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37.1 The Debate 37.1 The Debate
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37.1.1 Intentions 37.1.1 Intentions
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37.1.2 The Simple View 37.1.2 The Simple View
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37.1.3 Acting for a Reason and the Derivative Reasons View (DRV) 37.1.3 Acting for a Reason and the Derivative Reasons View (DRV)
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37.2 The Debate in More Detail: Shah vs. Schroeder 37.2 The Debate in More Detail: Shah vs. Schroeder
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37.2.1 Shah’s View 37.2.1 Shah’s View
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37.2.2 Schroeder’s View 37.2.2 Schroeder’s View
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37.3 Are Reasons to Act Reasons to Intend? 37.3 Are Reasons to Act Reasons to Intend?
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37.3.1 Omissions and Virtuous and Spontaneous Actions 37.3.1 Omissions and Virtuous and Spontaneous Actions
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37.3.2 What Kind of Intention? 37.3.2 What Kind of Intention?
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37.3.3 Instrumental Reasons to Intend 37.3.3 Instrumental Reasons to Intend
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37.3.4 Believing That One Ought To and Intending 37.3.4 Believing That One Ought To and Intending
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37.3.5 Normative Reasons 37.3.5 Normative Reasons
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37.3.6 Reasons (Not) to Act With a Certain Intention 37.3.6 Reasons (Not) to Act With a Certain Intention
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37.3.7 Preliminary Conclusions 37.3.7 Preliminary Conclusions
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37.4 Epistemic Reasons and Reasons to Intend 37.4 Epistemic Reasons and Reasons to Intend
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37.5 Further State-Given Reasons to Intend? 37.5 Further State-Given Reasons to Intend?
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37.6 Non-Standard Reasons 37.6 Non-Standard Reasons
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37.7 Conclusion 37.7 Conclusion
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References References
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37 Reasons to Intend
Get accessUlrike Heuer is a Reader in Philosophy at University College London.
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Published:10 July 2018
Cite
Abstract
Donald Davidson writes that “[r]easons for intending to do something are very much like reasons for action, indeed one might hold that they are exactly the same except for time.” That the reasons for forming an intention and the reasons for acting as intended are in some way related is a widely accepted claim. This chapter is concerned with exploring the claim that reasons to act provide reasons to intend and the various versions it can take, as well as the related question whether there can be reasons to intend of a different kind. The so-called “exclusivity claim” that only reasons to act provide reasons to intend has been much discussed recently, often in parallel to exclusivity claims concerning reasons for belief. Shah argues in favor of, and Schroeder and McHugh against, exclusivity, for instance. The chapter investigates this discussion in some detail.
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