Gender Wars? Diplomacy as a Depolarizing Practice in International Politics of Gender and Sexuality

Abstracts

To what extent is diplomacy a depolarizing tool of international society? This article proposes a novel theoretical and empirical focus on depolarization in international politics of gender and sexuality. It operationalizes the concepts of polarization and depolarization and integrates them with Self/Other theory in international relations. It puts forward an argument that the logic of diplomacy is, although not unequivocally, compatible with the logic of depolarization. The claim and the application of the framework are illustrated with a case study of gender equality and LGBT+ rights diplomacies in Poland. Based on the empirical findings, the article contends that diplomacy is primarily a practice of depolarization.

¿Hasta qué punto es la diplomacia una herramienta para despolarizar la sociedad internacional? Este artículo propone un novedoso enfoque, tanto teórico como empírico, sobre la despolarización en la política internacional en materia de género y sexualidad. El artículo operacionaliza los conceptos de polarización y de despolarización y los integra dentro de la teoría del «Yo/Otro» en las RRII. El artículo presenta el argumento de que la lógica de la diplomacia es, aunque no de manera inequívoca, compatible con la lógica de la despolarización. Esta cuestión y la aplicación de este marco se ilustran mediante un estudio de caso sobre la igualdad de género y los derechos de las personas LGBT + en Polonia. El artículo argumenta, sobre la base de las conclusiones empíricas, que la diplomacia es, principalmente, una práctica de despolarización.

Dans quelle mesure la diplomatie constitue-t-elle un outil de dépolarisation de la société internationale ? Cet article propose un angle théorique et empirique inédit sur la dépolarisation en politique internationale du genre et de la sexualité. Il rend les concepts de la polarisation et de la dépolarisation opérationnels, avant de les intégrer à la théorie du Moi/de l'Autre en RI. Il avance un argument selon lequel la logique de la diplomatie est, bien que cela soit sujet à interprétation, compatible avec la logique de dépolarisation. L'affirmation et l'application du cadre sont illustrées à l'aide d'une étude de cas des diplomaties relatives à l’égalité des genres et aux droits LGBT + en Pologne. En se fondant sur des résultats empiriques, l'article affirme que la diplomatie correspond d'abord à une pratique de dépolarisation.

Introduction

“Growing chasm” (Altman and Symons 2018), “queer divide” (Velasco 2019), and “the wall” (Janoff 2022) are labels used to describe the state of play of international gender and sexuality politics. They not only point to the existence of ideological differences but also to their persistence and one-dimensionality, with two groups formed along one axis. Some labels make use of militaristic vocabulary, such as “queer wars” (Altman and Symons 2016) or “symbolic battlefield” (Edenborg 2018), emphasizing animosity between the groups. The perception of polarization is also present in the imaginary outside of academia, with labels like “pink line” (Gevisser 2021), “a battle to eradicate gender” (EU Observer 2020), and “holy wars” (EU Observer 2022) appearing in public discourse.

This article puts into question whether polarization is the only dynamic we can observe in international politics of gender and sexuality and notes that depolarization has been theoretically and empirically neglected in this area. In order to address this gap, I develop a conceptual framework for studying (de)polarization in international relations (IR), adding to the Self/Other theory. In building the concepts, I take the theoretical point of departure in understanding polarization as the perception and description of politics in terms of “us” versus “them” (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 18). I then ask whether diplomacy can be a depolarizing tool. Diplomacy scholarship claims that a purpose of diplomacy is to allow states to live together in difference (Constantinou 2013, 142), which makes diplomacy a plausible institution of depolarization. I investigate this expectation with a case study of bilateral diplomacy of states pursuing gender progressive policies in Poland in the period 2020–2022. I conclude that diplomacy is primarily a practice of depolarization.

The article is organized into six sections. I start with a discussion of the literatures on international gender and sexuality politics and on Self/Other identity construction. The article then turns to the presentation of an original conceptual framework for studying (de)polarization. In the third section, I discuss ways in which diplomacy scholarship points to polarizing and depolarizing logics of diplomacy. The next section describes the research design and methods for the empirical investigation. The following analysis illustrates how diplomats (de)construct “us” versus “them” labels and (dis)engage with “them” based on the case study of activities of embassies in Poland.

Contribution to Scholarship: International Politics of Gender and Sexuality and Self/Other Theory

The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it adds to the scholarship on international politics of gender and sexuality, which has focused so far on intense disputation and polarization in this policy area without theoretical consideration of a reverse dynamic or empirical investigation of bilateral diplomacy. Second, the article contributes theoretically to Self/Other literature in IR, as I observe that this literature has not yet paid sustained attention to the acts of deconstruction of Otherness.

The international disputation around gender and sexuality norms became evident to the larger public during the negotiation of the 1994 Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development and the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, mainly in the context of sexual and reproductive health and rights (Girard 2014). In the late 2000s, the dispute around gender norms gained new traction as LGBT+ rights became a topic of intensified international discussion. In 2011, the UN Human Rights Council adopted its first resolution on sexual orientation and gender identity, in the midst of a strong opposition from gender conservative states (Symons and Altman 2015, 79). This period was followed by states’ mobilization around the ideas of “traditional values” (Wilkinson 2014; Horvath 2016; Stoeckl and Medvedeva 2018; Edenborg 2021) and opposition to “gender ideology” (Paternotte and Kuhar 2017a; Korolczuk 2020). On the other hand, in recent years, progressive states have significantly mobilized to promote progressive gender and sexuality norms internationally (Aggestam and True 2020). The intense disputation around gender and sexuality politics unfolds in various types of interactions and has been investigated in UN fora such as the UN Human Rights Council (Symons and Altman 2015; Jordaan 2016; Smith 2017; Voss 2019), the UN General Assembly (Symons and Altman 2015; Smith 2017), the Commission on the Status of Women (Goetz 2020; Cupać and Ebetürk 2021), in regional fora, such as the Council of the European Union (EU Observer 2020), as well as in development partnerships (Altman and Symons 2016; Velasco 2019, 124–31; Thiel 2022, 93–116) and public diplomacy (Jezierska 2021).

This empirical moment gave rise to theoretical reflections. Some understand the interaction of progressive and conservative forces through the concept of backlash (e.g., Goetz 2020; Cupać and Ebetürk 2021). Conservative mobilization is also explained as contestation of emerging international norms, for instance, recognition of LGBT+ rights as universal human rights (Voss 2019). Paternotte and Kuhar (2017b, 640) insist on understanding the anti-gender movement as a political project in its own right rather than a counterreaction to gender progressiveness. Naming the phenomenon as international norm polarization, Symons and Altman (2015, 64) define it as a competition between two normative spirals mobilizing states’ support for opposing positions.

