-
Views
-
Cite
Cite
Jaap H. Abbring, James J. Heckman, Pierre-André Chiappori, Jean Pinquet, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance: Can Dynamic Data Help to Distinguish?, Journal of the European Economic Association, Volume 1, Issue 2-3, 1 May 2003, Pages 512–521, https://doi.org/10.1162/154247603322391152
- Share Icon Share
Abstract
A standard problem of applied contracts theory is to empirically distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard. We show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinguish moral hazard from dynamic selection on unobservables. In the presence of moral hazard, experience rating implies negative occurrence dependence: individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims. We discuss econometric tests for the various types of data that are typically available. Finally, we argue that dynamic data also allow to test for adverse selection, even if it is based on asymmetric learning.