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Book cover for The American Law Institute: A Centennial History The American Law Institute: A Centennial History

Contents

Book cover for The American Law Institute: A Centennial History The American Law Institute: A Centennial History

A trust is one of several juridical devices whereby one person is enabled to deal with property for the benefit of another person.1

The Restatement of Trusts was one of the first of the American Law Institute’s (ALI’s) projects, and that Restatement, along with its two successors, has profoundly influenced both the common law and statutes in the field. Courts routinely refer to the Restatement in decisions on trusts,2 and the Restatement has served as a “storehouse for legislative drafters,” with provisions incorporated directly into many state statutes.3 That influence has continued throughout the almost first century since the project started. Indeed, the Uniform Trust Code (UTC), enacted in approximately two-thirds of states in some form, mentions the Restatement over three hundred times and, in its prefatory note, observes that the UTC “was drafted in close coordination” with the Restatement (Third);4 this coordination is highly unusual among the various Restatements. The trust Restatements have also deeply influenced the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, now in effect in forty-six states.5

The Carnegie Corporation provided funding to the ALI, with a particular interest in a property Restatement,6 and the Restatement of Trusts developed directly out of concern for the unwieldy scope of drafting a Restatement of Property. Because trusts were initially developed as a means to transfer real property, when land was the primary form for wealth—and indeed, nineteenth-century trust treatises focused on land7—the Trusts project was seen as a “branch” of the property project.8 Wills and intestate succession, which are often taught with trusts in law school courses, remained part of the Restatement of Property.9 There are arguments that it might have been more “systematic”10 to keep trusts in the property Restatement, given that, like wills and intestate succession, they all involve gratuitous, and frequently intergenerational, transfers of property.11

As this chapter traces, the three trust Restatements reflect the development of the “modern trust,” which, whether private or charitable, holds a variety of financial interests not solely or typically land. The three Restatements also reflect economic, social, and cultural changes that have occurred over the last century. We focus, in particular, on three issues in this development: who were the people using trusts and how; what role did “public policy” play in this private area; and how have trustees’ investment duties shifted. For example, the First Restatement, drafted between 1928 and 1935, did not recognize the modern inter vivos revocable trust. Under that Restatement, a trust could be created by “a declaration by the owner of property that he holds it as trustee for another person.”12 By the Restatement (Third), the method of creation had become a gender-neutral “declaration by an owner of property that he or she holds that property as trustee for one or more persons.”13 Not until the Third Restatement is there a section on the Creation of Inter Vivos Trusts, along with recognition that they need not comply with the requirements of the Wills Act.14 This iterative process of understanding the trust, then, demonstrated how the trust generally, and the revocable trust in particular, has become a flexible means of managing property inter vivos and therefore available to broader groups of users.

After providing a brief history of the trust Restatements, this chapter then turns to trace the preceding three through lines identified: first, it threads together how the three Restatements address the question of shifting social and legal norms, including how diverse populations across the wealth spectrum engage with wealth transfer through trusts; second, the chapter focuses on the “public policy” provision in each of the three trust Restatements and tracks that provision’s focus on gender roles, marriage, religion, and “detriment to community”; and third, it traces provisions relating to trustees’ fiduciary responsibilities to beneficiaries, primarily decisions about investments. As this chapter celebrates the positive impact of the Restatements of Trusts on the development of trust law, the chapter also provides suggestions for a Restatement (Fourth) of Trusts that, as has been true of the previous Restatements, would reflect the many developments in trust law since the Restatement (Third). In so doing, this chapter also steps back to provide a tempered critique of the role of trusts in perpetuating inequality, albeit with an understanding that the goal of the Restatement is not to transform the law but rather to reflect its development.

Ultimately, the questions raised in this chapter suggest that it is not too early to start envisioning and framing a Restatement (Fourth) of Trusts.

When work on the Restatement of Trusts was undertaken in 1927, it was the seventh such project of the new ALI, and publication of the Restatement of Trusts in 1935 meant that they were among the first ten volumes of Restatements issued.15 The Restatement (First) was issued in two volumes, with 460 sections. Austin Wakeman Scott, who taught Felix Frankfurter and many other legal luminaries at Harvard Law School, was the Reporter for the first two Restatements of Trust—as well as the Restatement of Restitution.16 As Lance Liebman noted in the Foreword to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, “[f]or half a century, Austin Wakeman Scott was the great American scholar of the law of trusts. Professor Scott was reported to have said: ‘To be great, a law professor must complete a Restatement.’ ”17 By his own lights, he is then doubly great, in the trusts Restatement domain alone.

During the drafting process, Scott described the initial decision-making on the scope of the Restatement (First).18 As he explained, the Reporter and Advisers decided to develop a Restatement on express trusts first, and then, after the completion of that project, to undertake constructive trusts; he was sensitive to the “confusion” that had resulted from treating express and implied contracts together.19 Nonetheless, an early draft of the Restatement noted that the “Subject of Trusts” as handled in the Restatement included charitable, resulting, and constructive trusts.20 And Scott was careful to point out that, notwithstanding the potential broad scope of the term “trust,” the volume would not treat “all kinds of situations where one person deals with property for the benefit of another,” because some such circumstances would be dealt with elsewhere, such as through the already-existing project on a Restatement of Agency.21

Scott shaped the Restatements in a series of ways. As a first example, he viewed trusts as donative, rather than contractual arrangements; this perspective was not inevitable, given the views of other, contemporaneous scholars.22 That decision has meant that a trust is viewed by many in the nature of a unilateral transaction, with the donor’s intent controlling, rather than as a bilateral agreement, in which a trustee has some power.23 Second, even though the original Restatement was slated to include “express private trusts,” charitable trusts, resulting trusts, and, as described earlier, constructive trusts,24 the last became part of the Restatement of Restitution, courtesy of what was probably a Harvard Law School hallway conversation.25 The first Restatement did include Chapter 11, “Charitable Trusts,” with more than fifty sections, and Chapter 12, “Resulting Trusts,” with almost sixty sections,26 although the ALI did not publish its first Restatement on Charitable Organizations until 2021.27 Third, Scott’s impact as the Reporter meant that commercial trusts were excluded from the Restatement,28 notwithstanding that the “1920s saw a miniature boom in writings about business trusts in law reviews, practice manuals, and treatises.”29

Furthermore, in seeking to articulate the law of trusts, the Restatement distinctly pushed the law in certain directions. For example, Scott noted that “[t]here is among the courts a difference of opinion” on whether “the wife or children” of a trust beneficiary can reach into a spendthrift trust.30 In a 1936 Harvard Law Review article, Scott seemed somewhat skeptical about the ability of a settlor to insulate beneficiaries from all claims, finding spendthrift clauses “hardly applicable” to a wife, and “wholly inapplicable” to children.31 Indeed, he had expressed similar skepticism long before he became the Reporter, noting that spendthrift trusts allowed the “creat[ion of] a favored class of persons who can live in idleness and in comfort or even in luxury without paying their debts,” and that, rather than a promising “reform,” the spendthrift trust “seems to violate the sound principles of personal responsibility upon which the doctrines of the common law are based.”32

While the Restatement of Trusts may have been one of the earliest of the Restatement projects, it was not uncontroversial as a project. In a 1931 Columbia Law Review article—published midway through the drafting of the Restatement—Yale law professor Thurman Arnold suggested that, rather than a Restatement of Trusts, the cases might instead be better sorted into a “restatement of the law of future interests, others in a restatement of the law of the administration of insolvent estates, others in a restatement of equitable remedies for fraud.”33 Moreover, notwithstanding Scott’s “unquestioned skill,” Arnold concluded that it was precisely Scott’s skill that illustrated “the attempt to restate trusts as a philosophy is the best proof that it cannot be done.”34 Scott quickly responded that, much as he “welcomed Arnold’s criticisms,” all through his article were “to be found certain assumptions as to the Restatement which are not warranted by the Restatement itself.”35 Arnold’s criticisms did not stop the project. Instead, the First Restatement has profoundly affected American law, and its impact is difficult to overstate. Within two years of its completion by the ALI in 1935, the Restatement had been either cited or quoted by the Supreme Court of the United States as well as by both supreme and appellate courts in a majority of states.36