While there are studies that notice negative dynamics between diplomats of conservative and progressive states (Symons and Altman 2015; Janoff 2022), the existing studies have not investigated reverse dynamics in diplomacy, consequently depicting gender and sexuality politics as rather uniformly antagonistic. The practice of bilateral diplomacy has been particularly neglected in this discussion.

The Self/Other literature, which studies collective and state identity formation through construction of Other(s) (e.g., Neumann 1996; Rumelili 2004; Mitzen 2006), is an insightful theoretical lens to understand international politics of gender and sexuality. For instance, in their study of the UN Human Rights Council, Symons and Altman (2015) note that the clash between progressive and conservative normative spirals persists as the norms in question become linked to state identities formulated against the backdrop of constitutive Others. Gender and sexuality are seen as particularly prone to state identity linkage in international politics because of their importance to individual identity (67). The Self/Other literature puts forward that all relationships are based on Self/Other constructions, while some are characterized by Othering where the identity of the Other poses a threat to the identity of the Self (Rumelili 2004). Surprisingly, the scholarship has not yet systematically considered dynamics reverse to Othering. In the next section, I discuss how the concepts of depolarization and polarization should be integrated with Self/Other theory.

Theorizing (De)Polarization in IR

By relating the concept of Othering to the concept of polarization, I propose to understand polarization as an intense type of Othering in which all states are pushed to take a position within a binary division and which creates the Self-Group, e.g., progressive states, and the Other-Group, e.g., conservative states.¹ Like any form of Othering, polarization is not about the existence of a mere difference between the groups of states but rather how the difference is interpreted and acted upon (see Somer and McCoy 2019, 13).² Depolarization is a flipside of this dynamic, an act of deconstruction of Otherness against binary dynamics of identity construction and engagement.

What precisely constitutes (de)polarization between the Self-Group and the Other-Group and how can it be observed? I operationalize the concepts by building primarily on a series of articles by McCoy, Rahman, and Somer (2018; Somer and McCoy 2018, 2019; McCoy and Somer 2019, 2021). They conceptualize polarization as the perception and description of politics in terms of “us” versus “them” (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 18). Such a definition puts focus on relations between groups and identity-based sources of polarization rather than on differences in groups’ ideological positions. In contrast to this comparativist literature on social groups within democracies, the framework of (de)polarization developed in this article considers states as members of the polarized sides. The question remains whether and how the processes of (de)polarization differ within states and between states. I propose two considerations. First, in within-state political systems, polarization produces clear winners who, e.g., by winning elections, rule over the polity, and losers who will become ruled by their opponents. In interstate relations, due to autonomy of states, the same power dynamics do not emerge to the same extent. This fact can make international society less prone to polarizing tendencies compared to within-state political systems. Second, some state identities can be less stable than social group identities as power within states shifts, making polarized constellations in IR less stable.

While gender and sexuality politics is an obvious case of the applicability of the framework due to its political salience and polarizing potential, (de)polarization dynamics occur and can be studied in any substantive field. Interstate relationships are multidimensional, and while we can study (de)polarization as constricted to a policy area, it should not be forgotten that such a study will not represent the overall relationship. Consequently, a progressive and a conservative state may have polarized relations in the area of gender and sexuality politics but not in the area of trade, although the dynamics in different areas can impact each other. The final caveat concerns the relationship between (de)polarization and substantive changes in state positions. Polarization is understood here as distinct from an ideological disagreement. The depolarizing action of one side does not need to lead to a change in the position of the other side to be depolarizing. The likely causality between (de)polarization and changes in state positions exceeds the scope of this paper.

In the remainder of this section, I present the conceptual framework, which is first explained step-by-step and then presented as a table. While the framework was developed for the goal of studying bilateral diplomacy, it is suitable for inquiries into (de)polarizing practices in other contexts. For reader’s convenience and quick reference, polarizing actions are labeled as P1, P2, etc., while depolarizing actions are labeled as D1, D2, etc.

Construction of the Self-Group and the Other-Group. Social and political life is potentially diverse and complex, consisting of a wide range of identities with multiple and cross-cutting worldviews, principles, and interests. Polarization takes place when such complexity is reduced to two opposing groups. It emerges discursively as in their speech, actors construct who is “us,” who is “them,” and what makes the two different. There are three aspects of the (de)polarizing construction that will be discussed: the boundary between the Self-Group and the Other-Group, the construction of each side as a Group, and the characterization of the Other-Group.

The Boundary between the Self-Group and the Other-Group

A defining feature of polarization is that identities of the Self-Group and the Other-Group are constructed as mutually exclusive (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 22). In consequence, the Self-Group and the Other-Group are understood as holding different and unreconcilable sets of values. International gender polarization provides examples of the construction of mutually exclusive identities into, e.g., “human rights proponents” and “defenders of the family” (P1). Polarized actors can move beyond the polarizing vicious cycles by acknowledging and emphasizing values and identities mutual for members of the Self-Group and the Other-Group (McCoy and Somer 2021, 16). Researchers find that the strategy of moral reframing, where the Self-Group presents its positions through the lens of values central to the Other-Group, is an effective means for political communication and persuasion (Feinberg and Willer 2019). Deconstruction of these labels and recognition of the value of individual freedoms and social relations for both Groups would serve as a practice of depolarization (D1).

Construction of Each Side as a Group

Polarization requires the construction of the Self-Group and Other-Group as uniform and distinguishable entities. Consequently, under a state of polarization, differences between members of the Self-Group are suppressed (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 18) and there is a feeling of strong sense of loyalty toward members of the Self-Group (23). The Other-Group is viewed as homogenous (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 21, 23), while middle-ground positions are not tolerated (23). In international gender politics, gender conservative actors refer to the Other-Group as proponents of “gender ideology,” a frame linking together variety of political debates and positions on, e.g., same-sex partnerships, transgenderism, abortion, sexuality education, and domestic violence. It is an exercise in polarization through the construction of a homogenous Other (P2). Depolarization will rely on deconstruction of these homogeneities. For instance, the deconstruction of “gender ideologists” into individual discussion partners holding divergent and nuanced positions would be an act of depolarization (D2).

