel (1995), 96, understands this passage to mean that ‘Augustus may have thought of employing the vigiles as a sort of riot police if necessary’, but then writes: ‘but we have no evidence that they were really used in this way’. But surely Suetonius provides such evidence.
Dig. 1.15: ‘The Prefect of the Vigiles takes cognizance of incendiaries, burglars, thieves, robbers, and harbourers of criminals, unless the culprit is so savage and notorious, that he is turned over to the Prefect of the City.’
Sen. Cont. 2.1.11–12.
Phenomena that we know well in modern cities perhaps appeared in Rome in the first century bc, necessitating a range of government interventions. Augustus’ Principate was an attempt at a solution, though incomplete. The vigiles represent an important step in the direction of a centralized emergency services unit.
Dio 55.27.1–3.
C.,
. Cf. P. M. Swan (2004), 183, who writes ‘It is anything but clear how he [Dio] thought the inheritence tax, which he says exempted the poor, exercised the people.’ Swan seems to suggest here that ‘ὅμιλος’ is to be read as ‘the poor’. He is guided by But Yavetz includes in his list populus, οἱ πολλοί δη̑μος and οἱ ἐν τῃ̑ πόλϵι. It cannot be maintained that these all refer to the poor. Importantly, however, there is evidence to suggest that the minimum property qualification was set very low. , cites papyrus which shows that in the second century ad a property worth 1,900 drachmas (HS 7,600) could be taxed. If this were the case in ad 5, it would suggest that a great part of the population was affected by the tax, including, perhaps, emancipated slaves who had inherited a few thousand sesterces in their master’s will.It is considered a single and unique affair by T. Wiedemann (1975), 264–71, esp. 268; R. Syme (1986), 115–27;
Suet. Aug. 19.1.
B. Levick (1999), index.
Scholia in Iuvenalem: 158.1–2.
Suet. Claud. 26.1.
Under ad 28 Tacitus, Ann. 4.71, writes that Julia had been exiled for twenty years: Illic viginti annis exilium toleravit…
Juv. Sat. 6.157–160.
Twice exiled: F. Norwood (1963), 153 n. 31Close, though he considers the first ‘relegation’ to have been an informal arrangement, as with Agrippa Postumus’ stay in Surrentum; R. Detweiler (1970), 290 n.12 seems to accept Norwood’s view; B. Levick (1976), 331, and (1999), 59, with caution on both occasions. Exiled once:
; R. A. Birch (1981), 454; R. Syme (1986), 123 f.; P. M. Swan (2004), 184 f. Unsure: T. Wiedemann (1975), 268 n. 3;Dio 55.27.2.
R. A. Bauman (1974), 43 f.; Dig. 47.10.5.11: Et ei, qui indicasset, sivi liber sive servus sit, pro modo substantiae accusatae personae aestimatione iudicis praemium constituitur, servo forsitan et libertate praestanda. Quid enim si publica utilitas ex hoc emergit, ‘And for the person who exposes such offence, whether he be free or slave, there is provided a reward according the wealth of the accused, to be assessed by the judge, and in the case of a slave liberty may follow. For it may be that a public good emerges from the exposure.’ There is, however, no evidence that slaves provided the bulk of information, if any, in ad 6.
Suet. Aug. 55.