The Restatement (Second) of Trusts, drafted between 1953 and 1959, was prompted by a second grant from the Mellon Trust, designed to ensure that the Restatements remained current.37 With Scott once again at the helm, the Restatement (Second) did not make substantial changes to the First Restatement.38 In his first Council draft in 1953, Scott predicted that “a considerable part of the material [for the second restatement] will not be affected, and the fundamental principles are unchanged.”39 It did, however, “provide fuller explanations for conclusions reached” so as to “give all possible aid to the practitioner, the judge and the law student.”40 As the introduction acknowledged, “[t]here will not be very much here which is contrary to what was said in the First Edition. But there is much more said here than was said in the First Edition,” offering recognition that the field of trusts was quickly expanding in new and unanticipated directions.41 One reason for the Restatement (Second) was to “integrate the material in the Restatement of the various Subjects,” such as the Restatements of Property and Restitution, “neither of which had been adopted at the time of the adoption of the Restatement of Trusts.”42

The Restatement (Third) of Trusts was drafted between 1994 and 2003, a period when United States trust law and other related laws addressing donative transfers were undergoing “rigorous, comprehensive reexamination.”43 Perhaps due in part to its close association with the new UTC, which was drafted during the same time period, the Restatement (Third) turned out to be more progressive and substantially longer than the previous versions. According to critics, this Restatement, more so than either of the previous Restatements, was often less about clarifying rules than moving them forward.44 Edward Halbach, described as the “contemporary master of the law of trusts,” inherited (so to speak) the Reporter position held by Scott for the first two Restatements,45 and he spent approximately twenty years, aided by numerous others, putting together the four volumes that make up the Restatement (Third) of Trusts.46 The Foreword, written by then Director of the ALI Lance Liebman, makes the ALI’s gratitude to Halbach for this enormous undertaking feel palpable.47 The drafting of the Restatement (Third) officially started in 1994, but from 1987 to 1992, Halbach also worked on a Restatement of the Prudent Investor Rule, described in its Foreword as “a project in its own right and … a partial revision of the Restatement Second of Trusts.”48 This volume, which covered modern investing rules and “related rules concerning the conduct of a trustee in the management of a trust,” eventually became part of the main volume of Restatement (Third).49 Halbach describes the goal of this interim volume as permitting trustees “to act in enlightened ways.”50

Over time, then, the Restatements did significant work both in describing the state of trust law and providing some aspirational points of focus. Shaped quite dramatically by two men, Scott and Halbach, these first three Restatements reflected the law—both as it was and could be—and also the preferences and philosophies of these two formative authors. In this way, the Restatements were significant for what subjects they discussed as much as for what subjects remained untouched.

The attempt to provide black-letter law in the trusts context initially spanned 460 provisions (reduced by the Restatement (Third) to 111 sections). This section focuses on three aspects of the Trust Restatements that reflect how economic, social, and cultural developments outside of trust law have profoundly affected trust law and how it was restated over the years.

Drafted between 1927 and 1935, the Restatement (First) of Trusts reflected its time period in the ways it described and illustrated how and by whom trusts were created and used. Employing all masculine pronouns,51 featuring the “prudent man” as trustee,52 and providing illustrations of its rules that involved primarily male actors,53 the Restatement showed in multiple ways that trusts were created, used, and administered primarily by and for men.

In the spendthrift trust provisions, for example, the Reporters recognize that “certain classes of claimants” are excepted from the rules that protect property held in a spendthrift trust, but they contemplate that it will always be a husband’s interest in the trust that his “wife or child” might seek for support or “the wife for alimony.”54 In other words, when marriages ended, the spouse seeking support was imagined as exclusively female and the person from whom support was sought exclusively male. The Restatement (Second) contained the same language and examples,55 with one anomalous exception.56 This default to the male as the only relevant property owners and managers was quite clearly reflective of the economic and social reality of the times in terms of naturalized gender roles and who held and controlled the wealth in families. These assumptions also reflect the legal realities of the relevant time period; it was not until 1979 in Orr v. Orr that the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a spousal support statute that granted support only to women upon divorce and not to men.57 Where this language failed was in any attempt to recognize the idiosyncratic ways in which women inherited and managed wealth even at the time.58 Instead, the language reflected exclusionary tropes about women and their relationship (or nonrelationship) to money.

As is clear from these provisions, women—at least married women—are not completely absent from the first two trust Restatements. Indeed, the Reporters of both volumes include sections that explicitly address married women’s capacity to be trust beneficiaries59 and to serve as trustees.60 But women are not the primary actors in any examples, with the exception of provisions on dower, curtesy, and coverture, where they by definition share the stage.61 And while married women are singled out and widows receive a nod,62 single women are virtually invisible. Accordingly, while women themselves are mostly background characters, gender is nevertheless omnipresent in the Restatements, being quietly produced with each illustration and each elision.

Produced similarly through absence is race. Any vocabulary relating to race appears to be textually absent from the first two trust Restatements. The sole exception is a comment in the cy pres provisions63 and some state annotations discussing cases on race.64 And although the race of the actors in the illustrations is never specified, the vast majority of national wealth was held by white people during the relevant drafting periods.65 This default form of identity in the Restatements, it is worth noting, was reflective of the composition of Reporters and Advisers for the first two Restatements who were all men and, from what we can tell, mostly white.66

In terms of human relationships, the Restatements of Trusts also reflect and reinforce the prevailing hetero-normative vision of a family at the time of drafting. Consequently, both the First and Second Restatements contain no references to same-sex relationships. As indicated, the words “wife” and “husband” appear frequently, the words “partner” (as in intimate partner) and “companion,” unsurprisingly, do not;67 there are several references to “cohabitation” but only in the context of it being illegal.68 A family in the Restatements of Trusts looks like this:

The “family” of a designated person may be construed to include himself and his wife and children or such children or other relatives or other person as are living with him …69

Perhaps even more so than with race and gender, the failure to recognize same-sex relationships is to be expected given the underground and illegal nature of same-sex relationships.70 Nevertheless with probate cases like In re Will of Kaufmann in 1965, questions about same-sex partners and inheritance mechanisms were already present on court dockets by the time of the Restatement (Second).71 Moreover, as with race and gender, the silence around sexual preference in family formation accomplished substantive work in reflecting—and reifying—the norm of the heterosexual marital family.72

The Restatement (Third) reflects a significant shift in how, for, and by whom trusts were used, though some of the social assumptions that pervade the first two Restatements do still exist. For example, the Restatement (Third) is noticeably more inclusive with respect to gender than its predecessors. Starting with the definition of “fiduciary relation” in Section 2, the masculine pronouns are exchanged for a more gender-neutral approach, so that “a person in a fiduciary relation to another is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other” and “not to profit at the expense of the other” or compete “without the latter’s consent.”73 The Restatement (Third)’s illustrations contemplate a broader array of family members creating, administering, and benefiting from trusts, with “examples of a fairly representative but far from exhaustive array of express private trusts” including male and female settlors, trustees, and beneficiaries.74 Of course, the families in the illustrations still consist of two different-sex parents. These families seek to keep their property in the family, to give to their children equally, to care for elderly siblings and ancestors suffering from poverty and bad health, and to donate to “worthy charities in the community.”75 Not only is the couple a heteronormative one but it is clear that the family is also well resourced.

