.... According to this argument: Moral/Epistemic Parity. If moral facts and claims entail irreducibly normative reasons, then epistemic reasons are irreducibly normative reasons; but No Scepticism about Epistemic Reasons. There are epistemic reasons. And it follows from these two claims...

... it is unsound. I go on to show why the tension Cowie thinks is fatal to CG arguments evades the fundamental issue at stake in contemporary debates over moral error theory, namely, whether categorical normative reasons exist. companions in guilt error theory moral reasons epistemic reasons categorical...

... the existence of is a fundamentally distinct relation from instances of R that do not have such properties. To further see that if epistemic and moral reasons are instances of the same fundamental relation and there are epistemic reasons, then scepticism about moral reasons is not warranted, consider...

..., then there are no epistemic reasons for belief. If there are no epistemic reasons for belief, then there is no epistemic reason to believe the epistemic error theory. So, either the epistemic error theory is false or there is no epistemic reason to believe it. So, we should reject the epistemic error theory. So...

... reasonable, or unreasonable, and the sense of reasonable intended when applied to faith. In order to have a method for determining the reasonableness of a belief, it considers two kinds of epistemic reasons: theoretical and deliberative. The chapter argues that trust in ourselves when we are epistemically...

... rights rule of law attitude s directives motivational difficulties problems mala prohibita conduct tax evasion legal systems normative weighing conduct-guiding function of law epistemic reasons social coordination double-counting reasons cognitive biases self-enhancement bias self-serving...

... retrospection rightness truth norm of belief lottery normativity rational belief unity of normativity theory of reasons reasons for feeling structural rationality epistemic reasons practical reasons 10 Conclusion There are reasons that are facts and reasons that are not. There are reasons that demand...

... those who deem reasons unimportant. Indeed, we hold that having sufficient epistemic reasons is necessary and sufficient for propositional justification, and that proper basing on them yields doxastic justification. But since possession and proper basing are grounded in competence, reasons...

... deontological GD conception of justification justification Steup M Nottelmann N BonJour L Alston W P Leite A reasons normativity normative reasons reasons for belief ontology of reasons epistemic justification epistemic reasons What I see when I look into the fridge gives me reason to believe...

...Critics like Matt Bedke, Terence Cuneo, and David Enoch have recently argued that an error theory that targets irreducible normativity has deeply problematic ramifications for hypothetical reasons, epistemic reasons, and deliberation. These challenges can all be viewed as versions of the companions...

..., ” Philosophical Studies 139(1): 57–71. Soames, S. ( 1989 ). “ Presupposition, ” in D. Gabbay , D. and F. Guenther (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic (Dordrecht: Reidel), vol. IV, 553–616. Turri, J. ( 2009 ). “ The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons...

... on the logically weakest assurance view, suggested by the work of Richard Moran, that such assurance or acceptance gives the recipient an epistemic reason to believe p, though whether this reason is a good one depends on further “background conditions.” On this view, testimonial reason-giving...

... Quine W V O Hacking I Nagel T epistemic reasons explanation belief needs interests Bloor Kuhn In the preceding chapters, I argued that facts about what belief would be justified by a given piece of evidence are facts that must be thought of as absolute, and not as varying from social...

... and externalism about epistemic reasons might look like should make us skeptical about external practical reasons. practical rationality procedural rationality Williams Bernard internalism about reasons reason s theoretical rationality Emergency Landing Captain Sullenberger...

... Jonathan Millikan Ruth Pritchard Duncan value of cognitive states Williamson Timothy Chang Ruth Baehr Jason buck-passing account epistemic normativity epistemic reasons justification epistemic value Buck-passing accounts (BPAs) hold that normative properties such as badness and rightness can...

... to believe in the general reliability of your perceptions, as long as they are internally consistent, but suspend belief until you come across sufficient epistemic reasons for this belief, could you then ever start believing in there being a physical world corresponding even in general outline to your...

..., epistemic reasons differ from practical reasons in that we could have justification for our premises which is external to our beliefs: for instance, we could perceive that it is the case that p. If we believe p because of what we perceive, our perception could be the reason or explanation...

.... This chapter makes an argument against VFA. It argues that epistemic reasons for belief should not be analysed in terms of value. But it argues that if epistemic reasons should not be analysed in terms of value but reasons for pro-attitudes should be analysed in terms of value, then epistemic reasons...

...-luck conditions lack. epistemic reasons epistemology Gettier E Gettierology Fake Barn Country Ginet C Goldman A metaethics Schroeder M epistemic rationality evidence Reasons First Epistemology Decisive Weight justification weight of reasons Sufficient Weight defeat Sylvan K Klein P...