
Contents
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27.1 Introduction 27.1 Introduction
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27.2 Does having a Perceptual Experience Make one have Justification for a Belief? 27.2 Does having a Perceptual Experience Make one have Justification for a Belief?
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27.3 Does having a Perceptual Experience Make one have Justification for a Belief about the External World? 27.3 Does having a Perceptual Experience Make one have Justification for a Belief about the External World?
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27.4 Does having a Perceptual Experience Make one have Justification for a Belief about the External World in Virtue of its Phenomenology? 27.4 Does having a Perceptual Experience Make one have Justification for a Belief about the External World in Virtue of its Phenomenology?
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27.5 Are Perceptual Experiences Composed of Sensations and Seemings? 27.5 Are Perceptual Experiences Composed of Sensations and Seemings?
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27.6 What Does Perceptual Experience Reveal? 27.6 What Does Perceptual Experience Reveal?
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27.7 Concluding Remarks: Beyond Perceptual Experience 27.7 Concluding Remarks: Beyond Perceptual Experience
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References References
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27 Consciousness and Knowledge
Get accessBerit "Brit" Brogaard is Professor of Philosophy at University of Miami. Her areas of research include philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and cognitive science. She is the author of the books Transient Truths (Oxford 2012), On Romantic Love (Oxford 2015), The Superhuman Mind (Penguin 2015), and Seeing and Saying (Oxford 2018).
Elijah Chudnoff is associate professor of philosophy at the University of Miami. He has written papers and books exploring the role of conscious experience in both a priori and empirical inquiry. He is currently working on a book about expertise.
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Published:09 July 2020
Cite
Abstract
This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular on the role perceptual consciousness might play in justifying beliefs about the external world. A version of phenomenal dogmatism is outlined according to which perceptual experiences immediately, prima facie justify certain select parts of their content, and do so in virtue of their having a distinctive phenomenology with respect to those contents. Along the way various issues are considered in connection with this core theme, including the possibility of immediate justification, the dispute between representational and relational views of perception, the epistemic significance of cognitive penetration, the question of whether perceptual experiences are composed of more basic sensations and seemings, and questions about the existence and epistemic significance of high-level content. A concluding section briefly considers how some of the topics pursued here might generalize beyond perception.
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