. | (I) . | (II) . |
---|---|---|
. | Baseline . | Recessions versus expansions . |
Reform_ey (+) | −1.465** | |
(0.579) | ||
Reversal_ey (−) | 1.288 | |
(1.513) | ||
Reform_term (+) | −0.199 | |
(0.531) | ||
Reversal_term (−) | 1.123 | |
(2.036) | ||
Reform_ey (+) (recessions) | −2.098** | |
(0.832) | ||
Reversal_ey (−) (recessions) | 0.309 | |
(1.345) | ||
Reform_term (+) (recessions) | −2.329** | |
(1.175) | ||
Reversal_term (−) (recessions) | −6.322*** | |
(1.936) | ||
Reform_ey (+) (expansions) | −0.143 | |
(0.997) | ||
Reversal_ey (−) (expansions) | 3.643 | |
(5.478) | ||
Reform_term (+) (expansions) | 1.707* | |
(0.923) | ||
Reversal_term (−) (expansions) | 10.221*** | |
(3.140) | ||
F-test: Reform_ey (+) versus (−) | 0.01 | 14.84*** |
Total effect recessions | −10.440 | |
Total effect expansions | 15.428 | |
F-test difference | 11.95*** | |
R2 | 0.10 | 0.13 |
Observations | 327 | 327 |
. | (I) . | (II) . |
---|---|---|
. | Baseline . | Recessions versus expansions . |
Reform_ey (+) | −1.465** | |
(0.579) | ||
Reversal_ey (−) | 1.288 | |
(1.513) | ||
Reform_term (+) | −0.199 | |
(0.531) | ||
Reversal_term (−) | 1.123 | |
(2.036) | ||
Reform_ey (+) (recessions) | −2.098** | |
(0.832) | ||
Reversal_ey (−) (recessions) | 0.309 | |
(1.345) | ||
Reform_term (+) (recessions) | −2.329** | |
(1.175) | ||
Reversal_term (−) (recessions) | −6.322*** | |
(1.936) | ||
Reform_ey (+) (expansions) | −0.143 | |
(0.997) | ||
Reversal_ey (−) (expansions) | 3.643 | |
(5.478) | ||
Reform_term (+) (expansions) | 1.707* | |
(0.923) | ||
Reversal_term (−) (expansions) | 10.221*** | |
(3.140) | ||
F-test: Reform_ey (+) versus (−) | 0.01 | 14.84*** |
Total effect recessions | −10.440 | |
Total effect expansions | 15.428 | |
F-test difference | 11.95*** | |
R2 | 0.10 | 0.13 |
Observations | 327 | 327 |
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the incumbent party's vote share. Reform_ey and Reform_term denote reforms in the election year and in the rest of the incumbent leader's term, respectively. Reform (+) and Reversal (−) denote liberalization and tightening reforms, respectively. Estimates are based on equation (4). Additional controls in the baseline specifications are included but not reported. Standard deviations based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
. | (I) . | (II) . |
---|---|---|
. | Baseline . | Recessions versus expansions . |
Reform_ey (+) | −1.465** | |
(0.579) | ||
Reversal_ey (−) | 1.288 | |
(1.513) | ||
Reform_term (+) | −0.199 | |
(0.531) | ||
Reversal_term (−) | 1.123 | |
(2.036) | ||
Reform_ey (+) (recessions) | −2.098** | |
(0.832) | ||
Reversal_ey (−) (recessions) | 0.309 | |
(1.345) | ||
Reform_term (+) (recessions) | −2.329** | |
(1.175) | ||
Reversal_term (−) (recessions) | −6.322*** | |
(1.936) | ||
Reform_ey (+) (expansions) | −0.143 | |
(0.997) | ||
Reversal_ey (−) (expansions) | 3.643 | |
(5.478) | ||
Reform_term (+) (expansions) | 1.707* | |
(0.923) | ||
Reversal_term (−) (expansions) | 10.221*** | |
(3.140) | ||
F-test: Reform_ey (+) versus (−) | 0.01 | 14.84*** |
Total effect recessions | −10.440 | |
Total effect expansions | 15.428 | |
F-test difference | 11.95*** | |
R2 | 0.10 | 0.13 |
Observations | 327 | 327 |
. | (I) . | (II) . |
---|---|---|
. | Baseline . | Recessions versus expansions . |
Reform_ey (+) | −1.465** | |
(0.579) | ||
Reversal_ey (−) | 1.288 | |
(1.513) | ||
Reform_term (+) | −0.199 | |
(0.531) | ||
Reversal_term (−) | 1.123 | |
(2.036) | ||
Reform_ey (+) (recessions) | −2.098** | |
(0.832) | ||
Reversal_ey (−) (recessions) | 0.309 | |
(1.345) | ||
Reform_term (+) (recessions) | −2.329** | |
(1.175) | ||
Reversal_term (−) (recessions) | −6.322*** | |
(1.936) | ||
Reform_ey (+) (expansions) | −0.143 | |
(0.997) | ||
Reversal_ey (−) (expansions) | 3.643 | |
(5.478) | ||
Reform_term (+) (expansions) | 1.707* | |
(0.923) | ||
Reversal_term (−) (expansions) | 10.221*** | |
(3.140) | ||
F-test: Reform_ey (+) versus (−) | 0.01 | 14.84*** |
Total effect recessions | −10.440 | |
Total effect expansions | 15.428 | |
F-test difference | 11.95*** | |
R2 | 0.10 | 0.13 |
Observations | 327 | 327 |
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the incumbent party's vote share. Reform_ey and Reform_term denote reforms in the election year and in the rest of the incumbent leader's term, respectively. Reform (+) and Reversal (−) denote liberalization and tightening reforms, respectively. Estimates are based on equation (4). Additional controls in the baseline specifications are included but not reported. Standard deviations based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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