
Contents
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1. Duff's Reasons for Claiming Intent to be Constitutive of Wrongdoing 1. Duff's Reasons for Claiming Intent to be Constitutive of Wrongdoing
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1.1. Complete Offences: A Phenomenological Claim 1.1. Complete Offences: A Phenomenological Claim
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1.2. Inchoate Offences: A Conceptual Claim 1.2. Inchoate Offences: A Conceptual Claim
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1.3. Causation: ordinary sense and language 1.3. Causation: ordinary sense and language
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2. The Normative Significance of Intent Being Constitutive of Wrongdoing 2. The Normative Significance of Intent Being Constitutive of Wrongdoing
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2.1. The taxonomy of ‘attacks’ and ‘endangerments’ 2.1. The taxonomy of ‘attacks’ and ‘endangerments’
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2.2. The taxonomy's normative significance in criminal law 2.2. The taxonomy's normative significance in criminal law
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2.2.1. Complete offences of harm 2.2.1. Complete offences of harm
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2.2.2. Inchoate offences 2.2.2. Inchoate offences
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2.2.3. Causation 2.2.3. Causation
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3. ‘Attacks’ and the Doctrine of Double Effect 3. ‘Attacks’ and the Doctrine of Double Effect
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3.1. The doctrine of double effect 3.1. The doctrine of double effect
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3.2. The relationship of DDE-I to ‘attacks’ 3.2. The relationship of DDE-I to ‘attacks’
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3.2.1. Complete offences 3.2.1. Complete offences
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3.2.2. Inchoate offences 3.2.2. Inchoate offences
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3.2.3. Proximate cause 3.2.3. Proximate cause
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4. Questions Regarding Duff's Claim 4. Questions Regarding Duff's Claim
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4.1. The validity of Duff's claim 4.1. The validity of Duff's claim
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4.1.1. Shared experience 4.1.1. Shared experience
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4.1.2. Conceptual nature 4.1.2. Conceptual nature
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4.1.3. Criminal law doctrine 4.1.3. Criminal law doctrine
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4.2. Relationship of Duff's claim to his view regarding the mens rea of inchoate offences 4.2. Relationship of Duff's claim to his view regarding the mens rea of inchoate offences
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5. Conclusion 5. Conclusion
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References References
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12 Is Intent Constitutive of Wrongdoing?
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Published:July 2011
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Abstract
According to conventional wisdom, criminal conduct consists of two inculpatory elements: wrongdoing, which is a function of socially-undesirable harms, and risks that can be defined independently of an actor's subjectivity; and culpability, which is a function of an actor's subjectivity. Antony Duff challenges this paradigm by advancing a thesis that some commentators equate with the much mooted Doctrine of Double Effect. Beginning in Intention, Agency, and Criminal Responsibility (1990) and continuing in Criminal Attempts (1995), and Answering for Crime (2007), Duff argues that the intent with which a person acts (as opposed to his willingness to endanger) can affect not only his culpability in acting but also the wrongfulness of what he does. This chapter critically examines Duff's thesis, distinguishing it from the much-criticised Doctrine of Double Effect, but questioning whether Duff shows that intent is constitutive of wrongdoing sufficient to justify the normative weight he accords it and, if he does so, whether he shows that willingness to inflict harm is not also constitutive of harm.
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