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James J. Anton, Dennis A. Yao, Markets for Partially Contractible Knowledge: Bootstrapping versus Bundling, Journal of the European Economic Association, Volume 3, Issue 2-3, 1 May 2005, Pages 745–754, https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.745
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Abstract
We discuss how a seller can appropriate rents when selling knowledge that lacks legal property rights by solving either an expropriation or a valuation problem and then analyze how seller rents increase when a portion of the intellectual property (IP) can be protected. The analysis shows that a sequential strategy in which the protected portion of the IP is sold prior to selling the unprotected IP is superior to selling both portions of the IP as a bundle.
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© 2005 by the European Economic Association
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