Tac. Ann. 1.72. Jerome Chron. P176 H: ‘Cassius Severus, the outstanding orator, who had mocked the Quintian proverb dies of starvation in the 25th year of his exile, covered with hardly a rag over his genitals.’ That places his condemnation in ad 8. The date is nevertheless disputed. Th. Mommsen (1899), 800; R. E. Smith (1951), 169–79, esp. 178;
, and , all place Cassius’ trial in ad 12 by associating it with Dio 56.27.1 f: καὶ μαθὼν ὅτι βιβλία ἄττα ἐφ’ ὕβρϵι τινῶν συγγράφοιτο, ζήτησιν αὐτῶν ἐποιήσατο, καὶ ἐκϵῖνά τϵ, τὰ μὲν ἐν τῃ̑ πόλϵι ϵὑρϵθέντα πρὸς τῶν ἀγορανόμων τὰ δὲ ἔξω πρὸς τῶν ἑκασταχόθι ἀρχόντων, κατέφλϵξϵ, καὶ τῶν συνθέντων αὐτὰ ἐκόλασέ τινας. ‘And learning that some pamphlets of an insulting nature were being written concerning certain people, he ordered a search be made for them; and those that were found in the city he ordered to be burned by the aediles, and those outside by the chief magistrates in each place, and he punished some of the writers’. None cite Jerome. R. A. Bauman (1974), 29–30, is aware of Jerome, but he too wishes to associate Cassius Severus with Dio 56.27.1. He therefore moves the Dio passage into a lacuna where ad 8 would have been because, he reasons, ad 8 was apparently a tumultuous year, while ad 12 was too peaceful to warrant such an episode. This is a poor and self-fulfilling argument. Logically, Dio’s evidence suggests that ad 12 was not peaceful. It is only if we remove Dio that the year seems tranquil, an erroneous method for establishing historical fact. A more recent examination of the evidence has been made by , who argues that the intensification of Cassius’ exile to Seriphos mentioned in Tac. Ann. 4.21.6 belongs in 12 ad, and that the note in Tacitus under ad 24 actually refers to a re-examination of Cassius’ situation, with a verdict to continue to uphold the prior judgments. But this is to damage the natural meaning of Tacitus’ words, which explicitly place Cassius’ move to Seriphos in ad 24. Dio 56.27.1 refers moreover to multiple authors. The most plausible solution is to place Cassius’ condemnation in ad 8, consider the situation in ad 12 to have been wholly unrelated, and place the intensification of Cassius Severus’ punishment (from relegatio to deportatio) to ad 24.Sen. Cont. 10 prae. 5–6. Eius is unknown. The editor of the Loeb text suggested Cassius Severus, but see Sen. Cont. 10 prae. 8: Cassi Severi, hominis Labieno invisissimi, belle dicta res ferebatur illo tempore quo libri Labieni ex senatus consulto urebantur: nunc me, inquit, vivum uri oportet qui illos edidici, ‘Cassius Severus, who was the greatest enemy of Labienus’, had a beautiful saying that was in circulation at the time when Labienus’ books were burnt by decree of the senate: ‘Now they should burn me alive; I know those books by heart’. Severus was frankly impressed by Labienus’ works, but his comment, as well as being witty, is critical of the decision to burn Labienus’ books. Indeed, it points out the futility of such action, since ideas can transcend mere paper. Seneca, on the other hand, is clear that the individual who proposed the penalty was the one who lived to see his works burn. G. W. Clarke (1972), 77, placed Labienus’ condemnation in ad 6, but there is no evidence to support this belief.
Sen. Cont. 10 prae. 8.
Inferred also by the nature of Labienus’ death, Sen. Cont. 10 prae. 7: Non tulit hanc Labienus contumeliam nec superstes esse ingenio suo voluit, sed in monimenta se maiorum suorum ferri iussit atque ita includi, veritus scilicet ne ignis qui nomini suo subiectus erat corpori negaretur: non finivit tantum se ipse sed etiam sepelivit, ‘Labienus did not take this insult nor did he wish to outlast his own genius, but he had himself carried into the tomb of his ancestors and walled-up, fearing that the fire which engrossed his books would be denied his body: he not only finished his own life, he burried himself.’ Labienus’ fear that fire might be denied to his own body, and his desire to bury himself, suggest a charge of maiestas, which would have brought with it either death or exile, which both prevented cremation and burial. Indeed, his suicide can be explained as an attempt to protect his testament from interference by the State, see also D. Hennig (1973), 251 f.
Sen. Cont. 10 prae. 8.
Tac. Ann. 4.34; Dio 57.24.2.
Tac. Ann. 1.10.1 on Augustus: simulatam Pompeianarum gratiam partium.
i.e. it was possible to sympathize with Pompey’s cause, but openly to lament the victory of Caesar, and later Octavian, was an entirely different matter. Both evidence a ‘Pompeian spirit’.
Cf.
. The case of Cremutius Cordus does not contradict my approach. Tac. Ann. 4.34: Cornelio Cosso Asinio Agrippa consulibus Cremutius Cordus postulatur novo ac tunc primum audito crimine, quod editis annalibus laudatoque M. Bruto C. Cassium Romanorum ultimum dixisset, ‘In the consulships of Cornelius Cossus and Asinius Agrippa, Cremutius Cordus was prosecuted for the new and hitherto unheard of crime of writing a history, praising Brutus and calling C. Cassius the last of the Romans.’ The charge against Cordus cannot have been that of simply writing a history (which would have set an impossible precedent to police), but writing a history in which, by praising Brutus and calling Cassius the last of the Romans, he had diminished the majesty of the Roman people and its government, since it could be argued that he had de-legitimized the government. The charge was novel and obviously constructed for the purpose of delation, as is made clear in Seneca’s Consolatio Ad Marciam; cf. R. H. Martin and A. J. Woodman (1989), 177 f. The commentators take Tacitus to mean that Cordus was the first to be charged with ‘writing a history’. Aware that this contradicts Seneca’s note concerning Labienus, they argue that Labienus was charged not with writing but with oratory. That is unlikely. Seneca states of Labienus’ punishment: ‘It was an unheard of novelty that punishment should be exacted from literature.’ If he had been charged with offensive oratory, why were his books burned?We know of at least two of Augustus’ friends being attacked. Cassius Severus apparently wrote that Quintus Vitellius, a quaestor under Augustus and the father of the future emperor, was descended from a cobbler whose son, given to making money from confiscated estates, married a common wife (mulier vulgaris) Suet. Vit. 2; see also Sen. Cont. 2.4.11, and the preface of Cont. 3; Sen. Suas. 6.11; Quint. Inst. 10.1.116, 12.10.11 and 6.3.27, where jests are described asperam.