This is not to say that the drafters did not consider changing social and cultural dynamics. John Langbein, who served as an Adviser on this volume and also as the Reporter for Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Donative Transfers (and an ex officio member of the UTC Drafting Committee), echoed Halbach’s view of the period during which both Restatements and the Uniform laws were drafted as a “cycle of renewal.”76 Langbein supplied additional reasons for revisions in these volumes as “changes in reproductive technology,” a gerontological revolution, changes in gender relations and concerns about gender equity, and changes in theory and practice of investment.77 He described the drafting process as “deeply inclusive,”78 although representation on the drafting committees of women and people of color does not appear to differ significantly from earlier Restatements.79

The Restatement (Third)’s major contribution to making trust planning more accessible was to recognize the broader role of revocable trusts and their interplay with other planning.80 This contribution had less to do with race and gender than it did categories of wealth and class. In a symposium piece about the state of twentieth-century law, Halbach explained that many of the changes seen in the Restatement (Third) came about because trusts were being used by “broader segments of society than in the past, and with greater diversity of objectives … but increasingly without aid of legal counsel.”81 Moreover, donors were living longer, and thus experiencing “substantial periods of diminished physical or mental health.”82 Accordingly, an explicit goal of the Restatement (Third) was to make trusts more “user-friendly” and “flexible,” so accessible to the “ordinary person.”83 The Reporters explain that “widespread legislative and judicial endorsement” and “popular interest” have together established the revocable trust “in American law as a socially useful and successful device for property management, especially late in life, and for the disposition of property (outright or in further trust) following the settlor’s death.”84 Section 25 therefore recognizes revocable trusts as nontestamentary85 but nevertheless “subject to substantive restrictions on testation … and other rules applicable to testamentary dispositions,”86 such as the spousal elective share, claims by estate creditors, and revocation-on-divorce rules.87 With respect to creditor provisions, the Restatement (Third) substantially reworked the rules on discretionary and spendthrift trusts to address what happens to a beneficiary who is a settlor or who may become a settlor.88

As these provisions relate to beneficiary rights—here, the use of trusts to shield beneficiaries from the claims of creditors—the Reporters of the Restatement (Third) sought to strike a balance between the settlor’s powers to control property and creditors’ rights. First, in addition to the long-recognized exception for spousal and child support claims, the Reporters spent time discussing an exception for tort creditors, recognizing that this exception had been recommended early on, had not gained significant traction, but had been recognized in at least one case that “may prove to be influential elsewhere.”89 Second, the Reporters affirmed the long-standing common law rule that creditors could reach the interests of any beneficiary who was also a settlor of the trust.90 In both cases, these rules “reflect a general acceptance of a fundamental common-law principle that a property owner, being free either to bestow property rights and benefits upon others or to withhold them, can bestow those rights and benefits through the trust device with the settlor’s chosen conditions and restraints so long as those conditions and restraints are not, in the conventional terminology of trust law, unlawful or contrary to public policy.”91

Within the trust Restatements, the authors traditionally cabined public policy in a separate section, identifying and discussing particular policy issues that have remained remarkably similar over time, albeit with certain modifications and amplifications. The Restatement (First) set forth the parameters that defined public policy in Section 62, stating in broad strokes that a trust or trust provision was invalid if it tended to induce the commission of illegal or immoral acts or acts against “public policy.” The Reporters furnished an example of “tending to induce the commission of illegal acts” in a trust established to pay the fines of a group of people “engaged in the commission of criminal acts.” A private trust, the Reporters explained, might also be invalid on the grounds of inducing the commission of an immoral act if the trust had as its purpose the provisioning of a nonmarital (“illegitimate”) child.92

In terms of “public policy,” the Reporters identified two thematic strands in the comments. One strand of public policy concern centered on family relationships and the maintenance of nuclear, marital families.93 From this perspective, trusts or trust provisions that restrained marriage, encouraged divorce, or encouraged the neglect of parental duties might be judicially determined to be invalid on public policy grounds. The other strand involved trusts and trust provisions that violated perpetuities, or otherwise restrained alienation (discussed earlier), and therefore facilitated accumulations. The Reporters did not specify or elaborate on the policy objectives that subtended these categories but nevertheless listed such trusts and trust provisions as being against public policy. As with some of the other textual examples given elsewhere, the authors revealed as much through their silence as through their direct explanations, perhaps assuming their objectives to be self-evident.

The Restatement (Second) of Trusts reiterated the same categories in its discussion of public policy,94 retaining a public policy emphasis on the importance of financial support within the marital family and the role of rules restraining perpetuities. Accordingly, the examples of “inducement of criminal or tortious acts” describes invalid trust provisions as those providing for payment of money to a “person” “if he should secure a divorce from his spouse by perjury or other improper means” or “if he should violate his duty to support his children, or should violate a public duty, such as the duty to serve in the armed forces of the nation if he is conscripted.”95 Similar language appears in the examples offered for trusts “encouraging immorality.” One example of a trust provision encouraging “immorality” is a provision that encourages the beneficiary to produce “an illegitimate child.”96 Taking a step away from the self-assuredness of the Restatement (First), however, the Restatement (Second) declined to provide too much specific guidance for fear of treading on particularized “conceptions of public policy which are prevalent in the community”97:

Owing to the changing character of ideas of morality, especially in regard to the relations of the sexes and religious matters, and owing to the diversity of ideas in different communities, it is inadvisable, if not impossible, to make categorical statements on these matters.

This nod to the variety and mutability of cultural norms was a shift in direction and tone from the previous Restatement and gestured to an understanding of the difficulties of universal pronouncements in the context of mores and morals, creating space for productive ambiguity in future iterations.

In addition to the categories culled from the Restatement (First), the Restatement (Second) Reporters added one new category: “Disposition of property detrimental to the community.”98 Here, the Reporter remarked:

A provision in the terms of the trust is invalid if performance of the provision would be injurious to the community as well as to the beneficiary. Thus, if a testator devises land in trust for a long period and directs that no building shall be erected upon any part of the land of more than three stories in height, and the land is situated in the heart of the business district of a city, the enforcement of the provision may be so harmful to the community, as well as to the beneficiaries of the trust, that it is against public policy to enforce it.

The example clearly involves a trust provision that impairs efficient use of the property in a profit-maximization community of business interests and therefore fails to speak to either larger societal interests or inequality concerns. Nevertheless, the new category recognized that there could be interests at stake other than the beneficiaries’ interests, providing a pivot point for future iterations.

Moving to the Restatement (Third), Section 29 (“Purposes and Provisions That Are Unlawful or Against Public Policy”), sounded the same categories and assumptions as previous Restatements.99 That is to say, Section 29 reiterated that an intended trust or trust provision was invalid if it was “unlawful or its performance calls for the commission of a criminal or tortious act,” if it violates the relevant perpetuities period, or if it is contrary to “public policy.” In the commentary about what kinds of trusts or trust provisions would be invalid on grounds of calling “for the commission of a criminal or tortious act,” the Reporter included a new example concerning fraudulent transfer. The example runs as follows: “[T]he owner of property might transfer it to another who agrees to hold it in trust for the transferor or another with the purpose being to conceal the interest of the transferor or other person, not merely for reasons of privacy but in order to mislead the government or others with respect to the true beneficial interests in the property.”100 This recognition of the ways in which trusts could be used to “mislead” the government or other creditors such as a divorcing spouse is a notable first in the public policy section.

Outside of trusts that deal in and tend to encourage illegality and fraud, the same strands appear in the discussion of public policy: the regulation of family relationships and the violation of perpetuities rules.101 In the context of family relationships, new commentary identified trusts or trust provisions that discourage “a person from living with or caring for a parent or child or from social interaction with siblings” as being against public policy. In addition, the Reporter also added that trusts or trust provisions were against public policy to the extent they mandated certain career choices and penalized beneficiaries for acting outside of very narrow parameters with respect to career choices. This example was new in the sense that it took work and career choices seriously as something that trust settlors might choose to control and manipulate, something the previous iterations had not done.

More broadly, the “General Comments” to Section 29(c), addressing trusts that are “contrary” to public policy, explained that a trust provision that induces beneficiaries “to exercise or not exercise fundamental rights that seriously affect their personal interests and lives” may be invalid even if a settlor could have made such gifts during life. Speaking broadly to this idea of finding the appropriate level of settlor control within the public policy framework, the Reporter wrote:

The private trust is tolerated, even treasured, in the common-law world for the flexibility it offers to property owners in planning and designing diverse beneficial interests and financial protections over time, individually tailored as the particular property owner deems best to the varied needs, abilities, and circumstances of particular family members and others whom the owner chooses to benefit. Yet these societal and individual advantages are properly to be balanced against other social values and the effects of deadhand control on the subsequent conduct or personal freedoms of others, and also against the burdens a former owner’s unrestrained dispositions might place on courts to interpret and enforce individualized interests and conditions.

The Reporter made no comment on what “other social values” might come into play or factor into the calculus of public policy pertaining to trust regulation and the regulation of dead-hand control. Nevertheless, adverting to such a balancing act and recognizing the possibility of myriad and competing interests was a step toward mitigating settlor control when exercised as a mode of social control over a beneficiary such as conditioning distribution on the religion, race, or gender of a beneficiary’s spouse.

