Table 2.

Results of Bayesian GLMM for the dictator game in the rLPFC experiment. We report the upper and lower borders of the 95% HDI of the posterior distributions. SEM are in brackets. Significant effects are highlighted in bold

PredictorEstimate (SE)2.5%97.5%
Intercept6.71 (1.25)4.529.40
tACStheta-sham0.36 (0.41)−0.401.18
tACSbeta-sham−0.03 (0.42)−0.860.80
Inequityabsolute−1.57 (0.46)−2.46−0.64
Efficiency4.06 (0.88)2.535.97
Inequitytype−4.56 (1.37)−7.36−1.99
Discomfort−0.29 (0.33)−0.920.37
Inequityabsolute × Inequitytype−2.21 (0.72)3.740.92
Inequityabsolute × Efficiency−0.55 (0.52)−1.590.47
Efficiency × Inequitytype4.59 (1.30)2.347.35
tACStheta-sham × Inequitytype−0.14 (0.51)−1.140.86
tACSbeta-sham × Inequitytype−0.39 (0.49)−1.350.61
tACStheta-sham × Inequityabsolute0.38 (0.41)−0.401.23
tACSbeta-sham × Inequityabsolute0.23 (0.38)−0.490.99
tACStheta-sham × Efficiency−0.68 (0.51)−1.700.30
tACSbeta-sham × Efficiency−0.57 (0.49)−1.560.35
tACStheta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Inequitytype−0.66 (0.59)−1.820.48
tACSbeta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Inequitytype−0.17 (0.54)−1.230.86
tACStheta-sham × Efficiency × Inequitytype1.67 (0.73)0.223.13
tACSbeta-sham × Efficiency × Inequitytype1.28 (0.75)−0.152.90
tACStheta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Efficiency−0.42 (0.62)−1.610.81
tACSbeta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Efficiency0.45 (0.56)−0.611.58
tACStheta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Efficiency × Inequitytype1.49 (0.80)−0.083.09
tACSbeta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Efficiency × Inequitytype0.03 (0.73)−1.361.48
PredictorEstimate (SE)2.5%97.5%
Intercept6.71 (1.25)4.529.40
tACStheta-sham0.36 (0.41)−0.401.18
tACSbeta-sham−0.03 (0.42)−0.860.80
Inequityabsolute−1.57 (0.46)−2.46−0.64
Efficiency4.06 (0.88)2.535.97
Inequitytype−4.56 (1.37)−7.36−1.99
Discomfort−0.29 (0.33)−0.920.37
Inequityabsolute × Inequitytype−2.21 (0.72)3.740.92
Inequityabsolute × Efficiency−0.55 (0.52)−1.590.47
Efficiency × Inequitytype4.59 (1.30)2.347.35
tACStheta-sham × Inequitytype−0.14 (0.51)−1.140.86
tACSbeta-sham × Inequitytype−0.39 (0.49)−1.350.61
tACStheta-sham × Inequityabsolute0.38 (0.41)−0.401.23
tACSbeta-sham × Inequityabsolute0.23 (0.38)−0.490.99
tACStheta-sham × Efficiency−0.68 (0.51)−1.700.30
tACSbeta-sham × Efficiency−0.57 (0.49)−1.560.35
tACStheta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Inequitytype−0.66 (0.59)−1.820.48
tACSbeta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Inequitytype−0.17 (0.54)−1.230.86
tACStheta-sham × Efficiency × Inequitytype1.67 (0.73)0.223.13
tACSbeta-sham × Efficiency × Inequitytype1.28 (0.75)−0.152.90
tACStheta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Efficiency−0.42 (0.62)−1.610.81
tACSbeta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Efficiency0.45 (0.56)−0.611.58
tACStheta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Efficiency × Inequitytype1.49 (0.80)−0.083.09
tACSbeta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Efficiency × Inequitytype0.03 (0.73)−1.361.48
Table 2.

