| . | (I) . | (II) . | (III) . |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reform_ey (recessions) | −2.046** | −2.125** | |
| (0.782) | (0.799) | ||
| Reform_ey (expansions) | −0.601 | −0.669 | |
| (0.935) | (0.959) | ||
| Reform_term (recessions) | −0.005 | −0.791 | |
| (1.260) | (0.992) | ||
| Reform_term (expansions) | −0.386 | 0.075 | |
| (1.285) | (1.172) | ||
| Initial level regulation | −2.380 | −0.545 | −3.354 |
| (3.018) | (3.110) | (2.996) | |
| Growth_ey | 0.474** | 0.465** | 0.478** |
| (0.214) | (0.201) | (0.215) | |
| Growth_term | 0.415 | 0.503 | 0.391 |
| (0.321) | (0.365) | (0.352) | |
| Advanced economy | 3.341*** | 3.281** | 3.400*** |
| (1.227) | (1.249) | (1.229) | |
| New democracies | 0.821 | 0.785 | 0.746 |
| (1.124) | (1.156) | (1.107) | |
| Majoritarian system | 2.210** | 2.294** | 2.208** |
| (0.960) | (0.994) | (0.930) | |
| Lagged vote share | −0.144 | −0.149 | −0.144 |
| (0.094) | (0.092) | (0.094) | |
| Total effect recessions | −2.046 | −0.005 | −2.916 |
| Total effect expansions | −0.601 | −0.386 | −0.594 |
| F-test difference | 0.91 | 0.03 | 1.02 |
| R2 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.10 |
| Observations | 327 | 327 | 327 |
| . | (I) . | (II) . | (III) . |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reform_ey (recessions) | −2.046** | −2.125** | |
| (0.782) | (0.799) | ||
| Reform_ey (expansions) | −0.601 | −0.669 | |
| (0.935) | (0.959) | ||
| Reform_term (recessions) | −0.005 | −0.791 | |
| (1.260) | (0.992) | ||
| Reform_term (expansions) | −0.386 | 0.075 | |
| (1.285) | (1.172) | ||
| Initial level regulation | −2.380 | −0.545 | −3.354 |
| (3.018) | (3.110) | (2.996) | |
| Growth_ey | 0.474** | 0.465** | 0.478** |
| (0.214) | (0.201) | (0.215) | |
| Growth_term | 0.415 | 0.503 | 0.391 |
| (0.321) | (0.365) | (0.352) | |
| Advanced economy | 3.341*** | 3.281** | 3.400*** |
| (1.227) | (1.249) | (1.229) | |
| New democracies | 0.821 | 0.785 | 0.746 |
| (1.124) | (1.156) | (1.107) | |
| Majoritarian system | 2.210** | 2.294** | 2.208** |
| (0.960) | (0.994) | (0.930) | |
| Lagged vote share | −0.144 | −0.149 | −0.144 |
| (0.094) | (0.092) | (0.094) | |
| Total effect recessions | −2.046 | −0.005 | −2.916 |
| Total effect expansions | −0.601 | −0.386 | −0.594 |
| F-test difference | 0.91 | 0.03 | 1.02 |
| R2 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.10 |
| Observations | 327 | 327 | 327 |
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the incumbent party's vote share. Reform_ey and Reform_term denote reforms in the election year and in the rest of the incumbent leader's term, respectively. Estimates are based on equation (4). Standard deviations based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
| . | (I) . | (II) . | (III) . |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reform_ey (recessions) | −2.046** | −2.125** | |
| (0.782) | (0.799) | ||
| Reform_ey (expansions) | −0.601 | −0.669 | |
| (0.935) | (0.959) | ||
| Reform_term (recessions) | −0.005 | −0.791 | |
| (1.260) | (0.992) | ||
| Reform_term (expansions) | −0.386 | 0.075 | |
| (1.285) | (1.172) | ||
| Initial level regulation | −2.380 | −0.545 | −3.354 |
| (3.018) | (3.110) | (2.996) | |
| Growth_ey | 0.474** | 0.465** | 0.478** |
| (0.214) | (0.201) | (0.215) | |
| Growth_term | 0.415 | 0.503 | 0.391 |
| (0.321) | (0.365) | (0.352) | |
| Advanced economy | 3.341*** | 3.281** | 3.400*** |
| (1.227) | (1.249) | (1.229) | |
| New democracies | 0.821 | 0.785 | 0.746 |
| (1.124) | (1.156) | (1.107) | |
| Majoritarian system | 2.210** | 2.294** | 2.208** |
| (0.960) | (0.994) | (0.930) | |
| Lagged vote share | −0.144 | −0.149 | −0.144 |
| (0.094) | (0.092) | (0.094) | |
| Total effect recessions | −2.046 | −0.005 | −2.916 |
| Total effect expansions | −0.601 | −0.386 | −0.594 |
| F-test difference | 0.91 | 0.03 | 1.02 |
| R2 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.10 |
| Observations | 327 | 327 | 327 |
| . | (I) . | (II) . | (III) . |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reform_ey (recessions) | −2.046** | −2.125** | |
| (0.782) | (0.799) | ||
| Reform_ey (expansions) | −0.601 | −0.669 | |
| (0.935) | (0.959) | ||
| Reform_term (recessions) | −0.005 | −0.791 | |
| (1.260) | (0.992) | ||
| Reform_term (expansions) | −0.386 | 0.075 | |
| (1.285) | (1.172) | ||
| Initial level regulation | −2.380 | −0.545 | −3.354 |
| (3.018) | (3.110) | (2.996) | |
| Growth_ey | 0.474** | 0.465** | 0.478** |
| (0.214) | (0.201) | (0.215) | |
| Growth_term | 0.415 | 0.503 | 0.391 |
| (0.321) | (0.365) | (0.352) | |
| Advanced economy | 3.341*** | 3.281** | 3.400*** |
| (1.227) | (1.249) | (1.229) | |
| New democracies | 0.821 | 0.785 | 0.746 |
| (1.124) | (1.156) | (1.107) | |
| Majoritarian system | 2.210** | 2.294** | 2.208** |
| (0.960) | (0.994) | (0.930) | |
| Lagged vote share | −0.144 | −0.149 | −0.144 |
| (0.094) | (0.092) | (0.094) | |
| Total effect recessions | −2.046 | −0.005 | −2.916 |
| Total effect expansions | −0.601 | −0.386 | −0.594 |
| F-test difference | 0.91 | 0.03 | 1.02 |
| R2 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.10 |
| Observations | 327 | 327 | 327 |
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the incumbent party's vote share. Reform_ey and Reform_term denote reforms in the election year and in the rest of the incumbent leader's term, respectively. Estimates are based on equation (4). Standard deviations based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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