Tac. Ann. 4.21.
Anonymous libel therefore never attracted a charge of maiestas, unless, of course, the victim were a magistrate or the princeps. It could be investigated in a public tribunal, but it made the perpetrator intestabilis. The idea that someone could be subjected to a public tribunal and yet suffer a penalty prescribed by a civil procedure is best explained by Paulus’ reference to an actio mixto iure, PS. 5.4.8. Here, the action comes between the iudicium publicum and the iudicium privatum.
Suet. Tib. 28.
Tac. Ann. 1.72 does not contradict this approach: Mox Tiberius, consultante Pompeio Macro praetore an iudicia maiestatis redderentur, exercendas leges esse respondit. Hunc quoque asperavere carmina incertis auctoribus vulgata in saevitiam superbiamque eius et discordem cum matre animum, ‘Soon after Tiberius, to an inquiry put to the praetor, Pompeius Macer, whether the maiestas court should be restored, responded that the law should carry on. Poems of unknown authorship satirising his savagery, arrogance, and his broken relationship with his mother, had also exasperated him.’ The statement belongs to ad 15. It relates simply to seditious libel (was the princeps cruel) rather than private contumelies; see also Suet. Tib. 58. Pompeius Macer may have been asking whether senatus consulta relating to investigations into treason had superseded his courts’ judgment; Tiberius said ‘no’.
A fragment of Cicero (De re publica 4.10.12), which is found in Augustine (De Civit. Dei 2.9) shows that defamation was a crime during Cicero’s childhood: nostrae contra duodecim tabulae cum perpaucas res capite sanxissent, in his hanc quoque sanciendam putaverunt, si quis occentavisset sive carmen condidisset quod infamiam faceret flagitiumve alteri, ‘Our twelve tables, on the other hand, though they provided the death penalty for only a few things, did provide it for any person who sang or composed a song which contained a slander or insult to anybody else.’ Sulla probably included it in his lex Cornelia de iniuriis, at which point the penalty was perhaps downgraded.
Cf. Seneca De Beneficiis 3.26.1. Seneca probably refers to the final period of Tiberius’ Principate, or at least to the period of Sejanus’ rule. For a case of written and spoken libel against the emperor as maiestas, see Tac. Ann. 14.48, for a recent discussion, see
.Dio 55.27.1.
App. BC 5.67–8.
Dio 55.25.5–6.
Dio 55.27.1.
Suet. Aug. 19.
Dio’s silence is still a problem. I can only conclude that Dio either passed over the results of the inquiry or more likely followed a tradition which conflated the exile of Paullus with his wife the younger Julia (there is a lacuna in Dio’s text for ad 8). The conspiracy of Cn. Cornelius Cinna Magnus (cos. ad 5) is an appropriate example. The younger Seneca placed the affair somewhere between 16 and 13 bc, while Dio placed it in ad 4. Badian is sceptical: ‘On Cinna, his [Dio’s] date of ad 4 is usually thought to be wrong, though Seneca’s main reference is so full of mistakes in names, dates, ages and even the sequence of other conspiracies that it would be hazardous to believe him,’ E. Badian (1982), 20–1. Significantly Dio is thought to have used Seneca as a source, M. Adler, ‘Die Verschwörung des Cn. Cornelius Cinna bei Seneca und Cassius Dio’, ZÖG, 60 (1909), 193–208;
; ; P. M. Swan (2004), 147–8. In both Dio and Seneca, Cinna Magnus plotted against Augustus. As with Cinna Magnus, Aemilius Paullus’ story may have suffered in transmission; the details of his trial were obscured.Scholia in Iuvenalem 6.158.
Dio 55.27.3–4.
Suet. Claud. 2.2; Pliny NH 2.96, 8.4.
