
Contents
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Introduction Introduction
-
Political control as a moderator of bureaucracies’ responses to bottom-up public pressure Political control as a moderator of bureaucracies’ responses to bottom-up public pressure
-
Case background: the Israeli 2011 social protests Case background: the Israeli 2011 social protests
-
Methodology Methodology
-
Sample selection Sample selection
-
Operationalisation of variables Operationalisation of variables
-
Control variables Control variables
-
-
Results Results
-
Discussion and conclusions Discussion and conclusions
-
Notes Notes
-
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
-
References References
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Three Political control or legitimacy deficit? Bureaucracies’ symbolic responses to bottom-up public pressure
Get access-
Published:January 2019
Cite
Abstract
Public administration research has focused on bureaucracies’responses to top-down pressures by elected politicians. By comparison, bureaucracies' responses to bottom-up public pressures, such as media coverage and social protest, and the micro-mechanisms that underlie variation in their response, have received less attention. This study analyses the extent to which subjection to political control shapes direct response of bureaucracies to bottom-up public pressures. Based on current literature, we explore two distinct micro-mechanisms: firstly, building, inter alia, on principal–agent theory, we would expect higher levels of political control to render bureaucracies more attentive to public pressures in order to pre-empt intervention by politicians who are reliant on public support (principal–agent mechanism). Conversely, building on regulation theory, we would expect autonomous agencies to exhibit attentiveness to salient public pressures to compensate for their precarious democratic legitimacy (legitimacy-deficit mechanism). Empirically, we analyse the responses of a diverse set of 36 bureaucracies to unprecedented social protests taking place in Israel during 2011. We focus on bureaucracies', including independent agencies', symbolic responses via advertising campaigns. Our analysis shows that higher levels of political control enhanced the inclination of bureaucracies to engage in symbolic interactions in response to social protests, supporting our extended version of the principal–agent model.
Sign in
Personal account
- Sign in with email/username & password
- Get email alerts
- Save searches
- Purchase content
- Activate your purchase/trial code
- Add your ORCID iD
Purchase
Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.
Purchasing informationMonth: | Total Views: |
---|---|
November 2022 | 1 |
November 2023 | 1 |
February 2024 | 1 |
March 2024 | 2 |
Get help with access
Institutional access
Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:
IP based access
Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.
Sign in through your institution
Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.
If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.
Sign in with a library card
Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.
Society Members
Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:
Sign in through society site
Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:
If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.
Sign in using a personal account
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.
Personal account
A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.
Viewing your signed in accounts
Click the account icon in the top right to:
Signed in but can't access content
Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.
Institutional account management
For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.