Trustees are required, pursuant to the duty of loyalty, to act in the sole interests of beneficiaries and, pursuant to the duty of care, to manage trust investments prudently; those duties have been consistent themes throughout the trust Restatements. In the Restatement (First), this was phrased as a trustee being “under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary,”102 and to make investments (in the absence of contrary terms in the trust) “as a prudent man would make of his own property having primarily in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity of the income to be derived.”103 While the comments noted that out-of-state investments were “not necessarily improper,” the Reporters also noted that purchasing stock was permissible “if prudent men in the community are accustomed to invest in such shares when making an investment of their savings with a view to their safety.”104 These provisions, remained the same in the Restatement (Second),105 although the comments recognized that attitudes had changed toward interstate—and international—investments and that states’ statutes had become more likely to allow investments in common stock.106

In between the most recent two Restatements was the interim Restatement of the Prudent Investor Rule, which was described as both “a project in its own right” as well as a “partial revision of the Restatement Second of Trusts.”107 The basic statement of the duty remained the same, although the investment standard had become gender neutral; the trustee’s duty “to the beneficiaries [is] to invest and manage the funds as a prudent investor would …”108 Yet as the project was being drafted, Halbach noted that he needed “to decide how and where to treat issues about social influence on investment decisions,” suggesting that they might be beyond the basic description of loyalty or could be “slipped” into the commentary on loyalty in Section 227.109 He did, indeed, “slip” them into the commentary on loyalty, noting that the minimal common law involving “social investing” was not helpful.110 He reminded readers of the importance of acting to further the trust purposes and with a mindset contemplated by the settlor.111

In Restatement (Third), a trustee still “has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries,”112 and “to invest and manage the funds of the trust as a prudent investor would, in light of the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust.”113 The Reporters provide more clarity on the issue of “social investing,”114 language that did not appear in earlier Restatements.115 This prohibition on investing in ways that might “advance” a trustee’s “personal views concerning social or political issues or causes” could mean that any consideration of factors other than what is in the beneficiary’s sole interest—even if consideration of such factors might ultimately benefit the beneficiary—would be impermissible because there would be a “mixed motive.”116 Section 87 provides additional support for that position, as the comments note that a trustee might abuse their power when acting from an “improper,” albeit not “dishonest motive, such as when the act is undertaken in good faith but for a purpose other than to further the purposes of the trust.”117 These provisions could be seen as part of the move toward shareholder wealth maximization, also evidenced in the opposition that Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) managers have faced in considering Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) investing.118

While the parameters of the Prudent Investor Rule have changed, from an emphasis on preserving the corpus and ensuring income in the first two Restatements to “liberating expert trustees to pursue challenging, rewarding nontraditional strategies, when appropriate to the particular trust, to providing unsophisticated trustees with reasonably clear guidance”119 in Restatement (Third), the “sole interest” standard and “no further inquiry” rule has remained consistent.120

Moving from one version of the Restatement to the next, what has come into increasingly sharp focus is the extent to which reform is, for the most part, effectuated in response to new developments in social outlook, wealth management, laws outside of the trust area (such as civil rights), and public policy. Part of the “cycle of renewal”121 is recognizing what was previously absent and making space for such matters within new discussions. Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter focuses on a few potential areas for reform, recognizing that the work of the Reporters will lie in not only keeping pace with public understandings of concepts like family and gender but also in recognizing the ubiquitous presence of public policy concerns throughout the Restatement. Even as the Restatement of Trusts was shaped by its Reporters to be flexible, they recognized the need to draw on court decisions and statutes, “seeking a seamless statement of the best principles of American trust law and offering intellectual guidance” to state legislatures, courts, and estate planners.122 The following three sets of suggestions, centered on calibrating the interests of trust settlors and beneficiaries with the social and democratic good of the relevant communities and larger collectives, take seriously this charge to state “best principles” and “offer[] intellectual guidance,” although we recognize that some are aspirational, rather than summaries of current developments.

Historically—and in the social imagination—it is clear that trusts have been and continue to be primarily the tools of the wealthy,123 even as they have come to be easier to create, understand, use, and administer. As a result, discussing how a Restatement (Fourth) might address a more diverse set of users is, in itself, a challenge; any discussion of wealth transmission affects a much narrower section of society than does a discussion of wealth generation, for example.124 Nonetheless, a new Restatement might build on the idea of growing access to revocable trusts as highly utilized estate planning devices by expanding on how trusts are being used as management vehicles for incapacity, for special needs, and even as a way to hold fractionalized property.125 In addition, a Restatement (Fourth) might take a position on the increase of Domestic Asset Protection Trusts (DAPTs), previously mentioned only in the comments to Restatement (Third), Section 60 (Transfer or Attachment of Discretionary Interests). Since the last Restatement, this form of trust, which allows an individual to create a trust for their own benefit and shield the property in that trust from creditors, has become even more prevalent as at least nineteen states have authorized them through new legislation.126 Although the Restatement (Third) disapproves of the comparable vehicle, a self-settled spendthrift trust,127 a Restatement (Fourth) will have to decide how to address DAPTs and similar trusts128 and the enhanced asset protection that they offer. Related doctrines, such as trust “decanting,” directed trusts, and trust protectors, all of which together tend to increase wealth disparities, have also become pivotal topics in the trust landscape,129 and it will be crucial for the Reporters to craft appropriate provisions addressing these trust law developments.

Perhaps as an easier task for the future Reporters, there are a number of areas in which a new Restatement could revise material based on the use of gendered language and social constructs, especially around families. For example, by examining and reimagining how gender and race manifest in the rules and illustrations, the Reporters could use their expressive powers to show that diverse populations engage with trusts.130

Looking ahead and envisioning a Restatement (Fourth), there are multiple ways in which the Reporters could build on the foundations laid out in previous versions, amplifying and expanding the connections between trust regulation and public policy. Even focusing solely on the specific public policy sections found in the previous Restatement—Section 62 in the First and Second, Section 29 in the Third—there is ample room for expanding to recognize existing developments.

Consider “illegal” trust terms, such as the fraudulent transfer example given in Restatement (Third). The rules on fraudulent transfer are one of the few tools that govern transfers into trusts, and future Reporters might want to analyze how such rules facilitate public policy goals related to tax collection, creditor rights, and family support debts. This analysis would align with new and continuing developments in trust law across the states, discussed in the previous section.131 Similarly, with the category of perpetuities, the Reporters should take into account new legislative activity expanding perpetuities periods. Perpetuities violations have been considered a public policy violation in all previous versions of the Restatement, but the Reporters have never explicitly articulated the policy rationales that make the Rule Against Perpetuities so fundamental. With almost a dozen states having fully abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities132 and even more having extended the perpetuities period to anything from 365 to 1,000 years,133 Reporters may be called upon, in order to capture these developments, to take a stance on how these developments sit with the traditional framing of perpetuities within the Restatements.134

Finally, Reporters for any future Restatement have the capacity to use the public policy power to effectuate antidiscrimination norms. Previous Restatements have all addressed within the public policy section the extent to which trusts or trust provisions may place conditions on a beneficiary’s religious faith and practice.135 This concern could provide the impetus for amplification around the topic of discriminatory conditions within trusts. Recognizing that these kinds of public policy limits are the only mechanism through which to address and combat discrimination in trusts and trust provisions, the Reporters might include policy statements about other forms of discrimination, such as by stating explicitly that trusts or trust provisions that place conditions based on race, gender, age, ability, or ethnicity presumptively violate public policy. The list might even include gender identity.136 Developing this more expansive framework in the public policy sections will not only move the Restatement toward a more robust understanding of antidiscrimination but also will help address concerns, stated elsewhere in this chapter, about the silence around the production of gender and race within the Restatements.

While the obligation of a trustee to act in the sole interest of the beneficiaries remains firmly entrenched,137 an example of the property rather than “contractarian” focus on fiduciary obligations, the development of ESG investing provides a distinct set of additional challenges to the meaning of “sole interest” and of “prudence.” If a beneficiary’s sole interest is defined as maximizing financial returns, albeit through prudent investing, then any attention to ESG investing might be seen as a distraction (at best) or, as discussed earlier, as a potential violation of the duty of loyalty. Indeed, pressure by beneficiaries or regulatory bodies to engage in ESG investing could be deemed as violating the duty of loyalty in requiring a trustee to consider “collateral benefits to third parties.”138 Alternative, less draconian views of compliance with the duty of loyalty might make ESG considerations permissible under certain circumstances,139 given that they are already becoming factors in other types of investment management and so could become part of acting as a prudent investor would.140 Perhaps ESG considerations “should” be part of any investment analysis.141 They might even be required, but only when such an investment strategy enhances the long-term value of a company,142 and can thus be viewed in the beneficiary’s sole interest.

