Table 17.

The effect of reforms on electoral outcomes—new versus old democracy.

(I)(II)(III)(IV)(V)
OLSOLS w/FEEx. electionsIMFIV
Reform_ey (New dem.)−1.936***−2.830***−2.015***−3.387***−3.177***
(0.612)(0.751)(0.577)(1.100)(0.675)
Reform_ey (Old dem.)−0.765−0.781−0.927−1.009−0.806
(0.503)(0.480)(1.960)(1.846)(0.490)
Reform_term (New dem.)1.1660.8900.9161.264*0.941
(0.769)(0.860)(1.046)(0.680)(0.728)
Reform_term (Old dem.)−1.124−0.901−1.984−6.419**−1.178*
(0.724)(0.706)(1.619)(2.934)(0.706)
Initial level regulation−3.801−0.173−2.298−0.626−4.603
(3.114)(4.690)(7.505)(2.944)(3.125)
Growth_ey0.531**0.4140.4650.556***0.554***
(0.208)(0.250)(0.278)(0.199)(0.213)
Growth_term0.3460.599*1.060*0.3430.303
(0.314)(0.346)(0.581)(0.305)(0.309)
Advanced economy3.596***5.209*2.296*3.622***
(1.212)(2.846)(1.337)(1.196)
New democracies−0.141−0.2260.1970.1460.536
(1.555)(2.277)(2.778)(1.230)(1.519)
Majoritarian system2.219**4.1440.4491.843*2.176**
(0.924)(4.108)(2.373)(0.990)(0.912)
Lagged vote share−0.150−0.249***−0.024−0.139−0.144
(0.093)(0.092)(0.129)(0.091)(0.091)
Total effect (New dem.)−0.770−1.940−1.099−2.123−2.236
Total effect (Old dem.)−1.889−1.682−2.911−7.428−1.984
F-test: difference0.550.030.382.330.03
Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F statistic44.64
Stock–Yogo 10% critical value16.38
(Uncentered) R20.110.110.150.120.27
Observations327327127327327
(I)(II)(III)(IV)(V)
OLSOLS w/FEEx. electionsIMFIV
Reform_ey (New dem.)−1.936***−2.830***−2.015***−3.387***−3.177***
(0.612)(0.751)(0.577)(1.100)(0.675)
Reform_ey (Old dem.)−0.765−0.781−0.927−1.009−0.806
(0.503)(0.480)(1.960)(1.846)(0.490)
Reform_term (New dem.)1.1660.8900.9161.264*0.941
(0.769)(0.860)(1.046)(0.680)(0.728)
Reform_term (Old dem.)−1.124−0.901−1.984−6.419**−1.178*
(0.724)(0.706)(1.619)(2.934)(0.706)
Initial level regulation−3.801−0.173−2.298−0.626−4.603
(3.114)(4.690)(7.505)(2.944)(3.125)
Growth_ey0.531**0.4140.4650.556***0.554***
(0.208)(0.250)(0.278)(0.199)(0.213)
Growth_term0.3460.599*1.060*0.3430.303
(0.314)(0.346)(0.581)(0.305)(0.309)
Advanced economy3.596***5.209*2.296*3.622***
(1.212)(2.846)(1.337)(1.196)
New democracies−0.141−0.2260.1970.1460.536
(1.555)(2.277)(2.778)(1.230)(1.519)
Majoritarian system2.219**4.1440.4491.843*2.176**
(0.924)(4.108)(2.373)(0.990)(0.912)
Lagged vote share−0.150−0.249***−0.024−0.139−0.144
(0.093)(0.092)(0.129)(0.091)(0.091)
Total effect (New dem.)−0.770−1.940−1.099−2.123−2.236
Total effect (Old dem.)−1.889−1.682−2.911−7.428−1.984
F-test: difference0.550.030.382.330.03
Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F statistic44.64
Stock–Yogo 10% critical value16.38
(Uncentered) R20.110.110.150.120.27
Observations327327127327327

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the incumbent party's vote share. Reform_ey and Reform_term denote reforms in the election year and in the rest of the incumbent leader's term, respectively. Estimates based on equation (6). Standard deviations based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table 17.

