
Contents
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The Deterrent and Compellent Imperatives The Deterrent and Compellent Imperatives
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Theory versus Practice Theory versus Practice
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The United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran The United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran
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Iranian Hostage Crisis: Failure to Deter Iranian Hostage Crisis: Failure to Deter
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Iran-Contra: A Failure of Incentives Iran-Contra: A Failure of Incentives
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A Credible Threat of Force and the End of the Iran-Iraq War A Credible Threat of Force and the End of the Iran-Iraq War
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Limits of Compellence? 1989 to 2003 Limits of Compellence? 1989 to 2003
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The Nuclear Imbroglio: A Brief Assessment of Deterrence and Compellence The Nuclear Imbroglio: A Brief Assessment of Deterrence and Compellence
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Concluding Thoughts Concluding Thoughts
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Notes Notes
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19 The United States and Iran: Challenges of Deterrence and Compellence
Get accessRay Takeyh is Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). His areas of specialization are Iran, political reform in the Middle East, and Islamist movements and parties. Prior to joining CFR, Takeyh was senior adviser on Iran at the Department of State. He was previously a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Takeyh is the coauthor of The Pragmatic Superpower and is the author of three previous books, Guardians of the Revolution, Hidden Iran, and The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine. He has also written more than 250 articles and opinion pieces in many news outlets including Foreign Affairs, the New York Times, and the Washington Post.
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Published:11 January 2018
Cite
Abstract
Implementing deterrent and compellent strategies are among the most critical tasks of the national security decision maker. However, as the case of U.S.-Iranian relations since 1979 demonstrates, deterring another state from taking action—especially if it considers those steps to be in its national interests—or compelling it to adopt policies in line with one’s own preferences but which represent a setback to the goals of the other state can be a difficult proposition. In addition, the Iran relationship demonstrates howthe use of deterrent and compellent instruments must be weighed against costs and other second- and third-order effects which may cause the policymaker to accept a less than optimal outcome in order to avoid greater complications in other areas.
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