Yet, despite the fact that these debates are heatedly taking place across investment offices, the special demands of ESG investing have not yet been addressed by the Restatement. A Restatement (Fourth) could do so, guided by the efforts of some states to require trustees to consider beneficiaries’ interests in ESG investing as a modification of the Prudent Investor Rule.143 For example, in Delaware, the code states: “when considering the needs of the beneficiaries, the fiduciary may take into account the financial needs of the beneficiaries as well as the beneficiaries’ personal values, including the beneficiaries’ desire to engage in sustainable investing strategies that align with the beneficiaries’ social, environmental, governance or other values or beliefs of the beneficiaries.”144 Delaware also provides for the enforceability of a trust term that directs a “sustainable or socially responsible investment strateg[y] … with or without regard to investment performance”;145 it allows a trustee to consider an investment that “sacrifices returns to achieve a benefit for a third party or for moral or ethical reasons.”146 Again, in order to better reflect what is happening within trust companies and what is being discussed among trustees, a Fourth Restatement will want to recognize these developments and fold them into new discussions.

The Restatements of Trusts have achieved the goals set forth in the ALI’s 1923 Certificate of Incorporation: “to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work.”147 The Restatements of Trusts helped to institutionalize a relatively new field of law.148

Today, while the core elements of trust law are reflected in the Restatement (Third) and the widely adopted UTC, broader questions about the role of trusts are becoming more important in an era of increasing social and economic inequality. On the one hand, Norman Dacey’s popularization of the revocable trust,149 the development of “Totten trusts,”150 and the growing use of trusts in planning for incapacity show the increasing potential reach of trusts as mechanisms for making trusts available to a broader group of people. On the other hand, dynasty trusts and domestic asset protection trusts show the ongoing role of trusts in sheltering wealth, conditions attached to trusts and trust provisions demonstrate the continuing challenge of combatting discrimination, and questions around ESG investing reveal new opportunities to consider the good of multiple stakeholders. The role of trusts in fostering economic inequality may not be an issue that should be addressed in a Restatement, but it is certainly a fundamental question raised by the Restatement’s clarification of the law.

Notes
1

 Restatement of the Law, Trusts, Introductory Note (1935).

2

 

Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 Yale L.J. 356, 373 (2005)
(noting “little variation in state law” before 1986, as states typically cited the Restatement as well as treatises by Scott and Bogert);
Lawrence W. Waggoner, What’s in the Third and Final Volume of the New Restatement of Property That Estate Planners Should Know About, 38 Actec L.J. 23, 24 (2012)
(“When it comes to litigation, the courts pay attention to the Restatement and usually follow it”);
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 52, 58 (1987)
(“Scott’s work has played a pivotal role in the legal understanding of the trustee’s investment management duties”).

3

 

John H. Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute in the United States?, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 1069, 1081 (2007)
[hereinafter Trust Law]; see  
John H. Langbein, The Uniform Trust Code: Codification of the Law of Trusts in the United States, 15 Tr. L. Int’l 66 (2001)
.

6

Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the Council—Dec. 17–20, 1926, 4 A.L.I. Proc. 96105 (out of Property); 103–04 (Carnegie).

7

Langbein, Trust Law, supra note 3, at 1072.

8

Proceedings, May 12, 1927, 5 A.L.I. Proc. 82(1), 110, 110; see also 1926 minutes, supra note 6, at 105 (“while the topic ‘Trusts’ is part of the law of Real Property, it is, from the point of view of the Restatement a related but independent Subject the law of which should be restated by those who have made a special study of it.”).

9

 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Restatement of Property: The Curse of Incompleteness, this volume (“wills and intestate succession are included under the umbrella of the Restatement of Property, whereas trusts are subject to a separate restatement, even though, from the perspective of modern legal practice and law school curricula, it would make more sense to cover both topics in a single restatement, e.g., ‘Trusts and Estates.’ ”).

10

 See Andrew S. Gold & Henry E. Smith, Restatements and the Common Law, this volume (describing systemic or “architectural” approach to law and Restatements). One also might wonder if treating these two subjects together would have provided the ALI with any economic advantage. See Deborah A. DeMott, Restating the Law in the Shadow of Codes: The ALI in Its Formative Era, this volume (describing importance of Restatement sales to ALI funding).

11

There are arguments in favor of both placements. Wills and trusts do seem to be part of property, given that they dispose of property and definitions of property are integral to what can be disposed of in wills. Intestacy could have been placed with family, given that much of intestacy law depends on definitions of family. In fact, there might well be arguments for a separate Wills and Intestacy Restatement that would deal with disposition of property at death. As discussed later, there were contemporaneous arguments that the ALI should not develop a Restatement of Trusts at all. See infra note 33.

12

 Restatement (First) of Trusts § 17 (1935). Although the First Restatement did not contemplate or provide for the modern inter vivos revocable trust, it did allow in Section 17 and some other sections for the creation of a trust inter vivos. See, e.g., id. § 58. An inter vivos trust at that time would have to comply with Wills Act formalities and if “he retains such complete dominion over the property that no substantial interest is created in the intended beneficiaries until the death of the settlor, and the disposition is therefore a testamentary disposition and is invalid” unless the settlor complies with testamentary formalities. Id. § 57 cmt. h. While a settlor could expressly provide for revocability, it was not presumed. Id. § 330.

13

 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 10 (2003).

14

 Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Part 2, Chap. 5, Introductory Note (“The answer given to that question in this Restatement (and also, now, quite consistently given in the case law, despite often awkward rationale) is ‘no.’ ”). The Second Restatement includes a Topic on The Creation of Testamentary Trusts (topic 11), but not on the Creation of Inter Vivos trusts.

15

 Restatement (First) of Trusts, Introduction (1935).

16

2008 A.L.I. Proc. 160 (“He was as important a figure as anyone, and if you want to have the sense of tradition, Professor Scott taught civil procedure to Felix Frankfurter”). As “a law student, [Scott] married the daughter of the President of Harvard University.” 2015 A.L.I. Proc. 3. Scott is also widely known for his treatise on Trusts, which was published in 1939 with a second edition published around the same time as the Restatement (Second).

17

 Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Foreword (2003).

18

 See generally  

Austin W. Scott, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 31 Colum. L. Rev. 1266 (1931)
.

19

 Id. at 1267.

20

 Id. n.3.

21

 Id. at 1267.

22

 

John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 Yale L.J. 625, 644 (1995)
(observing that Scott “got it wrong, but had the fortitude to write his error into the Restatement of Trusts” and citing Scott’s earlier discussion of this issue:
Austin Wakeman Scott, Nature of Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 269–70 (1917)
). Langbein’s view has highly influenced many scholars. See, e.g.,
Robert Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 621, 628–31 (2004)
;
Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 434, 471 (1998)
. Some also see this as “a larger exercise within academia to view all relationships generally as a species of contract.”
Frederick R. Franke Jr., Resisting the Contractarian Insurgency: The Uniform Trust Code, Fiduciary Duty, and Good Faith in Contract, 36 ACTEC L.J. 517, 520 (2010)
.

23

Langbein, supra note 22, at 652 (“On [] matters [relating to the trustee’s role], the trustee’s reasonable understanding of the deal should be as relevant as the settlor’s.”); id. at 671 (“The conventional account of the trust that we find in the second Restatement and in the treatises simply does not give due weight to the bedrock elements of contractarian principle that inform the norms of trust law, namely, consensual formation and consensual terms. Trusts are deals.”). Thus, for example, Langbein argues that the duty of loyalty is “overbroad,” given the “deal” the settlor believed they were making. Id. at 665.

24

 

Austin W. Scott, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 16 A.B.A. J. 496, 497 (1930)
. For resulting trusts, see  
Austin W. Scott, Discussion of Trusts, Tent. Draft No. 5, 11 A.L.I. Proc. 589, 589 (1934)
.