The effect of reforms on electoral outcomes—new versus old democracy.

(I)(II)(III)(IV)(V)
OLSOLS w/FEEx. electionsIMFIV
Reform_ey (New dem.)−1.936***−2.830***−2.015***−3.387***−3.177***
(0.612)(0.751)(0.577)(1.100)(0.675)
Reform_ey (Old dem.)−0.765−0.781−0.927−1.009−0.806
(0.503)(0.480)(1.960)(1.846)(0.490)
Reform_term (New dem.)1.1660.8900.9161.264*0.941
(0.769)(0.860)(1.046)(0.680)(0.728)
Reform_term (Old dem.)−1.124−0.901−1.984−6.419**−1.178*
(0.724)(0.706)(1.619)(2.934)(0.706)
Initial level regulation−3.801−0.173−2.298−0.626−4.603
(3.114)(4.690)(7.505)(2.944)(3.125)
Growth_ey0.531**0.4140.4650.556***0.554***
(0.208)(0.250)(0.278)(0.199)(0.213)
Growth_term0.3460.599*1.060*0.3430.303
(0.314)(0.346)(0.581)(0.305)(0.309)
Advanced economy3.596***5.209*2.296*3.622***
(1.212)(2.846)(1.337)(1.196)
New democracies−0.141−0.2260.1970.1460.536
(1.555)(2.277)(2.778)(1.230)(1.519)
Majoritarian system2.219**4.1440.4491.843*2.176**
(0.924)(4.108)(2.373)(0.990)(0.912)
Lagged vote share−0.150−0.249***−0.024−0.139−0.144
(0.093)(0.092)(0.129)(0.091)(0.091)
Total effect (New dem.)−0.770−1.940−1.099−2.123−2.236
Total effect (Old dem.)−1.889−1.682−2.911−7.428−1.984
F-test: difference0.550.030.382.330.03
Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F statistic44.64
Stock–Yogo 10% critical value16.38
(Uncentered) R20.110.110.150.120.27
Observations327327127327327
(I)(II)(III)(IV)(V)
OLSOLS w/FEEx. electionsIMFIV
Reform_ey (New dem.)−1.936***−2.830***−2.015***−3.387***−3.177***
(0.612)(0.751)(0.577)(1.100)(0.675)
Reform_ey (Old dem.)−0.765−0.781−0.927−1.009−0.806
(0.503)(0.480)(1.960)(1.846)(0.490)
Reform_term (New dem.)1.1660.8900.9161.264*0.941
(0.769)(0.860)(1.046)(0.680)(0.728)
Reform_term (Old dem.)−1.124−0.901−1.984−6.419**−1.178*
(0.724)(0.706)(1.619)(2.934)(0.706)
Initial level regulation−3.801−0.173−2.298−0.626−4.603
(3.114)(4.690)(7.505)(2.944)(3.125)
Growth_ey0.531**0.4140.4650.556***0.554***
(0.208)(0.250)(0.278)(0.199)(0.213)
Growth_term0.3460.599*1.060*0.3430.303
(0.314)(0.346)(0.581)(0.305)(0.309)
Advanced economy3.596***5.209*2.296*3.622***
(1.212)(2.846)(1.337)(1.196)
New democracies−0.141−0.2260.1970.1460.536
(1.555)(2.277)(2.778)(1.230)(1.519)
Majoritarian system2.219**4.1440.4491.843*2.176**
(0.924)(4.108)(2.373)(0.990)(0.912)
Lagged vote share−0.150−0.249***−0.024−0.139−0.144
(0.093)(0.092)(0.129)(0.091)(0.091)
Total effect (New dem.)−0.770−1.940−1.099−2.123−2.236
Total effect (Old dem.)−1.889−1.682−2.911−7.428−1.984
F-test: difference0.550.030.382.330.03
Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F statistic44.64
Stock–Yogo 10% critical value16.38
(Uncentered) R20.110.110.150.120.27
Observations327327127327327

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the incumbent party's vote share. Reform_ey and Reform_term denote reforms in the election year and in the rest of the incumbent leader's term, respectively. Estimates based on equation (6). Standard deviations based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

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