
Contents
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Introduction Introduction
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How to construct a successful example of an IRR-situation How to construct a successful example of an IRR-situation
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An Example of an IRR-situation An Example of an IRR-situation
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IRR-Situations and Frankfurt-Type Examples IRR-Situations and Frankfurt-Type Examples
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The Notion of a Morally Significant Alternative The Notion of a Morally Significant Alternative
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Dialectical Interlude Dialectical Interlude
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A Libertarian-Based Alternative to PAE A Libertarian-Based Alternative to PAE
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The Difference Between an IRR-scenario and a Deterministic Scenario The Difference Between an IRR-scenario and a Deterministic Scenario
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Objections and Replies Objections and Replies
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Conclusion Conclusion
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Notes Notes
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13 Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism
Get accessDavid Widerker is professor at Bar-Ilan University in Israel. He has published widely on the topics of free will and moral responsibility. He is a coeditor (with Michael McKenna) of Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities (2003). His recent articles include “Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities” (Philosophical Review, 1995), “Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look” (Philosophical Topics, 2000), “Agent-Causation and the Control-Problem” (Faith and Philosophy, 2005), “Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios” (The Journal of Philosophy, 2006), and “A Defense of Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism” (Philosophical Explorations, 2009).
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Published:18 September 2012
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Abstract
This article begins by reviewing a major objection to Frankfurt-type examples made in past writings, called here as the “Dilemma Objection.” It explains why PAP has an initial plausibility for many persons. This plausibility is grounded, the article argues, in a principle called the “principle of reasonable expectations” (PAE): An agent is morally blameworthy for a given act only if, in the circumstances, it would be morally reasonable to expect the agent to have done something else. It argues that in situations of such kinds, agents can be held morally responsible for their actions, even in a libertarian sense. This views is called “Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.” It argues that this more “Frankfurt-friendly” view is another possible option open to libertarians in response to Frankfurt-type examples.
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