Character of the Other-Group

Under the conditions of polarization, the Other-Group is not only constructed as a uniform opposite of the Self-Group but also attributed negative characteristics. Polarized groups construct each other as evil and lacking moral legitimacy (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 19), while the motivations behind the other side’s actions are questioned as ill-intentioned or self-interested (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018; Somer and McCoy 2019, 10). The Other-Group is feared by the Self-Group as an existential threat, considered so evil that no longer human (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 23; McCoy and Somer 2019, 244–5). It becomes a spiralling dynamic in which the construction of the Other-Group as threatening provokes the Self-Group to adopt polarizing strategies and justify their disregard for moral values and rules of the political system in which they operate (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 25; Somer and McCoy 2019, 14–7; McCoy and Somer 2019, 254–6; 2021, 14–5). In the context of international gender politics, this can mean treating the group of progressive states as threatening, a label that would justify, e.g., the obstructive behavior of conservative states in the UN Human Rights Council (P3). McCoy and Somer (2021, 16) caution against denigration and revanchist behavior and note that the groups must treat each other with dignity in order to escape polarizing dynamics. Although empathy has been highlighted as a quality allowing individuals to depolarize and see members of the Other-Group as humans, research suggests that feelings of empathy are tilted toward the members of the Self-Group and are likely to increase bias toward the Other-Group (Simas, Clifford, and Kirkland 2020). In the context of international gender politics, gender progressives may find it difficult to empathize with conservatives, given the harm that, in their view, they inflict on, e.g., children seeking gender affirming surgery or women seeking abortion. However, the acknowledgment of reasons for a conservative approach to gender norms, such as identity protection in the face of marginalization, would be an example of the deconstruction of negative characteristics of the Other-Group (D3).

Engagement of the Self-Group with the Other-Group. Under the conditions of polarization, the construction of the Self-Group and the Other-Group allows the groups to identify who belongs to “us” and who belongs to “them” and depending on the classification, proceed with a right course of action. I discuss four aspects of relations of the Self-Group with the Other-Group: cooperation, exchange of information, argumentative practices, and engagement with structural grievances.

Cooperation

When polarized, members of the Self-Group become less willing to reach out to members of the Other-Group and seek collaboration (Somer and McCoy 2018, 5). Interests of the groups are seen as mutually exclusive, and the contestation becomes a zero-sum game in which one group wins while the other loses (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 24–5). This attitude makes any type of decision-making or cooperation over common problems difficult, as compromise or consensus is burdensome to reach (18). Under international gender polarization, gender progressive and gender conservative states may refrain from any type of collaboration on women’s rights, even if due to minor differences of positions (P4). Depolarizing actions will include the identification of common interests and attempts at cooperation. A depolarization example can be cooperation on maternity leave initiatives, which may gather support from progressive states as incorporating feminist agenda and conservative states as incorporating a pronatalist agenda (D4).

Exchange of Information

Knowledge and information play an important role in polarization dynamics. The groups are confirmed in their positions through selective engagement with available information and staying in their own information bubbles (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 22). The Self-Group tends to view the Other-Group as ignorant (Somer and McCoy 2019, 10), uninformed, or misinformed. At the same time, in disputation of a polarizing issue, facts and moral truths lose their weight, which can explain why the conversation seems to evolve around factually provable questions (Somer and McCoy 2019, 14). An example of the polarized dynamic in international gender politics is the persistence with which some anti-gender actors claim association between homosexuality and pedophilia despite the scientific evidence disproving such a claim (P5). Depolarization would mean that the groups transcend their information bubbles and engage with the information produced, consumed, and circulated by the Other-Group instead of dismissing it at the face value. The consideration of evidence put forward by gender progressive actors in the previously described example can be classified as a depolarizing action (D5).

Argumentative Practices

Polarization is associated with regress of the quality of deliberation in society and a lack of respect for counterarguments or openness for persuasion (V-Dem Institute 2022, 16). The opposing groups may refrain from presenting, explaining, and arguing their positions or taking interest in positions and arguments of the other side, as they see any type of engagement as pointless, own logic as evident, and others’ logic as inevitably flawed. Lack of genuinely argumentative practices between conservative and progressive states will provide evidence of polarization (P6). In international gender politics, one will observe attempts at depolarization if progressive and conservative states engage with each other’s reasoning on, e.g., regulation of access to abortion, and argue in relation to these positions rather than in an argumentative vacuum (D6).

Engagement with Structural Grievances

Polarizations often occur from the standpoint of previously marginalized segments of society (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 18) and feed on the fear of exclusion from power structures (Somer and McCoy 2019, 14). Polarization is therefore not always, or at least not only, about the disputation of a narrow political issue but about deeper divisions within societies for which being for or against a certain issue serves as an identity marker and a catalyst for mobilization to protest structural inequalities. In the context of international gender politics, a connected underlying grievance of gender conservative states often lies in the perception of the progressive agenda promotion as undue influence of the hegemonic center (Global North/West) on the peripheries (Global South/East) (see, e.g., Korolczuk and Graff 2018; Sanders 2018; Evang 2022). Polarization would be observed if such underlying grievances are not acknowledged by the progressive side (P7). Depolarization would involve responding to underlying grievances and deficiencies in representation, welfare, governance, and inclusion that made societies receptive to polarizing strategies in the first place (McCoy and Somer 2021, 8, 12–14). If expressions of grievances regarding the structural inequalities in international gender politics were being addressed, this would constitute a depolarizing action (D7).

The above discussion on (de)polarization is summarized in table 1. The next section ponders the question of whether the practice of diplomacy encourages polarizing and depolarizing actions in interstate relations.

Diplomacy and International Polarization

In diplomacy, international society has a special institution tasked with understanding the Other, hardly comparable to anything we can find in domestic political systems. It seems to stem from the fact that while nation-states are built on the default idea of internal sameness (a single nation), at the foundation of international society lies the idea of separateness (multiple states). It is thus not surprising that the theme of engagement between Self and Other is prominent in the study of diplomacy (Neumann 1996; Faizullaev 2006; Kuus 2017). In this vein, the prediplomatic era is presented as a state of alienation, characterized by a lack of common ideational references and indifference or hostility toward the Other, a state that diplomacy is meant to mitigate (Der Derian 1991).

As argued by Constantinou (2013), diplomacy is rooted in a humanist legacy and represents a knowledge practice stemming from this tradition. Diplomacy is in that sense a practice of reflexivity in which “knowledge meant to expand our knowledge of other peoples and cultures and (when most successful) to help us understand ourselves” (154). The humanist origin of diplomacy may also manifest itself in a practice of diplomatic empathy toward the Other. In the words of the celebrated diplomat and diplomatic theorist Ernest Satow, “a good diplomatist will always endeavor to put himself [sic] in the position of the person with whom he is treating, and try to imagine what he would wish, do and say, under those circumstances” (2011, 133–4). Ideally, a sustainable mode of diplomacy should transcend beyond here and now of interstate interactions as diplomats strive for the maintenance of friendly relations, not only for the purpose of short-term political goals but also for peaceful coexistence for the benefit of future generations (Constantinou and Der Derian 2010).