25

2000 A.L.I. Proc. 226 (“Austin Scott, who, of course, was at work on the Restatement of Trusts, had planned in his Table of Contents, somewhere way at the end, Chapter 9 or Chapter 10, the last one was going to be called ‘Constructive Trusts.’ Well, at some point—I assume it was chatting with each other in the corridors at the Harvard Law School”). The rules applicable to resulting trusts were set out in Sections 404–60 of the First Restatement.

26

 Restatement (First) of Trusts, Chapters 11, 12, § 358 (1935).

27

 Restatement of the Law, Charitable Nonprofit Organizations (2021), https://www.ali.org/publications/show/charitable-nonprofit-organizations/  Restatement of the Law, Charitable Nonprofit Organizations, Introduction (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2019) (“Although some of the American Law Institute’s projects, most notably the Restatements of Trusts, include Sections that address charities or mention nonprofits generally, none addresses the topic in an organized or comprehensive manner.”).

28

 E.g., Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 1 cmt. b (1959). “Austin W. Scott, the reporter, excluded commercial trusts from the Restatement on the ground that ‘many of the rules’ of trust law are inapplicable in commercial settings.”

John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 Yale L.J. 165, 166 (1997)
.

29

 

John Morley, The Common Law Corporation: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-American Business History, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 2145, 2166 (2016)
(citing sources).

30

 

Austin W. Scott, Reception by the Courts of the Resettlement of Trusts, 23 A.B.A. J. 443, 444 (1937)
.

31

 

Austin Wakeman Scott, Fifty Years of Trusts, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 60, 69–70 (1936)
.

32

 

Austin W. Scott, The Trust as an Instrument of Law Reform, 31 Yale L.J. 457, 466 (1922)
.

33

 

Thurman Arnold, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 31 Colum. L. Rev. 800, 801 (1931)
.

34

 Id. at 823.

35

 

Austin Wakeman Scott, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 31 Colum. L. Rev. 1266, 1268 (1931)
.

36

Scott, supra note 30, at 443.

37

 

Herbert F. Goodrich, Introduction, Restatement (Second) of Trusts vii (1959)
.

38

 Id.

39

 Restatement, Second, Trusts Council Draft 1 (Jan. 26, 1953), available at  https://heinonline-org.proxy01.its.virginia.edu/HOL/Page?collection=ali&handle=hein.ali/resect1020&id=3&men_tab=srchresults (Austin W. Scott General Note to the Council).

40

 Id.

41

 Id.

42

 Id. at 2.

43

 

Edward C. Halbach Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust Law at Century’s End, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1877, 1881 (2000)
. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts was drafted hand in hand with the UTC and with the Restatement (Third) Property: Wills & Other Donative Transfers. See  
John H. Langbein, Major Reforms of the Property Restatement and the Uniform Probate Code: Reformation, Harmless Error, and Nonprobate Transfers, 38 ACTEC L.J. 1, 2 (2012)
.

44

For critiques of rules announced in the Third Restatement that deviated from common law, see, e.g.,

Mark Merric & Steven J. Oshins, Effect of the UTC on the Asset Protection of Spendthrift Trusts, 31 Est. Plan. 375 (2004)
(critiquing UTC and Restatement (Third) for eliminating common law distinction between support and discretionary trusts);
Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the Elusive Quest for Uniformity in the Law of Trusts, 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 713, 767 (2006)
(criticizing disclosure rules in Restatement and UTC); 12 Del. Code § 3315(a) (2008) (“Where discretion is conferred upon the fiduciary with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise by the fiduciary shall be considered to be proper unless the court determines that the discretion has been abused within the meaning of § 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, not §§ 50 and 60 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts.”); see also  
Richard Thomson, Too Much for Too Little: The Restatement’s Measure of Damages Where the Trustee Sells a Trust Asset for an Insufficient Price, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 2144, 2144 (2012)
(criticizing measure of damages in Restatement (Third) § 205 cmt. d for a negligent, albeit authorized, sale of a trust asset as potentially leading to “incongruently large [damages] compared with the duty to which the beneficiaries are entitled”).

45

 

Lance Liebman, Foreword, Restatement (Third) of Trusts ix (2003)
.

46

 See id. (“highly qualified Advisers gave the Reporters constructive criticism, as did our committed Members Consultative Group, our Council and our membership”); see also infra note 79 (discussing Advisers).

47

Liebman, supra note 45, at ix–x.

48

 

Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Foreword, Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule (1990)
.

49

 Restatement (Third) Trusts, Chapter 17 (2003).

50

 

Edward C. Halbach Jr., Organizational Meeting, Philadelphia, Dec. 18, Prelim. Draft 1 (Dec. 8, 1987)
of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule (1987).

51

 Restatement (First) of Trusts § 2 & cmt. b (1935) (defining a trust, as a “fiduciary relationship with respect to property” and explaining that a person in that fiduciary relation may not delegate “his duties as fiduciary” and “he is under a duty not to profit at the expense of the other [nor] … enter into competition with him without his consent.” (emphasis added)).

52

 Id. § 227 (“In making investments of trust funds the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary … (a) in the absence of provisions in the terms of the trust or of a statute otherwise providing, to make such investments and only such investments as a prudent man would make of his own property having primarily in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity of the income to be derived.”).

53

In Section 18, “Capacity of Settlor, Declaration of Trust,” “a person” has capacity to create a trust “by declaring himself trustee of property.” Id. § 18. Comment a explains that “certain classes of human beings,” which includes “married women at common law” together with “infants” and “insane persons,” lack the “full capacity” possessed by “other human beings.” See also § 350 cmt. a (Creation of a Charitable Trust, Capacity of the Settlor). The illustration shows how a “human being” with “full capacity” manifests that intent. Id. § 24 cmt. b (“A, the owner of Blackacre, devises it to B with a direction in the will that B pay the net income thereof to C during C’s life and that on C’s death he convey Blackacre to D.”).

54

 Id. § 157.

55

 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 2, 18, 24, 41, 43, 44, 45, 74, 157, 350 (1959).

56

In the section on “Tentative Trusts of a Savings Deposit,” the surviving spouse claiming an elective share in a (male) depositor’s account is referred to by both genders. See id. § 58 cmt. e (“e. Restrictions on testamentary disposition. Although the surviving spouse in claiming his or her statutory distributive share of the estate of the decedent is not entitled to include in the estate property transferred during his lifetime by the decedent in trust for himself for life with remainder to others, … the surviving spouse of a person who makes a savings deposit upon a tentative trust can include the deposit in computing the share to which such surviving spouse is entitled.”). This change appears first in the 1948 Supplement.

57

Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 268 (1979).

58

 See  

Lena Edlund & Wojciech Kopczuk, Women, Wealth, and Mobility, 99 Am. Econ. Rev. 146 (2009)
(describing an empirical study of women and wealth from nineteenth century to present); see also  
Sarah C. Haan, Corporate Governance and the Feminization of Capital, 74 Stan. L. Rev. 515, 522 (2022)
(noting that by 1929, women owned the majority of shares in some of the country’s largest corporations); see generally  
Mary Sydney Branch, Women and Wealth: A Study of the Economic Status of American Women (1934)
(statistical study showing status of women as taxpayers and controllers of wealth).

59

 Restatement (First) of Trusts § 118 (“The Beneficiary, Married Women”) (1935).

60

 Id. § 90 & cmt. b (“The Trustee, Married Women”) (limiting married woman’s capacity to serve as trustee to property she would have the capacity to deal with if it were owned by her outright, so nothing that would involve “making conveyances and contracts which are neither void nor voidable”).

61

 Id. §§ 144, 145, 146.

62

 Id. § 25, cmt. b, illus. 4 (“A devises and bequeaths all his property to B, his wife, “desiring her to give all her estate at her death to my relations.” Since the expression of desire applies not only to A’s property, but also to B’s property as to which A had no power to create a trust, he does not presumably intend to create a trust as to his property. In the absence of other evidence, B is entitled beneficially to the property and does not take it in trust”) (emphasis added). Although § 57, cmt. c, does acknowledge that even if a statute entitles “the wife of a testator” to a portion of the estate, “a married man” could avoid this claim by transferring “his property inter vivos in trust even though he reserves a life estate and power to revoke or modify.” Restatement (First) of Trusts § 57 (“Restrictions on testamentary disposition”) (1935).

