...This chapter argues that the relational models are not brain states resulting from self-organization in neural activity but are, rather, abstract objects akin to numbers and sets. However, even if this turns out to be true, it would not invalidate the naturalism of earlier chapters. This chapter...

... by examining how they attempt to eliminate abstract objects. Denying the existence of types but acknowledging the possibility of their existence will help in constructing a nominalist paraphrase. Purging reliance on types, according to Goodman, takes three steps: First, the existence of abstract objects like...

... that does not actually refer to a type. Because such apparent references can be “paraphrased away,” they are harmless, and we need not suppose that types exist. In denying the existence of types, the main motivation is epistemological in nature: knowledge of types, which are abstract objects...

...This chapter is concerned with what discussions about type are supposed to be speaking for, i.e. what the paraphrase might be. Nominalists, in paraphrasing sentences referring to abstract objects or universals, make do with words, terminology, and other linguistic tools. However, words are also...

... of it on this page — as do symphonies, bears, chess games, and many other types of things. This book examines the distinction between types and tokens and argues that types exist, even as abstract objects since they lack a unique spatiotemporal location. It demonstrates the ubiquity of references...