Hypothesis tests on professional jurisdictional control and digital skill shares in all job postings
| . | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . | (7) . | (8) . |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| H1a . | H1b . | H1c . | H2a . | H2b . | ||||
| Lawyers . | Other legal professionals . | Lawyers . | Other legal professionals . | Lawyers . | Other legal professionals . | Non-legal occupations . | ||
| UK regulated sector . | UK-US legal and non-legal sector . | UK regulated sector . | UK-US legal sector . | |||||
| DV: digital skill share . | . | |||||||
| Proxies for professional control | ||||||||
| Non-ABS firm | ‐0.1309 (0.780) | 1.4337*** (0.003) | 3.4149*** (0.002) | |||||
| United States | 1.1609*** (0.000) | 1.5053*** (0.000) | 4.0447*** (0.000) | |||||
| Legal sector | ‐2.1232*** (0.000) | 0.7592*** (0.000) | ||||||
| Control variables | ||||||||
| Lawyer to non-lawyer ratio | ‐0.4653 (0.359) | ‐1.0059 (0.944) | 0.2678 (0.165) | 9.2136*** (0.000) | ‐0.166 (0.931) | 8.8993*** (0.000) | ‐1.9195 (0.315) | ‐2.0426*** (0.003) |
| Number of job postings | 0.0241* (0.063) | 0.0636** (0.019) | 0.0061** (0.029) | 0.012 (0.342) | 0.0046* (0.067) | 0.0016 (0.192) | 0.0515*** (0.000) | 0.0182*** (0.000) |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Intercept | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Sample size | 2,307 | 2,262 | 106,065 | 301,986 | 106,065 | 301,986 | 2,184 | 44,135 |
| Adj. R2 | 0.005 | 0.009 | 0.001 | 0.011 | 0.003 | 0.011 | 0.016 | 0.007 |
| . | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . | (7) . | (8) . |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| H1a . | H1b . | H1c . | H2a . | H2b . | ||||
| Lawyers . | Other legal professionals . | Lawyers . | Other legal professionals . | Lawyers . | Other legal professionals . | Non-legal occupations . | ||
| UK regulated sector . | UK-US legal and non-legal sector . | UK regulated sector . | UK-US legal sector . | |||||
| DV: digital skill share . | . | |||||||
| Proxies for professional control | ||||||||
| Non-ABS firm | ‐0.1309 (0.780) | 1.4337*** (0.003) | 3.4149*** (0.002) | |||||
| United States | 1.1609*** (0.000) | 1.5053*** (0.000) | 4.0447*** (0.000) | |||||
| Legal sector | ‐2.1232*** (0.000) | 0.7592*** (0.000) | ||||||
| Control variables | ||||||||
| Lawyer to non-lawyer ratio | ‐0.4653 (0.359) | ‐1.0059 (0.944) | 0.2678 (0.165) | 9.2136*** (0.000) | ‐0.166 (0.931) | 8.8993*** (0.000) | ‐1.9195 (0.315) | ‐2.0426*** (0.003) |
| Number of job postings | 0.0241* (0.063) | 0.0636** (0.019) | 0.0061** (0.029) | 0.012 (0.342) | 0.0046* (0.067) | 0.0016 (0.192) | 0.0515*** (0.000) | 0.0182*** (0.000) |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Intercept | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Sample size | 2,307 | 2,262 | 106,065 | 301,986 | 106,065 | 301,986 | 2,184 | 44,135 |
| Adj. R2 | 0.005 | 0.009 | 0.001 | 0.011 | 0.003 | 0.011 | 0.016 | 0.007 |
Notes: The table shows the coefficients of regression models that evaluate the hypothesis H1a, H1b, H1c, H2a, and H2b. The parenthesis display p-values. ***Indicates statistical significance at a 1%, **at a 5%, and *at a 10% level. The standard errors are MacKinnon and White (1985) hetero-skedasticity robust. The dependent variable is the firm-level share of job postings with digital skills by year. The main independent variables proxy lawyer’s professional jurisdictional control over tasks. Lawyer’s professional jurisdictional control is of protective nature in non-ABS firms in the UK regulated sector, in the US, and in the legal sector. A regression coefficient of one corresponds to a one percent change in the share of job postings with digital skills. The control variables are the ratio of job postings in a firm for lawyers and non-lawyers (with other legal professionals in the non-lawyer category), and the number of vacancies a firm post in a year. The regressions include a year fixed effect and an intercept. The occupational category is defined by the occupation code.