Results of Bayesian GLMM for the dictator game in the rLPFC experiment. We report the upper and lower borders of the 95% HDI of the posterior distributions. SEM are in brackets. Significant effects are highlighted in bold

PredictorEstimate (SE)2.5%97.5%
Intercept6.71 (1.25)4.529.40
tACStheta-sham0.36 (0.41)−0.401.18
tACSbeta-sham−0.03 (0.42)−0.860.80
Inequityabsolute−1.57 (0.46)−2.46−0.64
Efficiency4.06 (0.88)2.535.97
Inequitytype−4.56 (1.37)−7.36−1.99
Discomfort−0.29 (0.33)−0.920.37
Inequityabsolute × Inequitytype−2.21 (0.72)3.740.92
Inequityabsolute × Efficiency−0.55 (0.52)−1.590.47
Efficiency × Inequitytype4.59 (1.30)2.347.35
tACStheta-sham × Inequitytype−0.14 (0.51)−1.140.86
tACSbeta-sham × Inequitytype−0.39 (0.49)−1.350.61
tACStheta-sham × Inequityabsolute0.38 (0.41)−0.401.23
tACSbeta-sham × Inequityabsolute0.23 (0.38)−0.490.99
tACStheta-sham × Efficiency−0.68 (0.51)−1.700.30
tACSbeta-sham × Efficiency−0.57 (0.49)−1.560.35
tACStheta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Inequitytype−0.66 (0.59)−1.820.48
tACSbeta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Inequitytype−0.17 (0.54)−1.230.86
tACStheta-sham × Efficiency × Inequitytype1.67 (0.73)0.223.13
tACSbeta-sham × Efficiency × Inequitytype1.28 (0.75)−0.152.90
tACStheta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Efficiency−0.42 (0.62)−1.610.81
tACSbeta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Efficiency0.45 (0.56)−0.611.58
tACStheta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Efficiency × Inequitytype1.49 (0.80)−0.083.09
tACSbeta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Efficiency × Inequitytype0.03 (0.73)−1.361.48
PredictorEstimate (SE)2.5%97.5%
Intercept6.71 (1.25)4.529.40
tACStheta-sham0.36 (0.41)−0.401.18
tACSbeta-sham−0.03 (0.42)−0.860.80
Inequityabsolute−1.57 (0.46)−2.46−0.64
Efficiency4.06 (0.88)2.535.97
Inequitytype−4.56 (1.37)−7.36−1.99
Discomfort−0.29 (0.33)−0.920.37
Inequityabsolute × Inequitytype−2.21 (0.72)3.740.92
Inequityabsolute × Efficiency−0.55 (0.52)−1.590.47
Efficiency × Inequitytype4.59 (1.30)2.347.35
tACStheta-sham × Inequitytype−0.14 (0.51)−1.140.86
tACSbeta-sham × Inequitytype−0.39 (0.49)−1.350.61
tACStheta-sham × Inequityabsolute0.38 (0.41)−0.401.23
tACSbeta-sham × Inequityabsolute0.23 (0.38)−0.490.99
tACStheta-sham × Efficiency−0.68 (0.51)−1.700.30
tACSbeta-sham × Efficiency−0.57 (0.49)−1.560.35
tACStheta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Inequitytype−0.66 (0.59)−1.820.48
tACSbeta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Inequitytype−0.17 (0.54)−1.230.86
tACStheta-sham × Efficiency × Inequitytype1.67 (0.73)0.223.13
tACSbeta-sham × Efficiency × Inequitytype1.28 (0.75)−0.152.90
tACStheta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Efficiency−0.42 (0.62)−1.610.81
tACSbeta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Efficiency0.45 (0.56)−0.611.58
tACStheta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Efficiency × Inequitytype1.49 (0.80)−0.083.09
tACSbeta-sham × Inequityabsolute × Efficiency × Inequitytype0.03 (0.73)−1.361.48
Close
This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

Close

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

View Article Abstract & Purchase Options

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

Close