... give us justification to self-ascribe beliefs. belief fallibility cf infallibility judgment justification pain Descartes René consciousness transparency access Evans Gareth introspection defeasibility Moore’s paradox Shoemaker Sydney Shah Nishi Velleman David Byrne Alex Gettier case...

... Gertler Brie skepticism perspective thinking attitudes belief emotion Moore G E Moore’s Paradox concepts rationality self blindness Shoemaker Sydney Evans Gareth perception desire imagination representation world Sartre Jean Paul self-knowledge privileged access first-person authority...

... Scanlon T guess reflective control belief guess control Moore’s paradox transparency One way of discerning what sort of control we have over our mental lives is to look at cases where that control is not exercised. This is one reason why philosophers have taken an interest in the phenomenon...

... Evans G reliabilism introspection principle of rationality perception principle of rationality disparity argument for accessibilism and the extended cognition thesis naturalistic reduction epistemology philosophy of mind vehicle externalism extended mind mentalism accessibilism Moore’s...

...Chapter 9 provides a subjectivist account of Moore’s Paradox. If the problem with believing Moore-paradoxical things were that the beliefs couldn’t be true or that they couldn’t constitute knowledge, the problem would be an objective one. The chapter argues that what all cases of Moore-paradoxical...

... in epistemology and philosophy of mind: Moore’s Paradox, the role of rationality in psychic unity and self-consciousness, the nature of the first-person standpoint in relation to one’s own attitudes, transparency accounts of self-knowledge, and the role of endorsement in the constitution of the self. Bell D...

...Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind. Eric Marcus, Oxford University Press. © Eric Marcus 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192845634.003.0004 I show how the view on offer resolves Moore’s Paradox. Moorean absurdity does not, as it is generally held, involve an inter-level...

... not, as it is generally held, involve an inter-level con ict between rst- and second-order beliefs (or the corresponding utterances); it is just a con ict between doxastic stances on the question of a single proposition s truth. Moore-Paradoxical statements are, in this way, similar to statements of the form p...

...-paradoxicality. At the same time, reasons are presented in defense of the idea that the standard provided by assertion’s norm will be different from that provided by belief’s norm. Consequently, the Moore’s paradox is not likely to enable us to discern very much about the standard for assertion’s norm. Assertion...

... conflicting desires at all, and a fortiori nothing especially wrong with having desires that conflict essentially. However, we can now see that this is mistaken and there is a problem that needs addressing. By considering a counterpart of Moore’s Paradox for desire I have argued that having...

... institutionalists believer best explanation deliberation deliberative transparency transparency of deliberation deliberatively formed beliefs deliberators entailment internalist motivational judgement internalism MJI Moore paradoxical Moore’s Paradox irrationality all things considered belief...

... critiques other authors characterizations of Moore-Paradoxical beliefs and assertions, and he repeatedly re nes them. This culminates in the following de nition (Ch. 16): A belief or assertion is Moore-paradoxical just in case its content is (i) conjugated in the present tense where one should be taken...

... you believe is not true. That would be just like the agent in Moore’s paradox, who asserts both ‘I believe it is raining’ and ‘It is not raining’. restrictive conception of perception judgement experience Descartes propositional thought Moore’s paradox Descartes said: [. . .] every sensory...

...This chapter begins with a discussion of Moore’s ‘paradox’. It argues that explaining the paradox requires one to recognize attitudes operative in judgement which are not themselves in the business of being correct or incorrect (true or false) — what it calls ‘Pyrrhonian attitudes’. It continues...

...Chapter 10 solves the puzzle by providing a subjectivist account of the objectivist intuitions. Seeing knowledge or truth as optional extras in any particular case would be Moore paradoxical, and so it would involve you in some sort of irrationality. So in any particular case of belief, you’re...

... power which it nonetheless seems to possess; and trouble arises for subjective probabilities in two ways. First, quantum Bayesianism is committed to an objectionable class of statements – quantum analogues of Moore’s Paradoxes; second, it renders mysterious how the means of enquiry about the world could...

... in the vicinity of Moore’s paradox. use character Kaplan D O’Connor D J settlement Kneale W Matushansky O Misplaced Character Fallacy of Predelli S Church A indexicals Castañeda H N Cohen L J Hintikka J Austin J L Bach K Davidson D Harnish R MacFarlane J Recanati F Searle J R speech act...

... Moore’s paradox normative judgement normativity truth Anscombe G E M belief Bykvist K Dummett M Hattiangadi A Humberstone I L intention Platts M truth Wedgwood R Wiggins D consistency content correctness norm normative concept ought rationality confidence credence doxastic attitude...

... to the thinker at the time determined by how distant they are from the same probability function? A consideration of so-called “Moore-paradoxical” propositions reveals that the answer to this question is: No. The internal mental facts “given” to the thinker at the time determine an appropriate...