Abstract

This article argues that “differential and more favourable treatment” of developing countries in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has been a logical consequence of their own inward-looking policies and the GATT's implicit mercantilism, the latter implying that liberalization, being costly, should not be demanded of relatively poor countries. Time has, however, reduced both the appeal of the protectionist model of development and the willingness of developed countries to accord differential treatment. The upshot has been pressure on more advanced developing countries to “graduate” and a growing literature recommending fuller and more equal participation of developing countries in the GATT. The case for fuller and more equal participation is not self-evident. It needs to be assessed on its merits in terms of the prospects for improved market access abroad and more efficient policy at home. The analysis indicates that the potential benefits should not be oversold. On balance, however, the most advanced developing countries would probably gain from active and more equal participation in both GATT and the multilateral trade negotiations while the remaining developing countries would benefit from graduation by the more advanced.

This content is only available as a PDF.
You do not currently have access to this article.