
Contents
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Introduction Introduction
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Courts as Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Courts as Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
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Quasi-judicial Institutions versus Courts Quasi-judicial Institutions versus Courts
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Moving toward Compulsory Adjudication Moving toward Compulsory Adjudication
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Origins of Courts as Institutions of Governance Origins of Courts as Institutions of Governance
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The “Activation” of Courts The “Activation” of Courts
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Whence Judicial Power? Whence Judicial Power?
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Judicial Power and Independence Judicial Power and Independence
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The Political Capacity to Constrain Judicial Independence The Political Capacity to Constrain Judicial Independence
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The Political Costs of Undermining Independence The Political Costs of Undermining Independence
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The Value of Judicial Independence to Political Actors The Value of Judicial Independence to Political Actors
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Conclusion Conclusion
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Notes Notes
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References References
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18 Courts: A Historical Political Economy Perspective
Get accessTom S. Clark is the Charles Howard Candler Professor of Political Science at Emory University.
Georg Vanberg is Ernestine Friedl Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Law and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Duke University. His research focuses on political institutions, including courts, legislatures, and coalition governance. His work has been published in the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, and the Journal of Politics, among others. He is the author of Parliaments and Coalitions (with Lanny Martin, Oxford University Press) and The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany (Cambridge University Press).
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Published:22 May 2023
Cite
Abstract
Judicial institutions are ubiquitous and fundamental to social life. This chapter explores the emergence and development of courts from quasi-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms to highly complex formal institutions that structure private law and police constitutional boundaries. The initial conditions for dispute resolution impose significant constraints on the ability to impose judgements, limiting dangers of the partiality. As courts develop into more formal, state-sponsored institutions, their coercive capacity grows, and the construction of institutional limits on judicial power takes on greater significance. Finally, as courts also assume a role in policing the constitutional boundaries of the state itself, protections for judicial independence emerge as an important condition. This chapter traces these developments and describes the conditions that favor the emergence of effective, independent courts.
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