| Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness (Lau and Rosenthal 2011) | The core of this theory lies in higher-order representations that target lower-order representations. The difference between unconscious and conscious content is based on its meta-representation by higher-order mechanisms. |
| Attended Intermediate Representation Theory (Prinz 2012) | Contents of experience are associated with intermediate representations. Such content becomes part of conscious experience when it becomes available to working memory through attention that is associated with gamma synchrony. |
| First-Order Representation Theory (Mehta and Mashour 2013) | Contents of experience and their phenomenal character, addressed as specific consciousness, are associated with sensory regions. On the other hand, post-sensory regions are associated with general consciousness, which makes content conscious. |
| Recurrent Processing Theory (Lamme 2006, Lamme 2010) | Consciousness is associated with recurrent or re-entrant processing, which occurs in highly interconnected sensory systems with the involvement of feedforward and feedback connections. |
| Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (Dehaene 2014) | Consciousness is considered as a global neuronal workspace that consists of prefronto-parietal brain regions. The entry of content into the stream of consciousness lies in ignition triggered by bottom-up sensory activation and top-down amplification of the sensory signals. |
| Posterior Cortical Hot Zone Theory (Koch et al. 2016) | This theory associates consciousness with local activations within posterior parts of the brain, namely parietal, temporal, and occipital lobes, while leaving the frontal cortex out of the consciousness processing. |
| Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness (Lau and Rosenthal 2011) | The core of this theory lies in higher-order representations that target lower-order representations. The difference between unconscious and conscious content is based on its meta-representation by higher-order mechanisms. |
| Attended Intermediate Representation Theory (Prinz 2012) | Contents of experience are associated with intermediate representations. Such content becomes part of conscious experience when it becomes available to working memory through attention that is associated with gamma synchrony. |
| First-Order Representation Theory (Mehta and Mashour 2013) | Contents of experience and their phenomenal character, addressed as specific consciousness, are associated with sensory regions. On the other hand, post-sensory regions are associated with general consciousness, which makes content conscious. |
| Recurrent Processing Theory (Lamme 2006, Lamme 2010) | Consciousness is associated with recurrent or re-entrant processing, which occurs in highly interconnected sensory systems with the involvement of feedforward and feedback connections. |
| Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (Dehaene 2014) | Consciousness is considered as a global neuronal workspace that consists of prefronto-parietal brain regions. The entry of content into the stream of consciousness lies in ignition triggered by bottom-up sensory activation and top-down amplification of the sensory signals. |
| Posterior Cortical Hot Zone Theory (Koch et al. 2016) | This theory associates consciousness with local activations within posterior parts of the brain, namely parietal, temporal, and occipital lobes, while leaving the frontal cortex out of the consciousness processing. |
Several theories of consciousness have been developed over the years. However, many of them are closer to metaphysics than neurobiology. Therefore, this table briefly describes only those that are closest to neurobiology, and their key points are empirically testable.
| Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness (Lau and Rosenthal 2011) | The core of this theory lies in higher-order representations that target lower-order representations. The difference between unconscious and conscious content is based on its meta-representation by higher-order mechanisms. |
| Attended Intermediate Representation Theory (Prinz 2012) | Contents of experience are associated with intermediate representations. Such content becomes part of conscious experience when it becomes available to working memory through attention that is associated with gamma synchrony. |
| First-Order Representation Theory (Mehta and Mashour 2013) | Contents of experience and their phenomenal character, addressed as specific consciousness, are associated with sensory regions. On the other hand, post-sensory regions are associated with general consciousness, which makes content conscious. |
| Recurrent Processing Theory (Lamme 2006, Lamme 2010) | Consciousness is associated with recurrent or re-entrant processing, which occurs in highly interconnected sensory systems with the involvement of feedforward and feedback connections. |
| Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (Dehaene 2014) | Consciousness is considered as a global neuronal workspace that consists of prefronto-parietal brain regions. The entry of content into the stream of consciousness lies in ignition triggered by bottom-up sensory activation and top-down amplification of the sensory signals. |
| Posterior Cortical Hot Zone Theory (Koch et al. 2016) | This theory associates consciousness with local activations within posterior parts of the brain, namely parietal, temporal, and occipital lobes, while leaving the frontal cortex out of the consciousness processing. |
| Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness (Lau and Rosenthal 2011) | The core of this theory lies in higher-order representations that target lower-order representations. The difference between unconscious and conscious content is based on its meta-representation by higher-order mechanisms. |
| Attended Intermediate Representation Theory (Prinz 2012) | Contents of experience are associated with intermediate representations. Such content becomes part of conscious experience when it becomes available to working memory through attention that is associated with gamma synchrony. |
| First-Order Representation Theory (Mehta and Mashour 2013) | Contents of experience and their phenomenal character, addressed as specific consciousness, are associated with sensory regions. On the other hand, post-sensory regions are associated with general consciousness, which makes content conscious. |
| Recurrent Processing Theory (Lamme 2006, Lamme 2010) | Consciousness is associated with recurrent or re-entrant processing, which occurs in highly interconnected sensory systems with the involvement of feedforward and feedback connections. |
| Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (Dehaene 2014) | Consciousness is considered as a global neuronal workspace that consists of prefronto-parietal brain regions. The entry of content into the stream of consciousness lies in ignition triggered by bottom-up sensory activation and top-down amplification of the sensory signals. |
| Posterior Cortical Hot Zone Theory (Koch et al. 2016) | This theory associates consciousness with local activations within posterior parts of the brain, namely parietal, temporal, and occipital lobes, while leaving the frontal cortex out of the consciousness processing. |
Several theories of consciousness have been developed over the years. However, many of them are closer to metaphysics than neurobiology. Therefore, this table briefly describes only those that are closest to neurobiology, and their key points are empirically testable.
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