
Contents
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Motivations for an Agent Causal Account Motivations for an Agent Causal Account
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From the Intractable Difficulties with Giving a Causal Theory of Action From the Intractable Difficulties with Giving a Causal Theory of Action
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From the Conflict Between a Causal Theory and Freedom of Action From the Conflict Between a Causal Theory and Freedom of Action
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Ontological and Metaphysical Commitments of Any Agent Causal Theory Ontological and Metaphysical Commitments of Any Agent Causal Theory
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Agents as Substances that Endure Through Time Agents as Substances that Endure Through Time
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Agents as Compositionally Irreducible Substances (Though Possibly Physically Composed) Agents as Compositionally Irreducible Substances (Though Possibly Physically Composed)
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Causal Antireductionism Causal Antireductionism
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Theories of Agent Causation Theories of Agent Causation
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Agent Causation and Event Causation: Their Distinctness and Their Relationship Agent Causation and Event Causation: Their Distinctness and Their Relationship
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What Does the Agent Cause? What Does the Agent Cause?
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Agent Causation and Reasons-Based Explanation of Action Agent Causation and Reasons-Based Explanation of Action
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Objections to Agent Causal Theories Objections to Agent Causal Theories
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The “Actions Are Datable, Agents Are Not” Objection The “Actions Are Datable, Agents Are Not” Objection
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The “Uniformity of Causal Power” Objection The “Uniformity of Causal Power” Objection
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The “Self-Creation is Impossible” Objection The “Self-Creation is Impossible” Objection
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The “No-Explanation” Objection The “No-Explanation” Objection
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The “Rollback” and “Luck” Objections The “Rollback” and “Luck” Objections
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The “Strengthened Luck” Objection The “Strengthened Luck” Objection
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The “Probabilistically Governed Agent Causation is Insufficient for Freedom” Objection The “Probabilistically Governed Agent Causation is Insufficient for Freedom” Objection
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Notes Notes
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15 Agent-Causal Theories of Freedom
Get accessTimothy O'Connor is professor and chair of the Department of Philosophy at Indiana University, Bloomington. He has published numerous articles in metaphysics, philosophy of mind and action, and philosophy of religion. He is the editor of Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will (OUP, 1995) and coeditor of Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings (2003), Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will (2009), Emergence in Science and Philosophy and A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. He is the author of Persons and Causes (OUP, 2000) and Theism and Ultimate Explanation (2008).
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Published:18 September 2012
Cite
Abstract
This article provides an overview of recent agent-causal theories, explaining what motivates them to postulate an “ontologically primitive” notion of causation by an agent or substance that is not reducible to ordinary modes of event-causation. It considers different accounts of the agent-causal view which have been defended by libertarians. It also poses the question whether agent-causal theories require a substance dualism of mind and body since they posit a causal relation between an agent and action irreducible to ordinary modes of causation. It argues that agent-causal theories do not necessarily require substance dualism, but may require causal powers and properties that are ontologically emergent.
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