
Contents
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1 Structural Variables Predicted to Affect the Likelihood of Collective Action 1 Structural Variables Predicted to Affect the Likelihood of Collective Action
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1.1 Situations Where Repetition is Not Relevant 1.1 Situations Where Repetition is Not Relevant
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1.1.1 The Number of Participants Involved 1.1.1 The Number of Participants Involved
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1.1.2 Subtractive versus Fully Shared Benefits 1.1.2 Subtractive versus Fully Shared Benefits
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1.1.3 The Heterogeneity of Participants 1.1.3 The Heterogeneity of Participants
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1.1.4 Face‐to‐Face Communication 1.1.4 Face‐to‐Face Communication
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1.1.5 The Shape of the Production function 1.1.5 The Shape of the Production function
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1.2 Repetition of Interactions 1.2 Repetition of Interactions
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1.2.1 Information about Past Actions 1.2.1 Information about Past Actions
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1.2.2 How Individuals are Linked 1.2.2 How Individuals are Linked
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1.2.3 The Possibility of Choosing Whether to Play or Not (Entry and Exit) 1.2.3 The Possibility of Choosing Whether to Play or Not (Entry and Exit)
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2 Towards a More General Theory of Human Behavior 2 Towards a More General Theory of Human Behavior
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2.1 Heuristics and Norms 2.1 Heuristics and Norms
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2.2 Contingent Strategies and Norms of Reciprocity 2.2 Contingent Strategies and Norms of Reciprocity
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2.3 The Core Relationships: Reputation, Trust, and Reciprocity as They Affect Cooperation 2.3 The Core Relationships: Reputation, Trust, and Reciprocity as They Affect Cooperation
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3 Linking Structural Variables to the Core Relationships 3 Linking Structural Variables to the Core Relationships
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4 Conclusions 4 Conclusions
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References References
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8 Collective Action Theory
Get accessElinor Ostrom is Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science; Co‐Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University; and Founding Director, Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University.
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Published:02 September 2009
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Abstract
This article discusses collective action theory and focuses on three broad tropics. It first examines the growing and extensive theoretical literature that posits a host of structural variables presumed to affect the likelihood of individuals achieving collective action to overcome social dilemmas. It studies how a theory of boundedly rational, norm-based human behaviour is a better foundation for explaining collective action than a model of maximizing material payoffs to self. The article also discusses the link between structural measures and core individual relationships. It ends by reflecting on the challenge that political scientists face in testing collective action theory in light of the large number of variables posited to affect outcomes.
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