Against this background, diplomacy reveals itself as anticipating and managing Othering effects of separateness, including polarization. The discussed research creates an expectation of diplomacy as a practice of depolarization. Diplomats should seek to understand the line of thinking of the Other-Group (D6) and cooperation with it (D4), acquaint themselves with information they consume (D5), approach its members as humans (D3), and counter alienation (D1, D2).

Nevertheless, the logics of mediation of estrangement, humanism, and empathy are not the only ones attributed to diplomacy. Constantinou (2013) juxtaposes the logic of humanism with the logic of statecraft as defining diplomatic practice. As tools of statecraft, diplomats are agents of states, using their skills to advance their interests. If the task of scoring goals for one’s state becomes the focus of diplomatic practice, the ends may start to justify the means. Under polarizing circumstances, the tactics of wilful polarization can be seen as useful, e.g., to mobilize support for one’s national interests. This strategy seems to be effective when used by political leaders in international context (Matush 2023). Moreover, the recent rise in populism in many countries around the world prompts a discussion of its consequences on the practice of diplomacy, which is predicted to become politicized and deprofessionalized (Lequesne 2020, 7–8) and therefore possibly more polarizing.

Finally, the logic of system maintenance, as one of the logics of diplomacy, points to its polarizing potential. According to Bull (1977, 176), diplomacy fulfills the function of symbolizing the existence of international society and is itself a custodian of the idea, with a stake in preserving and strengthening it. Elaborating on this metaphor, Adler-Nissen (2015, 23) says that a diplomat, as a custodian, “does not change the exhibitions or the museum as a whole, he or she mainly keeps things in order.” It follows that while diplomacy successfully mediates differences, it does not necessarily address the root causes of a crisis (24). Diplomacy serves the function of reproducing international society in the institutionalization of a balance between universalism and particularism (Jönsson and Hall 2005) or hierarchies between states (Barkawi 2015). Consequently, diplomacy should not be expected to engage in depolarization through response to grievances of the Other-Group over structural inequalities of the international system (P7).

Diplomacy’s role in polarization is therefore expected to be two-directional. On the one hand, diplomacy is fundamentally about understanding and relating to the Other and thus contains depolarizing qualities. On the other hand, diplomacy’s role in the protection of national interests and preservation of the status quo of international society could turn it into a polarizing activity. Rather than constituting competing theoretical claims, these perspectives picture diplomacy as a practice in which two logics of behavior can be in tension. As theorized by Constantinou (2013), diplomacy is a practice in which the logic of humanism and the logic of statecraft coexist, as polarizing and depolarizing tendencies should be expected to.

Bilateral diplomacy may offer more depolarizing potential than multilateral diplomacy. It is so because a bilateral relationship between the member of the Self-Group and the Other-Group separates this relationship from polarizing group dynamics of multilateral disputation and privileges recognition of the Other outside of the Other-Group. At the same time, bilateral diplomacy allows for a focused and intimate study of the Other due to its situatedness in a hosting state. The comparison between the case study of bilateral diplomacy presented in this paper and findings regarding diplomatic practice at the United Nations in international politics of gender and sexuality (Symons and Altman 2015; Janoff 2022) provides some empirical illustration of this assertion. Finally, it is important to consider the role of diplomats as individuals, with their own normative stands, which may or may not be the same as the positions of their states, or character traits, which can be more or less conducive to depolarization. As the interest of this paper lies in states as units of analysis and in diplomacy as a structuring practice, diplomats are approached as representatives of states rather than individuals who are themselves subjects of (de)polarization. Nevertheless, an individual-level analysis would be theoretically and empirically interesting for further studies.

In the remainder of the article, I will examine the interplay of depolarizing and polarizing actions in diplomacy based on an empirical case study.

Research Design and Methods

A study of international gender polarization can be approached from different angles, either by defining progressives or conservatives as the Self-Group or each of them in turn. Methodologically, in a bilateral context, activities of progressive states provide more empirical material for a study, as they are more publicized and proactive, e.g., through adoption of policy documents, publication of open letters, and organization of events. Moreover, the broader aim of the research project, which this study is a part, is to provide recommendations for progressive states on the promotion of women’s rights and LGBT+ rights in the context of polarization. These considerations drove the choice to study activities of embassies of progressive states as the Self-Group. The study looks at activities of progressive states in a context of the bilateral diplomatic relationship with a member of the Other-Group—Poland. The study analyzes the behavior of the Self-Group, rather than the Self-Group and the Other-Group, for several reasons. Analytically, in line with the previously discussed conceptualization, the classification of a behavior as polarizing or depolarizing is not dependent on the perception or reaction of the Other; therefore, the study of the Other’s behavior is not a sine qua non. Methodologically, studying bilateral diplomacy in a way that represents both sides equally raises multiple difficulties: While a location provides access to dozens of sending states—in this case, a group of progressive states—it does so for one hosting state (Poland); the addressees of activities of embassies have dispersed, as they interact with multiple groups (state agents, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and public) constituting the Other; and the study of diplomacy, an infamously closed-off activity, rests on access, which in this case despite attempts was difficult to obtain on the side of the Other beyond the scope discussed.

The membership of Poland in the conservative group of states is defined based on international positioning of its government in the time frame of interest for this study (2020–2022). It is important to note this temporal scope as Poland, as of the moment of writing, has a new center-right government which is less unambiguously gender conservative than the previous one. Poland constituted a challenging context for the spread of progressive gender and sexuality norms, ranking at the bottom of gender equality and LGBT+ rights indices in Europe (European Institute for Gender Equality 2022; ILGA-Europe 2022). At the same time, Poland placed better on women’s and LGBT+ rights than many other states in the gender conservative group, e.g., those where homosexuality is illegal. The former Polish government participated in international anti-gender initiatives, while the discourse in Poland links progressive gender and sexuality norms with undue Western influence. In recent years, the country has experienced intensified contestation over gender and sexuality, with Polish society being internally divided over the issues of LGBT+ rights and abortion (Ruszkowski, Przestalski, and Maranowski 2020, 87–100). The country can therefore be perceived by the Self-Group as a close, or at least a problematized, member of the Other-Group. In addition, in geopolitical imaginaries, Poland is positioned as part of the collective West, with its membership in the European Union and NATO, while at the same time remaining a postcommunist Eastern Other to the West (see, e.g., Neumann 1998; Kuus 2004; Rumelili 2004). This geopolitical construction should reinforce the idea of Poland as a “close Other” for states in the progressive group, the majority of which are Western. This “close Other” construction of Poland does not necessarily mean that diplomacy will be more likely to exhibit depolarizing potential, as the relative closeness may demand the imposition of a clearer boundary between the Self-Group and the Other-Group. Importantly, the constellation of commonalities and differences present in the case study allows both depolarizing and polarizing dynamics to emerge.

