... of obligation as weakest permission and Horty’s deontic STIT logic. Deontic logic contrastivism modal inheritance Ross paradox deontic STIT logic coarseness Contrastivism about ‘ought’ says that claims using this modality can only be understood relative to a (usually implicit) contrast class. ¹...

...The bulk of this chapter addresses the question: what is the proper semantics for deontic modal expressions in English? We consider a representative sample of recent challenges to a Kratzer-style formal semantics for modal expressions, as well as the rival views—Fabrizio Cariani’s contrastivism...

... (2017 ) core arguments for his “contrastivist” view of reasons. According to contrastivism, nothing is a reason for Φ-ing simpliciter; instead, facts are reasons for Φ-ing rather than performing some alternative act ψ. Snedegar offers the following case, inspired by Ross (2006...

...’. Snedegar develops contrastivism about reasons in a series of papers and in his book Contrastive Reasons, and Finlay discusses the end-relativity of reasons in chapter four of A Confusion of Tongues. Howard’s dual-aspect theory of reasons is stated in his ‘Primary Reasons...

...Mind-independent causal relation? Mind-independent causal relata? Contextualism x Contrastivism x x Pragmatism Idealism Realism x x This chapter argues that causal idealism, the view that causation is a product of mental activity...

... that reasons locutions are contrastive and John Skorupski’s claim that reasons locutions have an epistemic parameter and/or a weight parameter. Ambiguity Context of Utterance Contextualism Contrastivism Reasons Reasons Locutions Logical Form of Skorupski John Snedegar Justin Henning Tim Hybrids...

...This chapter applies contrastivism to an important debate in normative ethics. Contrastivism about reasons seems initially well placed to accommodate the supposed intransitivity of normative relations such as ‘better than’ or ‘more reason than’. But the theory as developed in Chapter 4 rules out...

...This chapter applies contrastivism to an issue in epistemology, and a parallel issue in the theory of practical reasoning. This is the rationality of withholding or suspending belief or intention. Popular theories of epistemic rationality struggle to explain why agents always ought to withhold...

...This book develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply...

... against. reasons weighing of Snedegar J Dual Scale Gert J justification difference from weighing of reasons Dorsey D Portmore D weighing reasons reasons against Dual Scale supererogation comparativism contrastivism opportunity cost The idea of weighing reasons brings to mind a single (double...

... the truth value of knowledge ascriptions can vary with the context of the subject rather than the attributor; epistemic contrastivism according to which knowledge is a ternary relation between a subject, a target proposition, and a contrast proposition; and finally semantic relativism about “knowledge...

... to explore structural analogies in other areas of philosophy. The third part of the book is about some major objections to contextualism (Chapter 7) and about alternative views, namely subject-sensitive invariantism, contrastivism, and relativism (Chapter 8)....

...This chapter motivates and introduces contrastivism about reasons at a general level. Both the concept of a normative reason and then the nature of a contrastivist theory of some concept are discussed, including the role of questions and question relativity. Finally, I explore the place...

... is that contrastivism provides the best account of our talk about reasons. ‘rather than’ Sinnott Armstrong Walter coordination across conjunction test Schaffer Jonathan Sennet Adam reasons contrastivism Rickless Samuel Ruben David Hillel Temple Dennis Crisp Roger Dancy Jonathan Exclusivity principle Nagel...

... a deeper form of contrastivism. The relationship between an agent’s reasons and what she ought to do is discussed. I defend a particular view about this relationship, such that what an agent ought to do, out of a given set of alternatives, is the option that wins—is most strongly supported by reasons...

...This chapter raises a problem for contrastivism: we should capture certain entailments between reasons relative to different sets of alternatives, but the theory as developed to this point lacks a way to do that. That is, the theory seems to allow for objectionably unconstrained contrast...

... transitivity de Facto Dependence causal modeling switching contrastivism events aspects structural equations extrinsicness Hall N Lewis D Billy black box cases causal reasoning omission involving causation preemption transitivity of causation Field H Kvart Igal McDermott Michael causal...

... for and against. With this account in hand, the chapter reveals that Dual Scale has no problem weighing any kind of reason against. Among other things, it also defends contrastivism about reasons and lays out the book’s assumptions concerning option individuation. reasons against contrastivism comparativism...

... (it has the best balance of reliability and ease of use). At the heart of this chapter is the attempt to minimize the computational complexity of calculating which, if any, option is required when there are more than just a few options. Along the way, it also further defends contrastivism and explains how...