
Contents
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5.1 Reasons For vs. Reasons Against 5.1 Reasons For vs. Reasons Against
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5.1.1 Justifying and Requiring Weight Against 5.1.1 Justifying and Requiring Weight Against
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5.1.2 Conceptually Necessary Functional Equivalences 5.1.2 Conceptually Necessary Functional Equivalences
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5.1.3 Categories vs. Kinds 5.1.3 Categories vs. Kinds
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5.2 Dual Scale and Reasons For/Against 5.2 Dual Scale and Reasons For/Against
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5.3 Equivalence Established 5.3 Equivalence Established
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5.4 Interlude: What Are My Options? 5.4 Interlude: What Are My Options?
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5.4.1 Maximalism About Options 5.4.1 Maximalism About Options
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5.4.2 Maximalism and Professor Procrastinate 5.4.2 Maximalism and Professor Procrastinate
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5.5 The Which Alternatives Question 5.5 The Which Alternatives Question
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5.5.1 Reasons Are Relative to Individual Competitions, Not Tournaments 5.5.1 Reasons Are Relative to Individual Competitions, Not Tournaments
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5.5.2 Equivalence’s Answer to WhichAlt 5.5.2 Equivalence’s Answer to WhichAlt
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5.5.3 Comparativism’s Answer to WhichAlt 5.5.3 Comparativism’s Answer to WhichAlt
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5.5.4 Non-comparativism’s Answer to WhichAlt 5.5.4 Non-comparativism’s Answer to WhichAlt
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5.6 Wine-ing About Weight 5.6 Wine-ing About Weight
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5.7 From Weight to Dual Scale 5.7 From Weight to Dual Scale
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5.8 Wrapping Up Part II 5.8 Wrapping Up Part II
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Cite
Abstract
Ethicists often reject the scale as a useful metaphor for weighing reasons. Yet they generally retain the metaphor of a reason’s weight. This combination is incoherent. The metaphor of weight entails a very specific scale-based model of weighing reasons, Dual Scale, at least in two-option cases. Justin Snedegar worries that scale-based models of weighing reasons can’t properly weigh reasons against an option. This chapter shows that there are, in fact, two different reason for/against distinctions, and it provides an account of the relationship between the various kinds of reason for and against. With this account in hand, the chapter reveals that Dual Scale has no problem weighing any kind of reason against. Among other things, it also defends contrastivism about reasons and lays out the book’s assumptions concerning option individuation.
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