The data consists of semi-structured interviews conducted with representatives of progressive embassies in Poland. Based on foreign policies of their states as well as snowballing, I identified a total of eighteen embassies actively involved in the promotion of women’s rights and LGBT+ rights and interviewed representatives of thirteen embassies in this group. The sample includes embassies of Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The sample provides a geopolitical variation (EU/non-EU, Western/non-Western states) as well as a variation in the levels of engagement. The interviewees were selected by the embassies based on their familiarity with the gender and sexuality file. They varied in terms of seniority, including ambassadors, mid-career diplomats, junior policy officers, and local staff. Each interview lasted for about an hour and took place between me and one or two representatives of an embassy. The interviewees were asked about the activities of the embassies on women’s rights and LGBT+ rights and about the motivations behind the choice of these activities in the context of anti-gender tendencies in Poland (see online appendix, Section A1).

For triangulation and contextual understanding, I supplemented the interviews with diplomats with three interviews with civil society actors cooperating with embassies on matters of gender and sexuality, an interview with two representatives of Polish authorities, social media content of gender progressive embassies, open letters, and Polish media sources on activities of the embassies (see online appendix, Sections A2 and A3).

The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and treated together with other sources as text for a textual analysis. The analysis was guided by the (de)polarization framework developed earlier (see table 1) and aimed at identifying polarization and depolarization in the context of the promotion of women’s rights and LGBT+ rights by the embassies. The anonymized quotes are presented in the analysis for illustrative purposes.

Analysis: Diplomacy as Mediation or Preservation of Estrangement?

The Diplomatic Context: Gender and Sexuality Politics in Poland

Gender and sexuality issues deeply divide Polish society. To illustrate, while 45 percent of Poles agree that same sex marriages should be allowed throughout Europe, 50 percent disagree with this statement (European Commission 2019).³ On the one hand, Poland’s legal framework protects the rights of women and LGBT+ individuals, with examples including legislation on domestic violence and general anti-discrimination laws. The country has a stable and vast network of progressive NGOs working on women’s and LGBT+ rights, which regularly protests conservative decisions. On the other hand, at the moment of writing, Poland does not give legal recognition to same-sex relationships, and Polish criminal law does not prohibit hate crimes based on sexual orientation or gender identity (Polish Ombudsman 2019). In 2020, over 100 local councils in Poland adopted symbolic resolutions declaring themselves unwelcoming to “LGBT ideology” (Atlas of Hate 2020). Members of the LGBT+ community are exposed to public ridicule from state officials. To illustrate, the former Minister of Education, Przemysław Czarnek stated that LGBT+ people “are not equal to normal people” (Pink News 2020), while Jarosław Kaczyński, the former Deputy Prime Minister and de-facto political leader of Poland, said that the need for gender reassignment in transgender people “is weird and should be treated” (Euractiv 2022). Women’s rights are contested. The former Polish government has put into consideration withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Trybunał Konstytucyjny 2020a). On October 20, 2020, the Polish Constitutional Court ruled that abortion on the grounds of fetal impairment is unconstitutional, further restricting the already conservative law on abortion (Trybunał Konstytucyjny 2020b). Anti-gender initiatives of state and local institutions went in hand with activities of anti-gender civil society actors such as Ordo Iuris and Foundation Life and Family.

The opposition to gender progressiveness is found to be grounded on a critique of neoliberalism as a sociocultural formation (Korolczuk and Graff 2018) and a symbolic resistance to East-West inequalities (Kovats 2018). Polish anti-gender actors argue that “gender ideology” is a foreign concept imposed on Poland by the West. The notions of Western cultural domination and imbalances in the conversation on gender and sexuality are noticeable in the Polish public discourse. The moral decay of the West and its malicious intent to control and denigrate Poland are prevalent themes in the Polish anti-gender discourse. The Polish government was furthermore an active player in international anti-gender politics. In the European Union, Poland contested the use of the term “gender” in EU documents (EU Observer 2020). On the UN level, Poland signed the Geneva Consensus Declaration against recognition of the right to abortion (United Nations 2020) and abstained from a vote in the Human Rights Council on the Mandate of the Independent Expert on protection from violence and discrimination related to sexual orientation and gender identity (see United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2022).

The embassies of progressive states in Poland are active in the country in many ways. For instance, they sign an annual open letter of support for LGBT+ community (e.g., US Embassy in Warsaw 2020). The language of the letter is kept simple and general and is adopted every year without major changes. Some of these embassies coordinate their activities in a group of “like-minded states,” including participation in Pride Parades all over Poland. The embassies also celebrate such events like International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia by displaying rainbow flags outside their premises, and regularly meet, consult, and provide financial support to LGBT+ rights NGOs in Poland. Women’s rights are promoted by the embassies through collaboration with Polish NGOs on issues of women’s empowerment and gender-based violence. In the context of the consideration of Poland’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, a group of embassies published an op-ed in a Polish newspaper highlighting the importance of the document (Rzeczpospolita 2021). Women’s rights and LGBT+ rights are major themes of embassies’ social media content. Activities of the embassies are met with criticism of local conservative organizations and sometimes regular citizens who see it as interference in Polish domestic affairs. Such discontent was expressed, e.g., in an open letter by Ordo Iuris to the diplomatic corps in Warsaw (Ordo Iuris 2022) as well as on social media (Jezierska 2021). Polish officials remain unsympathetic to embassies’ participation in Pride Parades but refrain from qualifying them as interference (Niezależna 2020; TVP Info 2020; Dziennik.pl 2021). Embassies of gender conservative states, such as Hungary, the Russian Federation, or Saudi Arabia, are present in Warsaw, a hub of over ninety diplomatic missions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland 2023); however, they do not visibly engage in gender and sexuality politics in the hosting country.

The proceeding sections present the analysis of gender equality and LGBT+ rights diplomacy in Poland from the perspective of (de)polarization in relations between progressive states (Self-Group) and conservative states (Other-Group).

