-
Views
-
Cite
Cite
Denis Gromb, Viral Acharya, Is one share/one vote optimal?, Review of Finance, Volume 29, Issue 3, May 2025, Pages 635–660, https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfaf011
- Share Icon Share
Abstract
In a tender offer by a value-increasing raider, voting shareholders face a free-rider problem. However, when they are not atomistic, they do not completely free-ride. In contrast, non-voting shareholders, who are never pivotal for the success of the offer, are absolute free-riders. Hence, in this case there is a gain from departing from one share/one vote. This departure also has a cost; there is an increased vulnerability to value-decreasing raiders, and the optimal governance structure balances the cost and the gain.
© The Author(s) 2025. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the European Finance Association. All rights reserved. For commercial re-use, please contact [email protected] for reprints and translation rights for reprints. All other permissions can be obtained through our RightsLink service via the Permissions link on the article page on our site—for further information please contact [email protected].
This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://dbpia.nl.go.kr/pages/standard-publication-reuse-rights)
Issue Section:
Article
You do not currently have access to this article.