Individual (one-person) choice task

Optimality/satisficing

Consistent EU/prospect theory/case-based decision theory (CBDT)

With and without risk

Lotteries/portfolio selection/(non)additive probabilities

Variation of complexity

Reinforcement/directional learning/evolutionary dynamics, restart effects; cyclicity of dynamic adaptation

Individual (one-person) choice task in social contexts

Reward allocation/dictator

Central concern for social interactions

Other regarding concerns (the dark and bright ones)

Lying, cheating, bribing, colluding but also altruism, efficiency seeking

Variation of “other(s)”

(Non-) asymmetry, kin-, group related

Strategic interaction (multiperson games)

Zero vs. variable sum

Only pure or mixed, only one or multiple equilibria

One-off vs. repeated

“Folk theorems” in the lab, reputation equilibria

Various equilibrium refinements/satisficing

For deterministic, stochastic, and incomplete information games

Learning/experience

Convergence to equilibria and, if so, which type

Perfect/imperfect (information)

Board games in the lab, independent choice acts, private information

Complete/incomplete (information)

All sorts of strategic market games (game-theoretic IO)

Static vs. sequential

“Hot,” “cold,” and “lukewarm”

Nonstrategic social interaction (cooperative games predicting outcomes only)

Competitive markets (double auction, clearing house, intermediaries)

Double oral auction/clearing house, stock, and commodity exchange Internet markets/trading platforms run by firms like Amazon and e-Bay or other intermediaries (market makers)

Characteristic function (face-to-face and free communication or more restricted and computerized)

Tests of cooperative game solutions (variants of core and bargaining sets, internally and externally stable sets, … as set solution and value (Shapley) concepts, as point solutions)

Unstructured bargaining

Back to cooperative traditions, no reduction to strategic interaction