63

 Restatement (First) of Trusts § 399 (“Cy Pres”), cmt. h (1935) (“Thus, where a testator, who died before slavery was abolished in the United States, bequeathed money in trust to be expended for the circulation of books and delivery of lectures or otherwise as in the judgment of the trustee would create a public sentiment that would put an end to negro slavery in the United States, and slavery in the United States was abolished by an amendment to the Constitution, the court may direct the application of the bequest to the promotion of the interests of former slaves.”).

64

 See, e.g., Restatement (First) of Trusts, Trust State Annotations: Florida, Maryland, Arkansas.

65

In 1930, for example, the racial wealth gap was 9–1, and in 1950 it was 7–1.

Ellora Derenoncourt et al., Wealth of Two Nations: The U.S. Racial Wealth Gap, 1860–2020, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 30101 (2022)
, available at  https://repec.cepr.org/repec/cpr/ceprdp/DP17328.pdf. For discussions of the racial wealth gap, and its history, see also, e.g.,
Danaya C. Wright, The Demographics of Intergenerational Transmission of Wealth: An Empirical Study of Testacy and Intestacy on Family Property, 88 U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 665, 670–72 (2019)
;
Palma Joy Strand, Inheriting Inequality: Wealth, Race, and the Laws of Succession, 89 Or. L. Rev. 453, 458–63 (2010)
.

66

To clarify, we have not found any information that any of them were not white. Restatement (First) of Trusts x–xi (1935); Restatement (Second) of Trusts iii (1959).

67

Even the word “spouse” appears in only eleven sections in the Restatement (First). See  Restatement (First) of Trusts §§ 62, 74, 144, 145, 146, 170, 238, 239, 289, 407, and 408 (1935).

68

 Id. §§ 290 cmt. a, 293 cmt. c, 294.

69

 Id. § 120 cmt. b (“Members of a Definite Class”); see also, e.g., id. § 161 (“Inseparable Interests”), illus. 1 (“A bequeaths Blackacre to B in trust to provide a home for C and his family. C has a wife and two children. C’s creditors cannot reach his interest under the trust.”); § 362 cmt. b (“Restrictions upon the Creation of Charitable Trusts”) (“Usually the invalidity of the disposition is made dependent on the survival of certain members of his family, such as his wife or child, descendant of a child or parent.”). The first two trust Restatements did recognize that not all families live in harmony and that marriages may end before death. See, e.g., id. § 26.

70

An illegality that persisted in some states until Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003), in 2003 with respect to intimate relationships and until Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015), in 2015 with respect to marriage.

71

 In re Kaufmann’s Will, 20 A.D.2d 464, 474 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964), aff’d, 205 N.E.2d 864 (1965).

72

The question of the role of Restatements in reifying the heteronormative family also emerges in the contribution of Linda C. McClain and Douglas NeJaime, The ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Addressing Family Inequality Through Functional Regulation, in this volume.

73

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015).

74

 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 (2003); see also, e.g., id. § 11 (“a person has capacity to create a revocable inter vivos trust by transfer to another or by declaration to the same extent that the person has capacity to create a trust by will.”); § 17 (a trust is created by “a declaration by an owner of property that he or she holds that property as trustee for one or more persons”).

75

 Id. § 13.

76

Langbein, supra note 43, at 5.

77

 Id. at 5.

78

 Id. at 6–7.

79

By the Third Restatement, Halbach was aided by four male associate reporters; three women accompanied the twenty men who served as Advisers. See  Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Vol. 1, at v–vii (2003); Restatement (Third) of Trusts Vol. 3, at v–ix (2007); Restatement (Third) of Trusts Vol. 4, at v–ix (2012). Similar demographics attend the 1992 Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule volume, for which Halbach was also the reporter. Both volumes increased participation through large “consultative groups.”

80

 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 25 cmt. a (2003); see also § 19 (“Pour-Over Disposition by Will”).

81

Halbach, supra note 43, at 1883.

82

 Id.

83

Halbach, supra note 43, at 1881, 1883; see also  Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Foreword ix (2003).

84

 Id. § 25 cmt. a.

85

 Id. § 25 (1) & (2).

86

 Id. § 25(2).

87

 Id. § 25 cmts. d, e; see also id. §§ 34.1(3), 34.3(3), 55.

88

 See id. at § 58 cmts. e & f; § 60 cmts. e & g.

89

 Id. § 59 Reporter’s Note to cmt. a at 400 (citing Sligh v. First Nat’l Bank, 704 So. 2d 1020 (Miss. 1997)); see  

Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 215, 221–22 (2011)
.

90

 Id. § 58(2), 60 cmt. f.

91

 Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Introductory Note 4012 (2003).

92

The Reporters also noted: “Whether such provisions are invalid depends upon the conceptions of public policy which are prevalent in the community at the time of the creation of the trust.” What is meant by “public policy” in a particular community at a particular time raises a host of questions that are beyond the scope of this chapter but that we hope to explore in the future. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) (“The fact that a State’s governing majority has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting a practice.”). But cf.

Nathan Oman, Private Law and Local Custom, in The Oxford Handbook of the New Private Law 159, 172–74 (Andrew S. Gold et al. eds., 2020)
(describing the local character of the common law).

93

Two other scenarios the Reporters envisioned as contra public policy were the restraint of religious freedom and restraining a beneficiary from performing public duties.

94

 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 62 (1959); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 29 (2003).

95

 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 62 cmt. b (1959).

96

 Id. § 62 cmt. c.

97

 Id. § 62 cmt. d.

98

 Id. § 62.

99

 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 29 (2003).

100

 Id.

101

The Restatement (Third) did not directly address the increase in jurisdictions’ recognition of perpetual trusts. See  

Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1343 (2003)
(observing that the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, ch. 13, introductory note, “dodges the issue” of perpetual trusts by writing: “It is worth noting, however, that this section [on modification and termination of trusts] applies in the common-law context and that different issues—and different planning and drafting considerations—may arise with respect to trusts of indefinite duration in jurisdictions that have adopted legislation to abolish the rule against perpetuities.”).

102

 Restatement (First) of Trusts § 170 (1935).

103

 Id. § 227(a).

104

 Id. § 227, cmts. k, l.

105

 Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 170, 227 (1959).

106

 Id. § 227, cmts. l, m.

107

Hazard, supra note 48, at ix.

108

 Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227 (1987).

109

 Memo from Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Second Expanded Draft of “Prudent Investor Rule” and Related and Affected Sections for Discussion, June 2–3, at iii, iv, in  Restatement of the Law Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule Prelim. Draft No. 4 (Aug. 15, 1989).

110

 Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227 cmt. c.

111

 Id.

112

 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78 (2007).

113

 Id. § 90; see  

Susan Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties and ESG Integration, 90 Colo. L. Rev. 731, 785 et seq. (2019)
.

114

Thus, for example, in managing the investments of a trust, the trustee’s decisions ordinarily must not be motivated by a purpose of advancing or expressing the trustee’s personal views concerning social or political issues or causes.” Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 90 cmt. c (2007).

115

For example, it is not in Section 170 (Duty of Loyalty), 187 (Control of Discretionary Powers), or 227 (General Standard of Prudent Investment) of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts.

116

 

Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 381, 413 (2020)
.

117

 Restatement (Third) § 87 cmt. c; see Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 116, at 414 (“If a trustee could not consistent with the terms of the trust make an outright distribution to achieve the same collateral environmental benefit, then the trustee ought not be allowed to circumvent that limit by pursuing the same purpose via the trust’s investment program.”).

118

 

Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform and the Sustainability Imperative, 131 Yale L.J. 1217, 1243 (2022)
; see  
Quinn Curtis et. al., Do ESG Mutual Funds Deliver on Their Promises?, 120 Mich. L. Rev. 393, 396 (2021)
(noting that the Department of Labor adopted an ERISA rule in late 2020 “that may deter 401(k) plans from offering ESG funds”); Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 116, at 403–04 (noting Supreme Court precedent that ERISA investments must be made by focusing solely on financial benefit). But see  
Abbye Atkinson, Commodifying Marginalization, 71 Duke L.J. 773 (2022)
(noting the importance of considering the impact of investments on pension fund beneficiaries); Gary, supra note 113, at 798 (a prudent investor is increasingly advised to consider ESG factors).

119

 

Edward C. Halbach Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 27 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 407
, 411 (First and Second Restatements), 415 (1992).

