
Contents
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25.1 Introduction: Varieties of Epiphenomenalism 25.1 Introduction: Varieties of Epiphenomenalism
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25.2 Epiphenomenalism about Conscious Will 25.2 Epiphenomenalism about Conscious Will
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25.2.1 The Libet Experiments and Free Will 25.2.1 The Libet Experiments and Free Will
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25.2.2 Questioning the Time of Action Initiation 25.2.2 Questioning the Time of Action Initiation
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25.2.3 Questioning the Measured Time of Conscious Willing 25.2.3 Questioning the Measured Time of Conscious Willing
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25.3 Epiphenomenalism about Visually Guided Motor Action 25.3 Epiphenomenalism about Visually Guided Motor Action
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25.3.1 The Dissociation Argument 25.3.1 The Dissociation Argument
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25.3.2 The Hypothesis of Experience-Based Control 25.3.2 The Hypothesis of Experience-Based Control
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25.3.3 Does Visual Experience Directly Guide Motor Action? 25.3.3 Does Visual Experience Directly Guide Motor Action?
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25.3.4 Does Visual Experience Typically Guide Motor Action? 25.3.4 Does Visual Experience Typically Guide Motor Action?
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25.4 Conclusion 25.4 Conclusion
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References References
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25 Consciousness and Action: Contemporary Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism
Get accessBenjamin Kozuch received his doctorate in philosophy from the University of Arizona in 2013, and is now assistant professor at the University of Alabama. Much of his research involves using neuroscientific data to evaluate philosophical theories of consciousness. He also conducts research regarding visual illusions, and the nature of pain experiences. Before coming to philosophy, Benjamin was a freelance bassist in New Orleans, and he currently competitively mountain bikes.
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Published:09 July 2020
Cite
Abstract
In its classical form, epiphenomenalism is the view that conscious mental events have no physical effects: while physical events cause mental events, the opposite is never true. Unlike classical epiphenomenalism, contemporary forms do not hold that conscious mental states always lack causal efficacy, only that they are epiphenomenal relative to certain kinds of action, ones we pre-theoretically would have thought consciousness to causally contribute to. Two of these contemporary, empirically based challenges to the efficacy of the mental are the focus of this chapter. The first, originating in research by Libet, has been interpreted as showing that the neural events initiating voluntary actions precede our conscious willing of them, meaning the conscious will cannot be what causes them. The second challenge, originating in studies by Milner and Goodale, consist of instances in which the content of visual consciousness and motor action dissociate, casting doubt on the intuitive view that visual consciousness guides visually based motor action.
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