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1. Introduction 1. Introduction
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2. Biographical Details 2. Biographical Details
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3. The Law of Significant Assertion 3. The Law of Significant Assertion
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4. Jones versus Frege 4. Jones versus Frege
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5. Encounter with Russell 5. Encounter with Russell
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6. Concluding Remarks 6. Concluding Remarks
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Acknowledgments Acknowledgments
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References References
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Notes Notes
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E. E. Constance Jones and the Law of Significant Assertion
Get accessJeanne Peijnenburg is Professor Emerita of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. She was research director of the Faculty of Philosophy and received several grants from the Dutch National Science Foundation. Her expertise lies in formal epistemology, philosophy of science, and the history of analytic philosophy. She has written about thought experiments, retrocausation, Zeno paradoxes, weakness of will, probability, and truth approximation in such journals as Mind, Erkenntnis, Philosophical Studies, and Synthese. Together with David Atkinson she developed a probabilistic resolution of the regress problem in epistemology (Fading Foundations, Springer Open Access 2017).
Maria van der Schaar is Senior University Lecturer at the Institute of Philosophy, Leiden University. Her research is in philosophy and history of logic, more specifically, judgement and the first person in logic (Judgement and the Epistemic Foundation of Logic, editor, Springer, 2013; “Frege on Judgement and the Judging Agent,” Mind, 2018). Her work relates to the history of analytic philosophy (her book on G. F. Stout, Palgrave 2013), the Brentano School (her book on Kazimierz Twardowski, 2015), and the early modern period (John Locke, G. W. Leibniz).
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Published:18 September 2023
Cite
Abstract
Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones (1848–1922), a Cambridge logician and Mistress of Girton College, is especially known for her law of significant assertion, with which she tries to escape Hermann Lotze’s skepticism about categorical propositions. Her first formulation of it dates from 1890, and several philosophers have pointed out the similarities with Gottlob Frege’s use of Sinn and Bedeutung in 1891 and 1892. This chapter argues that there are also important differences from Frege’s approach, and that Jones’s discovery relies on the traditional distinction between extension and intension. Although Bertrand Russell did not think highly of Jones’s views, he seems to have felt the pressure to discuss them in his paper “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description” of 1911, where his criticism resembles the way he criticized Frege in “On Denoting” of 1905. The chapter surmises that Russell’s argument against Jones may be questionable, since it is based on an assumption that Frege makes, but that Jones rejects.
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