
Contents
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
13.1 What is Dualism? 13.1 What is Dualism?
-
13.1.1 Dualism vs. Physicalism 13.1.1 Dualism vs. Physicalism
-
13.1.2 An Epistemic Standard for Physical Science: Objectivity 13.1.2 An Epistemic Standard for Physical Science: Objectivity
-
13.1.3 A Metaphysical Standard for Physical Science: Structure and Dynamics 13.1.3 A Metaphysical Standard for Physical Science: Structure and Dynamics
-
13.1.4 The Epistemic, the Metaphysical, and Brute Necessities 13.1.4 The Epistemic, the Metaphysical, and Brute Necessities
-
-
13.2 Arguments for Dualism 13.2 Arguments for Dualism
-
13.2.1 The Knowledge Argument 13.2.1 The Knowledge Argument
-
13.2.2 The Zombie Argument 13.2.2 The Zombie Argument
-
13.2.3 Can We really Perform these Thought Experiments? 13.2.3 Can We really Perform these Thought Experiments?
-
13.2.4 The Use of Armchair Reasoning 13.2.4 The Use of Armchair Reasoning
-
-
13.3 Dualism and Theoretical Simplicity 13.3 Dualism and Theoretical Simplicity
-
13.4 Dualism and Mental Causation 13.4 Dualism and Mental Causation
-
13.4.1 The Exclusion Argument 13.4.1 The Exclusion Argument
-
13.4.2 The Completeness Premise 13.4.2 The Completeness Premise
-
-
13.5 The Epistemic Sources of Dualism and Physicalism 13.5 The Epistemic Sources of Dualism and Physicalism
-
References References
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
13 Dualism: How Epistemic Issues Drive Debates about the Ontology of Consciousness
Get accessBrie Gertler is Commonwealth Professor of Philosophy at the University of Virginia. Her work focuses on epistemic and metaphysical questions about the mind. She is the author of Self-Knowledge (Routledge 2011), as well as numerous articles on self-knowledge, dualism, mental content, and the self.
-
Published:09 July 2020
Cite
Abstract
Dualism is a metaphysical view about the nature of consciousness, driven largely by epistemic concerns. Dualism’s chief rival, physicalism about consciousness, is also a metaphysical view driven largely by epistemic concerns. A primary goal of this chapter is to correct a widespread misunderstanding about how epistemic issues shape the debate between dualists and physicalists. According to a familiar picture, dualism is motivated by armchair reflection, and dualists accord special significance to our ways of conceptualizing consciousness and the physical. In contrast, physicalists favor empirical data over armchair reflection, and physicalism is a relatively straightforward extension of scientific theorizing. This familiar picture is inaccurate. Both dualist and physicalist arguments employ a combination of empirical data and armchair reflection; both rely on considerations of how we conceptualize certain phenomena; and both aim to establish views that are compatible with scientific results but go well beyond the deliverances of empirical science. The discussion highlights these neglected epistemic parallels between dualism and physicalism.
Sign in
Personal account
- Sign in with email/username & password
- Get email alerts
- Save searches
- Purchase content
- Activate your purchase/trial code
- Add your ORCID iD
Purchase
Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.
Purchasing informationMonth: | Total Views: |
---|---|
October 2022 | 5 |
November 2022 | 12 |
December 2022 | 2 |
January 2023 | 6 |
February 2023 | 17 |
March 2023 | 1 |
April 2023 | 7 |
May 2023 | 15 |
June 2023 | 11 |
July 2023 | 8 |
August 2023 | 6 |
September 2023 | 4 |
October 2023 | 10 |
November 2023 | 5 |
December 2023 | 6 |
January 2024 | 7 |
February 2024 | 12 |
March 2024 | 15 |
April 2024 | 15 |
May 2024 | 5 |
June 2024 | 3 |
July 2024 | 10 |
August 2024 | 8 |
September 2024 | 14 |
October 2024 | 10 |
November 2024 | 14 |
December 2024 | 10 |
January 2025 | 2 |
February 2025 | 4 |
April 2025 | 10 |
May 2025 | 2 |
Get help with access
Institutional access
Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:
IP based access
Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.
Sign in through your institution
Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.
If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.
Sign in with a library card
Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.
Society Members
Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:
Sign in through society site
Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:
If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.
Sign in using a personal account
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.
Personal account
A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.
Viewing your signed in accounts
Click the account icon in the top right to:
Signed in but can't access content
Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.
Institutional account management
For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.