Construction of the Self-Group and the Other-Group

The Boundary between the Self-Group and the Other-Group

The representatives of progressive embassies navigated sameness and difference with ease, revealing themselves in that sense as professional mediators of estrangement. They constantly problematized, contextualized, and questioned the constructions of the Self-Group and the Other-Group as separated (D1). When asked about the differences in approaches to gender and sexuality in their countries and in Poland, the interviewees argued that Polish people are “equally modern” as them (Interview 1) and that there are a lot of “educated” (Interview 5) and “progressive” (Interview 6) people in the hosting country. Diplomats also emphasized that their country and Poland share the same path to progress, in that sense viewing Poland as a former self:

“We are all moving in the same direction, some sooner, and others might be a step or two back in certain areas” (Interview 10)

“I’m old enough to know…in [my country] (…) opinion polls were not so much different than that the ones in Poland, I mean, if you ask people “should gay people be able to marry?”, it also was about 50-50.” (Interview 1)

The Other was consequently always made relatable but either by being the same as the Self, a construction that requires treating parts (e.g., NGO partners) as a whole (Poland), or by being a former version of Self (D1), a discourse that demands a linear vision of progress and can be seen as patronizing, as suggested in the interviews conducted with Polish officials and NGOs. It evidences that depolarization, through the construction of the Other as similar to the Self, is not always something unambiguously positive.

Diplomats’ responses constantly mixed state identities constructed within the boundaries of gender and sexuality disputation with broader identification. The most prominent reference was Poland’s shared place in European communities of values as a member of the European Union, the Council of Europe, NATO, and a party of international human rights instruments. Diplomats often expressed that Poland is “not-that-different” from the Self-Group not necessarily because of its gender and sexuality policies but rather because of its membership in European and Western clubs (D1). In other words, Poland was not constructed as similar to the Self-Group because of its approach to gender and sexuality; rather, its approach to gender and sexuality could not have been that different since Poland is European and Western (“We’re still in Europe after all, it cannot be that bad” (Interview 1). Furthermore, the anti-gender stance of the Polish government was seen as putting into question Poland’s place in European and Western identity clubs, while progress in the area of gender and sexuality was regarded as affirming its belonging to Europe and to the West. As diplomats’ open letter on the Istanbul Convention said in praise of Poland’s implementation of the Convention:

Poland thus confirmed [emphasis added] its membership in the community of countries which through cooperation in European and UN fora wish to significantly contribute to improving the situation of people around the world. (Rzeczpospolita 2021; translated from Polish)

The commonalities were also emphasized through linkages to other, sometimes surprising, identities. For instance, one interviewee recalled this exchange in the discussion of same-sex couples’ rights with the Polish government:

At a meeting here in Warsaw [country’s representative] said “we are talking to you like one conservative government to another conservative government” (…) because there is no bigger conservative value than marriage and family. (Interviewee 13)

In this example, the diplomat employed moral reframing (Feinberg and Willer 2019), a depolarization tactic of presenting one’s position in relation to Other’s values, in this case conservatism (D1).

A notorious exception from diplomatic commonality-seeking was the media interview given by the US ambassador to Poland in which she contended that “Poland is on the wrong side of history” regarding LGBT+ rights (Polska Agencja Prasowa 2020) (P1). These words, however, were deemed atypical of what a diplomat does and says, the US ambassador at the time being a political appointee and a controversial figure in the diplomatic milieu.

Since diplomats do not specify what defines the boundary between the Self-Group and the Other-Group, the difference between “us” and “them” becomes elusive. When suggesting the existence of a difference, as in the letter in support of LGBT+ community, they make general references to equality, democracy, and human rights without relating these concepts to the situation in Poland. In the interviews, the boundary was sometimes drawn on the adoption of “anti-LGBT ideology” declaration or hate speech toward LGBT+ community, actions regarded by interviewees as separating the Self-Group from the Other-Group (“All these terrible “LGBT ideology free zones” … What is it? Where are we? It isn’t normal” (Interview 3) (P1).

Construction of Each Side as a Group

The heterogeneity of the progressive group of states was not only emphasized but celebrated by the interviewees as symbolizing the openness and diversity of the group (Interviews 1, 3, 5, and 9). The activities of the Self-Group were driven by bottom-line consensus, and diplomats preferred to expand the membership of the group rather than maintain ambitious and rigid positions (D2). Inclusive Self-Group construction, which permitted diversity, also served as an important statecraft function, as the interviewees underscored that “numbers count” and that broad coalitions are essential for ensuring the interests of their states. For instance, here is how a diplomat talked about a coalition for an initiative on violence against women:

In the past we would say violence against women, girls, transgender, binary, etcetera. And then some members of the group asked me, “well, could we stick to violence against women and girls?”. (…) I thought, what counts more for me? (…) what speaks more to the public? If we have all these women or we have only me, and maybe my [like-minded country] colleague, and maybe somebody else. (Interview 9)⁴

The Self-Group was referred to by the interviewees through labels not always directly associated with gender and sexuality, such as “like-minded,” “liberal,” “democratic,” “group of friends,” “international community,” and “global movement.” The collective identification served as a mobilizing tool (“We participate [in the Pride Parade] because [emphasis added] we are like-minded with these other countries” (Interview 12). While these broad labels were used to designate the Self-Group, the actual label of gender progressiveness was rarely used. Diplomats highlighted that the Self-Group is not homogenous in its levels of progress, while no single state in the group can claim to be fully gender progressive. When describing the Self-Group, the interviewees also problematized the idea of a state as a uniform and stable entity and underscored the heterogeneity of national societies and the fluctuation of state policies over time, with examples of the rise of the radical right in Sweden or the overturn of Roe v. Wade in the United States (D2).

The heterogeneity of the Other-Group was also emphasized. Poland, although recognized as a member of the Other-Group, was differentiated from the rest of the members due to its relatively good record on individual rights and its status within European and Western communities of values (D2). The diplomats did not represent Poland as a homogeneously conservative country, instead describing the country as comprising roughly three layers progressive Polish activists, a conservative government and anti-gender movements, and the polarized Polish society at large. This separation allowed the interviewees to contain the Otherness of Poland in the Polish government, or even only in its most conservative branches, and in local conservative organizations such as Ordo Iuris (P2):

All these hate messages and this big ideological discourse only interest the big politicians. So it’s only ministerial level and Prime Minister and Mr Kaczynski and Mr Ziobro, but with the people we interact with from day-to-day, they don’t care (…). (Interview 1)

You know, you have this Law and Justice government and within the government, you have officials that are even more conservative than conservatives, and they come up with something like this. (Interview 9)

The constructions of Poland presented by the interviewees were made possible by overlooking the gender conservativeness of parts of Polish society, most of all of the electorate of the ruling Law and Justice Party.

The homogeneity of both groups was further problematized through a particular understanding of diplomacy as a practice of relationship maintenance beyond “the here and now” (D2). As said by one of the interviewees:

If you’re talking about the broader role of an embassy in supporting development of relations between Poland and [interviewee’s country], that is far beyond the relations just between the national government and the national government that are empowered in a particular time. (Interview 6)

Character of the Other-Group

Similarly to their preference for commonalities over differences, the diplomats tended to express positive rather than negative affect toward the Other. When speaking of the Polish government, the interviewees made repeated references to the label of good friendship, a strong relationship that allows honesty and even criticism of each other (Interviews 3, 10, 11, and 12). One diplomat said that their country and Poland “may not be the best friends,” but they are still “the same family” (Interview 1), alluding to the need for mutual support and cooperation despite differences (D3).