120

The UTC diverged from the Restatement by changing the “no further inquiry” rule into a presumption, which a trustee could rebut by showing an absence of conflict. See UTC § 802(c); see also  

John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 Yale L.J. 929, 944 (2005)
(arguing that the “no further inquiry” rule is a relic and prevents trustees from engaging in transactions that will benefit both the trust and its beneficiaries, reflecting his contractarian view of trusts);
Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to Professor John Langbein, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 541 (2005)
(arguing that “best interests” standard would impose the risk of serious harm on beneficiaries). Although drafted in tandem and sharing many provisions, the UTC and Restatement (Third) do diverge at times. See, e.g.,
Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the Remainderman: The Trustee’s Duty to Inform, 46 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J. 173, 185–192 (2011)
(describing differences between UTC and Restatement in defining beneficiaries entitled to information from a trustee);
Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 1125, 1179 (2013)
(describing differences in modification and termination provisions).

121

Langbein, supra note 43, at 5; text accompanying supra note 79.

122

Liebman, supra note 45.

123

 

Ray D. Madoff, Immortality and the Law: The Rising Power of the American Dead 80 (2010)
(“[A]s a practical matter, [generation-skipping trusts] were only available to those families wealthy enough to keep their assets locked up in trust);
Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Decanting: A Critical Perspective, 38 Cardozo L. Rev. 1993, 1994 (2017)
(“Poor people do not create trusts.”); see also  
Alison A. Tait, High-Wealth Exceptionalism, 71 Ala. L. Rev. 981, 995–1000 (2020)
(describing how private trust companies enhance the wealth of high-net-worth families);
Felix Chang, Asymmetries in the Generation and Transmission of Wealth, 79 Ohio St. L.J. 73, 74–75 (2018)
;
Iris J. Goodwin, How the Rich Stay Rich: Using a Family Trust Company to Secure a Family Fortune, 40 Seton Hall L. Rev. 467, 467–78 (2010)
;
Carla Spivack, Beware the Asset Protection Trust, 5 Eur. J. Prop. L. 1–26 (2016)
;
Carla Spivack, Democracy and Trusts, 42 ACTEC L.J. 311,339 (2017)
;
Kent Schenkel, Exposing the Hocus Pocus of Trusts, 45 Akron L. Rev. 63, 64 (2012)
.

124

 

Naomi R. Cahn, Dismantling the Trusts & Estates Canon, 2019 Wis. L. Rev. 165 (2019)
.

125

 

Caitlin Henderson, Note, Heirs Property in Georgia: Common Issues, Current State of the Law, and Further Solutions, 55 Ga. L. Rev. 875, 898 (2021)
(discussing family land trusts as a way to remedy heirs property).

126

 

David G. Shaftel, Twelfth ACTEC Comparison of the Domestic Asset Protection Trust Statutes (2019), https://www.actec.org/assets/1/6/Shaftel-Comparison-of-the-Domestic-Asset-Protection-Trust-Statutes.pdf?hssc=1reference
.

127

 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 58 (2007).

128

 See, e.g., 2022 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2022-101 (West) (authorizing spousal limited access trusts (SLATs) that provide substantial asset protection benefits to donor spouse).

129

 See Sterk, supra note 123, at 2028–32 (describing social costs of decanting); see generally Tait, supra note 123 (describing how high-wealth families use trust and financial rules to preserve their wealth).

130

 See, e.g.,

E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 1063, 1077–80 (1999)
(describing expressive function of intestacy law);
Lee-ford Tritt, Technical Correction or Tectonic Shift: Competing Default Rule Theories Under the New Uniform Probate Code, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 273, 294–95 (2010)
(same).

131

For a sampling of commentary, see  

John K. Eason, Home from the Islands: Domestic Asset Protection Trust Alternatives Impact Traditional Estate and Gift Tax Planning Considerations, 52 Fla. L. Rev. 41, 53 (2000)
;
Adam Hirsch, Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2685 (2005–2006)
;
Stewart Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1035, 1048 (2000)
;
Ritchie W. Taylor, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: The “Estate Planning Tool of the Decade” or a Charlatan?, 13 BYU J. Pub. L. 163, 167 (2013)
.

132

A growing number of states—at least seventeen—allow for self-settled DAPTs. Those states are Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.

133

Some states have repealed the rule against perpetuities (Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Dakota). Other states have adopted longer fixed periods for the rule against perpetuities, sometimes only for certain types of property, including Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware (110 years for real property held in trust), Florida, Nevada, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington. About a third of states have retained the rule against perpetuities but allow certain trusts to continue without application of the rule (Arizona, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Wyoming). Howard Zaritsky, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 50-State ACTEC Survey, available at  https://www.actec.org/assets/1/6/Zaritsky_RAP_Survey.pdf?hssc=1 (last visited Aug. 25, 2022).

134

 See  

Jesse Dukeminier & James Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1303 (2002–2003)
;
Mary Louise Fellows, Why the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Sparked Perpetual Trusts, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2511 (2005–2006)
;
Max Schanzenbach & Robert Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes—Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2465 (2005–2006)
;
Lawrence Waggoner, Effectively Curbing the GST Exemption for Perpetual Trusts, 135(10) Tax Notes (June 2012)
.

135

A trust provision is ordinarily invalid if its “enforcement would tend to restrain the religious freedom of the beneficiary by offering a financial inducement to embrace or reject a particular faith or set of beliefs concerning religion. Illustrative is a provision granting or terminating a beneficial interest only if the beneficiary should adopt or abandon a particular religious faith.” Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 29 (2003).

136

 See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).

137

Langbein, supra note 120, at 943 (arguing that the sole interest test should be replaced by the best interest test).

138

Schanzenbach and Sitkoff distinguish between “risk-return ESG,” which focuses on improving returns by using ESG metrics to improve return while minimizing risk (a fossil-fuel share company has stock prices that are artificially inflated because of inadequate accounting for regulatory risks), and “collateral benefits” ESG, which focuses on “providing a benefit to a third party or otherwise for moral or ethical reasons.” Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 134, at 397–98. They agree with the Restatement approach in which “collateral benefits ESG investing would ‘ordinarily’ violate the sole interest rule,” which does not allow for the trustee to motivated by the trustee’s own views. Id. at 412.

139

“[I]n general, ESG investing is permissible for a trustee of a pension, charity, or trust subject to American trust fiduciary law if: (1) the trustee reasonably concludes that the ESG investment program will benefit the beneficiary directly by improving risk-adjusted return; and (2) the trustee’s exclusive motive for adopting the ESG investment program is to obtain this direct benefit.” Id. at 385–86.

140

 

Jane Gorham Ditelberg, Investing in and for the Future: ESG Investing for Trust Assets Under the Prudent Investor Rule, 47 ACTEC L.J. 23, 24 (2021)

141

Gary, supra note 113, at 799 (“As long as a strategy does not involve sacrificing financial returns, then even if the duty of loyalty is defined as the duty to act solely in the financial interests of the beneficiaries, the duty of loyalty is not compromised by a direction to invest using a strategy that incorporates ESG criteria”).

142

“[W]e argue that the fiduciary duty (of loyalty) should be extended and declared publicly by our policymakers to require that institutional investors take equality factors into account.”

Anat Alon-Beck et al., No More Old Boys’ Club: Institutional Investors’ Fiduciary Duty to Advance Board Gender Diversity, 55 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 445, 481 (2021)
(advocating such a duty for institutional investors). “We believe that this suggested extension is consistent with a director’s fiduciary duties, as long as the decision positively contributes to the financial growth and overall long-term value creation of the company.” Id. at 484.

143

Ditelberg, supra note 140, at 25.

144

 Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3302(a) (2018)(emphasis is new language); Ditelberg, supra note 140, at 25 (noting that Georgia adopts a similar approach); see also Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 134, at 387 (nothing that Delaware was the first state to address ESG considerations in its trust code).

145

 Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3303(a)(4).

146

Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 134, at 418.

147

 

American Law Institute, Capturing the Voice of the American Law Institute: A Handbook for ALI Reporters and Those Who Review Their Work 1 (rev. ed. 2015)
(quoting original Certificate).

148

 See Scott, supra note 31, at 60 (Harvard first offered trusts as a course in 1882).

149

 See  

John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1108, 1113 (1984)
.

150

 Id.

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