...: it is that connection that explains the fundamental impermissibility of epistemic akrasia. epistemic akrasia higher-order evidence accuracy epistemic permissibility epistemic justification epistemic rationality evidential support Moore's paradox Consider the following case: Undergraduate skeptic Luna is just...

... epistemic rationality epistemic value veritism Critical thinking is considered to be a central epistemic aim of education. If we think of Socrates’ method of teaching, the claim goes back at least to Antiquity. In more recent times, in the twentieth century, it has become an object of investigation...

... this concern successfully is to lean on critical thinking as the core of our educational theory, bringing us right back to where we started. civic education criticality critical pedagogy critical thinking educational objectives epistemic rationality This paper assesses the prospects of combining...

... the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases. First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and outline a particular argument for dualism. Finally...

... of rationality simpliciter, not epistemic rationality. In this chapter, I argue that the same grounds which led us to posit a distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic norms of belief should make us skeptical of the existence of a distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic norms of inquiry...

... features of rational decision-making that we can settle before trying to assess heuristic-driven behaviour as rational or not. To begin with, it is useful to introduce a distinction that is often drawn in philosophy between ‘epistemic rationality’ and ‘practical rationality’. Roughly, the former concerns...

... epistemic reasons epistemic justification epistemic rationality epistemic normativity virtue epistemology Reasons attract unprecedented interest in recent literature on the foundations of epistemic normativity. This follows a trend in metaethics, where many view reasons as the basic units...

... attitudes in a single point of view. (1996: 110) We can bring this out by contrasting first-person and third-person perspectives on the requirements of epistemic rationality. If I rationally believe that it’s irrational for you to believe that p, it doesn’t follow that it’s irrational...

... Foley R BonJour L change of belief epistemic rationality global rationality pragmatic rationality simultaneous beliefs If there is one respect in which humans differ most fundamentally from the other animals, perhaps it is our superior ability to reason about, and understand, the world...

... or rational belief. For reasons that I explain later, this is not a book about knowledge; for other reasons that I explain later, it is a book about rational rather than justified belief. To be precise, it is a book about epistemic rationality as opposed to practical rationality or any other kind...

...The short abstract: Epistemic utility theory + permissivism about attitudes to epistemic risk permissivism about rational credences. The longer abstract: I argue that epistemic rationality is permissive. More specifically, I argue for two claims. First, a radical version of interpersonal...

... H Tversky A Probabilistic reasoning Baron J Evans J St B T Harvey N Koehler D J CART Comprehensive Assessment of Rational Thinking Heuristics and biases tasks Kokis J Creative Leadership Forum Pinker S Grunewald M Ho C Kelley C Macpherson R Meserve R J Sá W epistemic rationality...

... conditionalization Ross J epistemic accessibility defeat Pryor J skepticism White R rational reflection new rational reflection expert functions rationality epistemic rationality uncertainty about rationality Does rationality require that there be a match between one’s opinions about what it would...

... (London: John Bohn, 1839), vol. 1, 77 . Hawthorne John Hornsby Jennifer Hyman John norms reasons Stanley Jason Unger Peter Hieronymi Pamela Littlejohn Clayton reason action Price A W Davis Wayne Sandis Constantine Sehon Scott Hobbes Thomas epistemic reasons epistemic rationality...

.... ( 2003 ). “ Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique, ” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66: 612–40. 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00281.x Littlejohn, C. ( 2012 ). Justification and the Truth-Connection (Cambridge: Cambridge...

... to the sceptic. Critics (Pritchard and Jenkins) have argued that Wright-style entitlement is not an epistemic kind of warrant and does not sustain epistemic rationality. This chapter develops a consequentialist alternative to Wright’s proposal. Acceptance of anti-sceptical hypotheses is epistemically warranted...

...This chapter sets out in detail another serious problem for modest vindications of morality: the problem of disagreement. When there is disagreement of a certain type over whether a proposition is true, it is epistemically rational to suspend judgement about its truth. There is disagreement...

... testimony as we do testimony about non-moral matters. And there are no moral experts, as there are experts on non-moral matters. Is this treatment of moral questions epistemically rational? This chapter argues that there is a connection between the standards of epistemic rationality for beliefs...