Some interviewees expressed negative affect toward top Polish politicians and organized anti-gender groups (P3). The negative affect seemed to have been driven, in line with previous research on polarization (Simas, Clifford, and Kirkland 2020), by the feeling of empathy toward the Self-Group, in this case Polish LGBT+ community (“This government tries to prevent activists from operating by menacing them more with court orders and with convictions” (Interview 1). When talking about their counterparts in the Polish administration, representatives of the embassies expressed mostly positive affect, emphasizing respectful and warm personal connections and professionalism of their partners despite differences. Diplomats did not express negative attitudes toward Polish society at large (D3). Although Polish conservatives were not vilified, they were usually presented as irrelevant or misinformed (“We aim for the younger population. Not for the sixty-five-year-old somewhere in the East of the country” (Interview 9); “[Gender conservatism is the result of] lack of political will to direct information” (Interview 10), again evidencing that lack of polarizing behavior, in this case vilification, is not per se unambiguously positive.

It must be added that the interviewees viewed careful representation of the Other as part of their role as diplomats, including through debunking stereotypes and correcting misinformation. For instance, many embassies were engaged in informing their countries about the scope of the “anti-LGBT ideology” declarations and correcting the assumptions made by politicians, press, and the public outside of Poland that the instruments prevented LGBT+ individuals from accessing the territory or state services in the municipalities (D3).

Engagement of the Self-Group with the Other-Group

Cooperation

The interviewees perceived the search for opportunities for cooperation to be the very purpose of diplomacy, and issues on which diplomats could get the Self-Group and the Other-Group to cooperate were perceived as areas on which diplomats should focus. The interviewees named examples of topics on which they could cooperate with the Polish government, e.g., work-life balance initiatives (D4). When points of overlap between the Self-Group and the Other-Group were discovered, they were enthusiastically welcomed, even if occasionally met with surprise, as this diplomat recounted:

“We had an event at the residence with a group of women ambassadors, and I invited the Minister for Family and Social Policy. She is of course of the Law and Justice government. And when I mentioned that we were going to do this campaign on violence against women she immediately said ‘I want to join’. And I was like…ok, she wants to join us [confusion]. I was happy of course!” (Interview 9)

Exchange of Information

The interviewees also perceived information-gathering for the purpose of understanding the Other as one of the main roles of bilateral embassies. Although the interviewees do put more trust in information produced by those they agree with, e.g., progressive NGOs (P5), the information produced by the Other-Group, e.g., the Polish right-wing press, is habitually consulted as part of embassies’ day-to-day activities (D5). The purpose of this exercise is to be able to understand the logic of thinking of the Other. Occasionally, however, information from the Other-Group pushes the interviewees to examine their own assumptions. As a civil society interviewee confirmed, progressive embassies do juxtapose the information received from their NGOs with information received from the Polish government and conservative press and ask their local partners for clarifications and additional evidence. They also recognize the need to use expertise and data in their activities and therefore to act against the trend of devaluation of facts in a polarized discourse (D5).

The interviewees understood their function as listening and meeting with all actors who were willing to meet with them. Consequently, gaining information about the Other-Group from original sources was seen as necessary (D5). Diplomats saw themselves in that sense as careful “ears” of their states in the hosting country. These qualities were visible in the way diplomats followed the topic of “anti-LGBT ideology” declarations:

I’ve also met, for instance, with the mayor of one of the first towns that brought in an anti-LGBT zone, but also one of the first that got rid of it. I met the mayor to hear about his experience both in bringing in the resolution and then deciding to remove it and to find out what the history of that was, why they made those decisions (…). To understand what the motivation in bringing it in was, why they brought it in, why they decided to get rid of it. Who was involved, who was consulted. (Interview 2)

And in the way several diplomats kept contact with a Polish anti-gender foundation Ordo Iuris:

We met to understand their position. They are an influential actor in Poland and in Polish politics. Influential also to some extent on the government, I would say. And they have put forth various public campaigns. So it was important to hear from them directly what their approach is, what their objectives are, how they perceive the issue. (Interview 6)

In recounting these stories, the interviewees highlighted the need for a deep understanding of the Other-Group.

Argumentative Practices

Persuasion of others to their positions was seen by the interviewees as part of embassies’ job. They exercised this role through various means, e.g., public diplomacy talks on feminist foreign policy, social media posts on LGBT+ rights, and open letters on issues of concern (D6). They also believed in the importance of ongoing conversation between the Self-Group and the Other-Group. The quote below is emblematic of how diplomats valued discussion in this context:

You always have to have a relationship in order to have a discussion about anything. Otherwise, you’re not having a discussion, you’re just yelling at each other. So you have to spend time and understand the viewpoint of the other side. Otherwise it’s not going to be relevant. You’re not going to be talking about the right thing. (…). Otherwise there’s no point in being in that country. You’re not serving yourself or your citizens if you can’t call someone and have a conversation. Things only change when you have a calm discussion. I mean, the same way you build any relationship. You meet, you talk, you consider the other viewpoint, you share your viewpoint. It’s like any relationship. (Interview 2)

However, deliberation between the Self-Group and the Other-Group on concrete points of disagreement was limited. As stated before, embassies had a high interest in understanding the positions of the Other; nevertheless, this knowledge was not followed by an argumentative response. Embassies’ activities aimed at persuasion did not engage with the arguments of the Other. A good example is the open letter in support of the Istanbul Convention (Rzeczpospolita 2021), which does not address anti-gender criticism of the instrument. In Poland this discourse is centered on the use of the word “gender” in the Convention, interpreted by some as requiring Poland to recognize the nonbinarity of gender. The letter, however, does not make reference to this narrative. Lack of engagement on points of difference contributes to the elusiveness of the ideological axis dividing the Self-Group and the Other-Group, as diplomats in their activities use language with which the Other seemingly should be able to agree. This language was limited to general references to equality, democracy, and human rights, even when the interviewees were pushed to engage in argumentation, by anti-gender actors or conservative members of the public. In a similar vein, embassies did not engage in accusations of interference in internal affairs. Lack of argumentative engagement with conservatives in Poland was explained by the perception of their positions as manifestly meritless. The role conception of diplomacy as a practice of constraint seemed to sit uncomfortably with advocacy-oriented roles that diplomats are also made to perform (P6). The interviewees often referred to the Human Rights Council, the Council of the European Union, or meetings between heads of state as more appropriate places for argumentative practices, while bilateral diplomacy was seen as better placed to emphasize similarities rather than differences.

