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Vincent P. Crawford, Tamar Kugler, Zvika Neeman, Ady Pauzner, Behaviorally Optimal Auction Design: Examples and Observations, Journal of the European Economic Association, Volume 7, Issue 2-3, 1 May 2009, Pages 377–387, https://doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.2-3.377
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Abstract
This paper begins to explore behavioral mechanism design, replacing equilibrium by a model based on “level-k” thinking, which has strong support in experiments. In representative examples, we consider optimal sealed-bid auctions with two symmetric bidders who have independent private values, assuming that the designer knows the distribution of level-k bidders. We show that in a first-price auction, level-k bidding changes the optimal reserve price and often yields expected revenue that exceeds Myerson's (1981) bound; and that an exotic auction that exploits bidders' non-equilibrium beliefs can far exceed the revenue bound. We close with some general observations about level-k auction design.