Suet. Claud. 2.2. Levick, B.; (1976), 327, n. 102; Dio places the dedication at the very end of ad 6, the Fasti Praenestini (V. Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones (1955), 46), and Ovid Fasti 1.705–8 give only the date: 27 Jan. P. M. Swan (2004), 185–6 postulates that Dio has erred by linking thematically two episodes concerned with the elder Drusus, i.e. dedication of the temple by Tiberius and the gladiatorial games put on by Germanicus and Claudius at end of ad 6. Swan thus dates the dedication to 27 Jan. ad 6. It is similarly possible however that Dio has dragged back to the end of ad 6 an event which in fact took place at the very beginning of ad 7, i.e. events were organized to celebrate the life of the elder Drusus over a period of 2–3 months.
Dio 55.27.5.
Vell. 2.111.4; at 2.104.3 Velleius tells us that towards the end of ad 4 he joined Tiberius in Germany as a praefectus equitum and that ‘for nine continuous years…I was a spectator of his superhuman achievements’.
Vell. 2.105.3; 2.107.3.
Dio 55.30.6.
Dio 55.31.1.
Appian BC 5.66; Dio 48.33.1; Suet. Aug. 66.1.
Vell. 2.111.2.
Suet. Tib. 21.3.
Tiberius’ already possessed maius imperium in upper and lower Germany and possibly Gaul, but there is no evidence to suggest that it extended originally to Illyricum.
Vell. 2.113.1; Dio 55.32.1; Suet. Tib. 16.1 puts the number at 15, but Velleius ought to be preferred.
A. J. Woodman (1977), 141 suggests that Velleius intends to ‘magnify this pietas by emphasising the difficulty of the winter journey’. It is certainly reminiscent of Tiberius’ rushed journey to see his dying brother ( Livy Per. 142; Pliny NH 7.48) and later his dying father (Vell. 2.123.1; Suet. Tib. 21.1).
Dio 55.27.5.
Suet. Tib. 16.2.
Rumours suggesting a weakened relationship must be placed within a wider context. Suetonius, Tib. 21.2, knew of a tradition which believed that Augustus was unimpressed with Tiberius and secretly ridiculed him: Scio vulgo persuasum quasi egresso post secretum sermonem Tiberio vox Augusti per cubicularios excepta sit: ‘Miserum populum R., qui sub tam lentis maxillis erit!, I know that it is commonaly believed that after Tiberius had left the room, following the secret conversation, Augustus’ voice was heard by the servants: “What misery for the Roman people, to be crushed by such slow moving jaws!” The influence of a late tradition aside, a belief that Augustus tolerated Tiberius would, logically, have appeared owing to the nature of Tiberius’ retirement in 6 bc. Scepticism would have been a natural reaction to Tiberius’ adoption.
Dio 55.27.4.
It is interesting to note that by highlighting Claudianus Tiberius could point out a historical connection to the Cornelii, Valerii, Fabii, and even the Aemilii. Julia’s children had no such Republican tradition and had to draw on Aeneas and his offspring. Perhaps L. Aemilius Paullus advertised himself as a superior candidate on account of his heritage, or compared himself to one of his famous ancestors, most notably the consul of 182 and 168 bc. For a discussion of this family in late Republican politics, see
.Dio 55.32.1 f.
Cf. R. A. Birch (1981), 451: ‘The first punishment—‘abdicatio’ and removal to Surrentum—was a curious mixture of extreme severity and surprising leniency…exile in Surrentum was presumably comfortable, probably very comfortable, and as favourable a sentence of this kind as could have been imposed.’ Birch has erred by relying on Levick’s interpretation of abdicatio.
Month: | Total Views: |
---|---|
October 2022 | 1 |
November 2022 | 8 |
December 2022 | 10 |
January 2023 | 3 |
February 2023 | 10 |
March 2023 | 5 |
April 2023 | 8 |
May 2023 | 4 |
June 2023 | 2 |
July 2023 | 5 |
August 2023 | 4 |
September 2023 | 3 |
October 2023 | 2 |
November 2023 | 3 |
December 2023 | 1 |
January 2024 | 5 |
February 2024 | 1 |
March 2024 | 2 |
April 2024 | 3 |
May 2024 | 2 |
June 2024 | 4 |
July 2024 | 8 |
August 2024 | 1 |
September 2024 | 4 |
October 2024 | 2 |
November 2024 | 2 |
December 2024 | 5 |
January 2025 | 5 |
February 2025 | 6 |
March 2025 | 3 |
April 2025 | 4 |
May 2025 | 2 |