
Contents
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25.1 Introduction 25.1 Introduction
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25.2 Reasons for Belief as Normative Reasons 25.2 Reasons for Belief as Normative Reasons
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25.2.1 Explanatory and Normative Reasons 25.2.1 Explanatory and Normative Reasons
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25.2.2 What Kind of an Animal Is a Reason? 25.2.2 What Kind of an Animal Is a Reason?
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25.2.3 Practical Reasons for Belief? 25.2.3 Practical Reasons for Belief?
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25.2.4 Reasons, Evidence, and Inference 25.2.4 Reasons, Evidence, and Inference
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25.2.5 Summary: Normative Reasons for Belief? 25.2.5 Summary: Normative Reasons for Belief?
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25.3 Reasons for Belief and Normative Conceptions of Justification 25.3 Reasons for Belief and Normative Conceptions of Justification
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25.3.1 The Weak GD Conception 25.3.1 The Weak GD Conception
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25.3.2 The Strong GD Conception 25.3.2 The Strong GD Conception
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25.4 Conclusion 25.4 Conclusion
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References References
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25 Reasons for Belief and Normativity
Get accessKathrin Glüer is Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at Stockholm University, Sweden. She mainly works in the philosophy of mind and language, with occasional forays into epistemology.
Åsa Wikforss is Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at Stockholm University, Sweden. She mainly works in the philosophy of mind and language, with occasional forays into epistemology.
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Published:10 July 2018
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Abstract
In this chapter, we critically examine the most important extant ways of understanding and motivating the idea that reasons for belief are normative. First, we examine the proposal that the distinction between explanatory and so-called normative reasons that is commonly drawn in moral philosophy can be rather straightforwardly applied to reasons for belief, and that reasons for belief are essentially normative precisely when they are normative reasons. In the course of this investigation, we explore the very nature of the reasons-for-belief relation, as well as the ontology of such reasons. Second, we examine the idea that the normativity derives from the internal connection between reasons for belief and epistemic justification, distinguishing between two distinct normativist accounts of justification, a weaker and a stronger one. We argue that neither line of argument is compelling. Pending further arguments, we conclude that normativism about reasons for belief is not supported.
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