
Contents
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Cyber Operations and De-Escalation Cyber Operations and De-Escalation
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The Role of Signaling in International Politics The Role of Signaling in International Politics
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What are signals? What are signals?
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Challenges of signaling Challenges of signaling
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Signaling for accommodation and de-escalation—not just resolve Signaling for accommodation and de-escalation—not just resolve
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Public versus secret signaling Public versus secret signaling
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What Does This Mean for Signaling in Cyberspace? What Does This Mean for Signaling in Cyberspace?
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The limitations of cyber signaling for resolve The limitations of cyber signaling for resolve
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Cyber Operations as Accommodative Signals Cyber Operations as Accommodative Signals
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Plausible deniability and accommodative cyber signaling Plausible deniability and accommodative cyber signaling
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Revealing Operational Information to Reassure in Cyberspace Revealing Operational Information to Reassure in Cyberspace
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Conclusion Conclusion
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4 Restraint and Accommodation: How Cyber Operations Can Defuse Crises
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Published:March 2023
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Abstract
Chapter 4 extends the logic of the theory developed in Chapter 3 regarding the role cyber operations could play in facilitating crisis de-escalation, specifically through acting as “accommodative signals” that convey a willingness to avoid escalation. The chapter draws on three sets of literature in the traditional security studies field: crisis bargaining and management, signaling, and secrecy and covert action. It integrates these and applies their logics to cyberspace. Specifically, the chapter argues that some cyber operations can act as accommodative signals, creating the conditions for crises to peacefully resolve, for the same reasons that they do not cause escalation. These cyber operations allow states to “do something” in a visible manner—defacing websites, disrupting traffic to a network, or even degrading military capabilities—that is not clearly linked to the government. Neither do they cause effects costly enough to prompt the other side to retaliate in a painful way, escalating the situation. Cyber operations are particularly useful as accommodative signals when a state is faced with more hawkish domestic political audiences pushing for a more aggressive stance during a crisis. In this context, a state can leverage the ambiguity around responsibility for cyber operations to take low-cost, but visible, actions in cyberspace to placate domestic veto players while not exacerbating the crisis. The chapter also explores how states can demonstrate restraint or signal reassurance in the use of its own cyber capabilities, as distinct from cyber operations as accommodative signals during non-cyber crises.
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