Hypothesis tests on professional jurisdictional control and digital skill shares in all job postings
| . | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . | (7) . | (8) . |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| H1a . | H1b . | H1c . | H2a . | H2b . | ||||
| Lawyers . | Other legal professionals . | Lawyers . | Other legal professionals . | Lawyers . | Other legal professionals . | Non-legal occupations . | ||
| UK regulated sector . | UK-US legal and non-legal sector . | UK regulated sector . | UK-US legal sector . | |||||
| DV: digital skill share . | . | |||||||
| Proxies for professional control | ||||||||
| Non-ABS firm | ‐0.1309 (0.780) | 1.4337*** (0.003) | 3.4149*** (0.002) | |||||
| United States | 1.1609*** (0.000) | 1.5053*** (0.000) | 4.0447*** (0.000) | |||||
| Legal sector | ‐2.1232*** (0.000) | 0.7592*** (0.000) | ||||||
| Control variables | ||||||||
| Lawyer to non-lawyer ratio | ‐0.4653 (0.359) | ‐1.0059 (0.944) | 0.2678 (0.165) | 9.2136*** (0.000) | ‐0.166 (0.931) | 8.8993*** (0.000) | ‐1.9195 (0.315) | ‐2.0426*** (0.003) |
| Number of job postings | 0.0241* (0.063) | 0.0636** (0.019) | 0.0061** (0.029) | 0.012 (0.342) | 0.0046* (0.067) | 0.0016 (0.192) | 0.0515*** (0.000) | 0.0182*** (0.000) |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Intercept | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Sample size | 2,307 | 2,262 | 106,065 | 301,986 | 106,065 | 301,986 | 2,184 | 44,135 |
| Adj. R2 | 0.005 | 0.009 | 0.001 | 0.011 | 0.003 | 0.011 | 0.016 | 0.007 |
| . | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . | (7) . | (8) . |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| H1a . | H1b . | H1c . | H2a . | H2b . | ||||
| Lawyers . | Other legal professionals . | Lawyers . | Other legal professionals . | Lawyers . | Other legal professionals . | Non-legal occupations . | ||
| UK regulated sector . | UK-US legal and non-legal sector . | UK regulated sector . | UK-US legal sector . | |||||
| DV: digital skill share . | . | |||||||
| Proxies for professional control | ||||||||
| Non-ABS firm | ‐0.1309 (0.780) | 1.4337*** (0.003) | 3.4149*** (0.002) | |||||
| United States | 1.1609*** (0.000) | 1.5053*** (0.000) | 4.0447*** (0.000) | |||||
| Legal sector | ‐2.1232*** (0.000) | 0.7592*** (0.000) | ||||||
| Control variables | ||||||||
| Lawyer to non-lawyer ratio | ‐0.4653 (0.359) | ‐1.0059 (0.944) | 0.2678 (0.165) | 9.2136*** (0.000) | ‐0.166 (0.931) | 8.8993*** (0.000) | ‐1.9195 (0.315) | ‐2.0426*** (0.003) |
| Number of job postings | 0.0241* (0.063) | 0.0636** (0.019) | 0.0061** (0.029) | 0.012 (0.342) | 0.0046* (0.067) | 0.0016 (0.192) | 0.0515*** (0.000) | 0.0182*** (0.000) |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Intercept | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Sample size | 2,307 | 2,262 | 106,065 | 301,986 | 106,065 | 301,986 | 2,184 | 44,135 |
| Adj. R2 | 0.005 | 0.009 | 0.001 | 0.011 | 0.003 | 0.011 | 0.016 | 0.007 |
Notes: The table shows the coefficients of regression models that evaluate the hypothesis H1a, H1b, H1c, H2a, and H2b. The parenthesis display p-values. ***Indicates statistical significance at a 1%, **at a 5%, and *at a 10% level. The standard errors are MacKinnon and White (1985) hetero-skedasticity robust. The dependent variable is the firm-level share of job postings with digital skills by year. The main independent variables proxy lawyer’s professional jurisdictional control over tasks. Lawyer’s professional jurisdictional control is of protective nature in non-ABS firms in the UK regulated sector, in the US, and in the legal sector. A regression coefficient of one corresponds to a one percent change in the share of job postings with digital skills. The control variables are the ratio of job postings in a firm for lawyers and non-lawyers (with other legal professionals in the non-lawyer category), and the number of vacancies a firm post in a year. The regressions include a year fixed effect and an intercept. The occupational category is defined by the occupation code.
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