| . | Price . | . | Productivity . | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Discretion . | Log(norm price) . | . | Discretion . | Log(TFP) . |
| . | (1) . | (2) . | . | (3) . | (4) . |
| Discretion | 0.056 | |$-0.289$| | |||
| (0.018) | (0.221) | ||||
| Share of connected top 500 firms | 0.873 | 0.034 | 0.577 | 8.90 | |
| (0.154) | (0.018) | (0.179) | (0.119) | ||
| Share of unconnected top 500 firms | |$-0.349$| | |$-0.045$| | |$-0.428$| | 1.39 | |
| (0.062) | (0.008) | (0.077) | (0.054) | ||
| Share of domestic firms | 0.300 | |$-0.058$| | 0.224 | |$-2.33$| | |
| (0.060) | (0.008) | (0.069) | (0.052) | ||
| Central government agency | |$-0.640$| | |$-0.014$| | |$-0.566$| | 0.098 | |
| (0.031) | (0.004) | (0.033) | (0.031) | ||
| Services | 0.707 | |$-0.042$| | 0.573 | |$-0.669$| | |
| (0.031) | (0.004) | (0.032) | (0.031) | ||
| Correlation of d and μ | 0.026 | -0.111 | |||
| (0.046) | (0.098) | ||||
| Observations | 44,915 | 34,930 | |||
| . | Price . | . | Productivity . | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Discretion . | Log(norm price) . | . | Discretion . | Log(TFP) . |
| . | (1) . | (2) . | . | (3) . | (4) . |
| Discretion | 0.056 | |$-0.289$| | |||
| (0.018) | (0.221) | ||||
| Share of connected top 500 firms | 0.873 | 0.034 | 0.577 | 8.90 | |
| (0.154) | (0.018) | (0.179) | (0.119) | ||
| Share of unconnected top 500 firms | |$-0.349$| | |$-0.045$| | |$-0.428$| | 1.39 | |
| (0.062) | (0.008) | (0.077) | (0.054) | ||
| Share of domestic firms | 0.300 | |$-0.058$| | 0.224 | |$-2.33$| | |
| (0.060) | (0.008) | (0.069) | (0.052) | ||
| Central government agency | |$-0.640$| | |$-0.014$| | |$-0.566$| | 0.098 | |
| (0.031) | (0.004) | (0.033) | (0.031) | ||
| Services | 0.707 | |$-0.042$| | 0.573 | |$-0.669$| | |
| (0.031) | (0.004) | (0.032) | (0.031) | ||
| Correlation of d and μ | 0.026 | -0.111 | |||
| (0.046) | (0.098) | ||||
| Observations | 44,915 | 34,930 | |||
Note: Each observation is an individual contract. The sample consists of non-construction tenders for 2009–2015. Columns (1) and (2) (columns 3 and 4) report the results of the parametric model using log-normalized price (log-TFP) as the dependent variable of the outcome equation. Odd columns report the parameter estimates of the selection equation, while even columns report them for the outcome equations. Share of connected top 500 firms is the share of total contract value awarded to right-connected top 500 firms during the pre-reform period in the tender’s product category, Share of unconnected top 500 firms and Share of domestic firms are corresponding shares for firms unconnected to the right and for domestic companies. The outcome equations also include a cubic function of log-anticipated contract value and an indicator for the post-reform period, which are not reported in the table. Standard errors in parentheses.
| . | Price . | . | Productivity . | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Discretion . | Log(norm price) . | . | Discretion . | Log(TFP) . |
| . | (1) . | (2) . | . | (3) . | (4) . |
| Discretion | 0.056 | |$-0.289$| | |||
| (0.018) | (0.221) | ||||
| Share of connected top 500 firms | 0.873 | 0.034 | 0.577 | 8.90 | |
| (0.154) | (0.018) | (0.179) | (0.119) | ||
| Share of unconnected top 500 firms | |$-0.349$| | |$-0.045$| | |$-0.428$| | 1.39 | |
| (0.062) | (0.008) | (0.077) | (0.054) | ||
| Share of domestic firms | 0.300 | |$-0.058$| | 0.224 | |$-2.33$| | |
| (0.060) | (0.008) | (0.069) | (0.052) | ||
| Central government agency | |$-0.640$| | |$-0.014$| | |$-0.566$| | 0.098 | |
| (0.031) | (0.004) | (0.033) | (0.031) | ||
| Services | 0.707 | |$-0.042$| | 0.573 | |$-0.669$| | |
| (0.031) | (0.004) | (0.032) | (0.031) | ||
| Correlation of d and μ | 0.026 | -0.111 | |||
| (0.046) | (0.098) | ||||
| Observations | 44,915 | 34,930 | |||
| . | Price . | . | Productivity . | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Discretion . | Log(norm price) . | . | Discretion . | Log(TFP) . |
| . | (1) . | (2) . | . | (3) . | (4) . |
| Discretion | 0.056 | |$-0.289$| | |||
| (0.018) | (0.221) | ||||
| Share of connected top 500 firms | 0.873 | 0.034 | 0.577 | 8.90 | |
| (0.154) | (0.018) | (0.179) | (0.119) | ||
| Share of unconnected top 500 firms | |$-0.349$| | |$-0.045$| | |$-0.428$| | 1.39 | |
| (0.062) | (0.008) | (0.077) | (0.054) | ||
| Share of domestic firms | 0.300 | |$-0.058$| | 0.224 | |$-2.33$| | |
| (0.060) | (0.008) | (0.069) | (0.052) | ||
| Central government agency | |$-0.640$| | |$-0.014$| | |$-0.566$| | 0.098 | |
| (0.031) | (0.004) | (0.033) | (0.031) | ||
| Services | 0.707 | |$-0.042$| | 0.573 | |$-0.669$| | |
| (0.031) | (0.004) | (0.032) | (0.031) | ||
| Correlation of d and μ | 0.026 | -0.111 | |||
| (0.046) | (0.098) | ||||
| Observations | 44,915 | 34,930 | |||
Note: Each observation is an individual contract. The sample consists of non-construction tenders for 2009–2015. Columns (1) and (2) (columns 3 and 4) report the results of the parametric model using log-normalized price (log-TFP) as the dependent variable of the outcome equation. Odd columns report the parameter estimates of the selection equation, while even columns report them for the outcome equations. Share of connected top 500 firms is the share of total contract value awarded to right-connected top 500 firms during the pre-reform period in the tender’s product category, Share of unconnected top 500 firms and Share of domestic firms are corresponding shares for firms unconnected to the right and for domestic companies. The outcome equations also include a cubic function of log-anticipated contract value and an indicator for the post-reform period, which are not reported in the table. Standard errors in parentheses.
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