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L. A. Paul, II—L. A. Paul: Categorical Priority and Categorical Collapse, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 87, Issue 1, 1 June 2013, Pages 89–113, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2013.00221.x
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Abstract
I explore some of the ways that assumptions about the nature of substance shape metaphysical debates about the structure of Reality. Assumptions about the priority of substance play a role in an argument for monism, are embedded in certain pluralist metaphysical treatments of laws of nature, and are central to discussions of substantivalism and relationalism. I will then argue that we should reject such assumptions and collapse the categorical distinction between substance and property.
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© The Aristotelian Society, 2013
Issue Section:
Fundamental Reality
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