Engagement with Structural Grievances

The last part of the analysis investigates embassies’ engagement with Other’s grievances regarding structural inequalities underpinning international gender polarization. In this context, the discourse on Western interference in Other-Group’s affairs was also identified in an interview with representatives of the Polish authorities. Promotion of women’s and LGBT+ rights by progressive embassies was understood as a “superiority complex” and a “lack of respect for democratic choices of the Polish society.” The interviewees also expressed grievances about the unequal treatment of Central and Eastern European countries in the common communities of values such as the European Union.

This narrative of interference was known to diplomats, and the intention not to impose any solutions on Poland was repeatedly emphasized (D7). In that sense, respect for the autonomy of the Other is institutionalized within diplomacy, and indeed, embassies refrain from expressing opinions on specific legislative solutions, e.g., the legalization of same-sex partnerships or liberalization of abortion. However, the cultural and symbolic power of influence that members of the Self-Group possess and make use of was not acknowledged, nor was the way in which the progressive side benefits from the balance of this type of power being tilted toward the West. The economic imbalance of power between the West and the East was not recognized, not even in the context of the European Commission and Norway’s halt on funding to Polish municipalities that adopted “anti-LGBT ideology” declarations and demanded for their repeal, a strategy that would not have been possible without the existence of the economic imbalance (P7). The interference narrative is furthermore confronted with an altogether denial of the relevance of “East” and “West” as markers of division of power in international society. At the same time, Poland is considered to be part of the West, but its place in the Western club is presented as conditional and in need of confirmation, while its positions on gender and sexuality allow other states to assess whether it belongs to the West rather than co-define what the West is. The interference narrative was perceived as something that diplomats must be attentive to in their activities, but only in the limited logic of statecraft. Consequently, it was argued that economic incentives should not be “visibly” linked to women’s and LGBT+ rights in order “not to fall into this trap that “it’s the foreigners pushing us one way or the other” (Interview 1). Although understandable, as some conservative states tend to deny the otherwise undeniable existence of genuinely local progressive movements within their countries and equate them with foreign states that support them (Gevisser 2021), this representation of activities of progressive states does not acknowledge that they do influence a situation in a different state in the context of a power imbalance. In that sense, this example illustrates the likely circular dynamic of polarization in which a polarizing action of one state (suppression of difference within a state) produces a reaction of another state (lack of engagement with international structural grievances).

Diplomacy—Mediation or Preservation of Estrangement?

The analysis of activities of progressive embassies in Poland in the area of gender and sexuality points to the depolarizing role of diplomacy in international society. Diplomats shy away from the construction of binary identities. They actively deconstruct the difference and distance between the progressive camp and Poland as an example of a conservative Other (D1), as well as question the monolithic understandings of the Self-Group and the Other-Group (D2). They show care for adequate representation of the Other and express positive affect toward the host country (D3). In reaction to ideological differences, they respond with engagement rather than disengagement. Diplomats see their raison d’'être in search of cooperation with (D4) and information about the host country (D5), even more so in light of differences.

However, this finding needs to be problematized. While largely a depolarizing practice, diplomacy does not represent all elements of depolarizing behavior. Due to its general discomfort with acknowledging and defining differences, diplomats shy away from argumentation of positions and deliberation (P6). Their engagement with structural grievances underpinning polarization is also limited. Although they show concern for state autonomy, they shy away from addressing the issue of power imbalance (P7). The analysis has also shown negative trends emerging from depolarizing practice of diplomacy. In deconstructing ideational distance between their states and the host country, diplomats may fall into a “former Self” trap, which can be read as condescending. By limiting the expression of negative affect to, e.g., political leaders, in order not to refer negatively to the population, they can invisibilize or deny the agency of supporters of said politicians.

Conclusion

In this paper, I argued that international politics of gender and sexuality has been so far understood through a focus on polarizing and antagonistic dynamics, neglecting possible depolarizing mechanisms. I then developed a conceptual framework for studying (de)polarization in IR. The framework, especially its attention to depolarization, built on and contributed theoretically to the Self/Other literature. Later, I addressed the question of whether diplomacy is a depolarizing practice by first discussing it theoretically and then investigating it empirically through a case study. I concluded that diplomacy is primarily a depolarizing practice.

My theoretical expectations and empirical findings on the role of diplomacy in international gender polarization stand in contrast with the literature and public discourse on progressive-conservative camps. To illustrate, in research conducted by Janoff (2022), the United Nations reveals itself as a “polarized multilateral environment rife with conflict, dysfunction and mistrust,” “toxic” and “cynical” (114), where “diplomats dehumanize their opponents” and make far-reaching generalizations about the Other-Group (130). The presented study of progressive embassies in Poland paints a more optimistic picture of relations between “us” and “them.” The reasons for this divergence can be twofold. First, there has been a tendency to focus on polarizing aspects in this context, while the investigation of the depolarizing role of diplomacy did not make its way to research questions. Second, as has been discussed, it may be that the depolarizing side of diplomacy is more pronounced in a bilateral than a multilateral context, as bilateral diplomacy entails interactions with a diverse set of host state actors rather than one delegation.

The findings can be of great relevance for policymakers and implementers. States promoting gender equality and LGBT+ rights should anticipate polarizing dynamics and act accordingly, harnessing the depolarizing potential of diplomacy while also planning around its shortcomings in that regard. Novel insights presented in this article also point to directions for further research. The extent to which diplomacy is a depolarizing practice should be examined in varying contexts. The conceptual framework of (de)polarization developed for this study could be applied to other substantive fields (e.g., climate, freedom of religion) and levels of interstate relations (e.g., summitry, people-to-people diplomacy).

Author Biography

Monika de Silva is a PhD researcher at the Gender and Diplomacy Project at the Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg. She received a master’s degree in law from University of Warsaw and advanced master’s degree in EU international relations and diplomacy from College of Europe. Her professional experience includes work at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European External Action Service, and the Council of Europe. She is interested in gender and sexuality norms, diplomacy, international law in action, and the European Union.

Notes

Authors’ note: Data collection for this article was possible thanks to the grant received from Lundgrens Vetenskapsfond. I am grateful for substantial feedback provided by Ann Towns, Marina Nistotskaya, Katarzyna Jezierska, Ulrika Möller, Geoffrey Wiseman, participants of the ISA annual conference (March 2023), participants of the joint IP-CERGU seminar at the University of Gothenburg (June 2023), and two anonymous reviewers.

Footnotes

References