| . | (1) . | (2) . |
|---|---|---|
| . | |$\%$| Female candidates . | |$\%$| Females elected . |
| Panel A: data | ||
| Pre-quota | 10 | 7.5 |
| Post-quota | 35 | 20 |
| Δ quota | +25 | +12.5 |
| Panel B: baseline simulation | ||
| Pre-quota | 8 | 8 |
| Post-quota | 34 | 28 |
| Δ quota | +26 | +20 |
| Panel C: counterfactual: more contestable | ||
| Pre-quota | 8 | 8 |
| Post-quota | 29 | 23 |
| Δ quota | +21 | +15 |
| Panel D: counterfactual: less contestable | ||
| Pre-quota | 8 | 8 |
| Post-quota | 39 | 32 |
| Δ quota | +31 | +24 |
| . | (1) . | (2) . |
|---|---|---|
| . | |$\%$| Female candidates . | |$\%$| Females elected . |
| Panel A: data | ||
| Pre-quota | 10 | 7.5 |
| Post-quota | 35 | 20 |
| Δ quota | +25 | +12.5 |
| Panel B: baseline simulation | ||
| Pre-quota | 8 | 8 |
| Post-quota | 34 | 28 |
| Δ quota | +26 | +20 |
| Panel C: counterfactual: more contestable | ||
| Pre-quota | 8 | 8 |
| Post-quota | 29 | 23 |
| Δ quota | +21 | +15 |
| Panel D: counterfactual: less contestable | ||
| Pre-quota | 8 | 8 |
| Post-quota | 39 | 32 |
| Δ quota | +31 | +24 |
Notes: This table presents the share of women among both candidates and elected politicians in the data (panel A), in our calibrated model (panel B), and in counterfactual simulations of our model with more (panel C) and less (panel D) electoral competition among the two main parties.
| . | (1) . | (2) . |
|---|---|---|
| . | |$\%$| Female candidates . | |$\%$| Females elected . |
| Panel A: data | ||
| Pre-quota | 10 | 7.5 |
| Post-quota | 35 | 20 |
| Δ quota | +25 | +12.5 |
| Panel B: baseline simulation | ||
| Pre-quota | 8 | 8 |
| Post-quota | 34 | 28 |
| Δ quota | +26 | +20 |
| Panel C: counterfactual: more contestable | ||
| Pre-quota | 8 | 8 |
| Post-quota | 29 | 23 |
| Δ quota | +21 | +15 |
| Panel D: counterfactual: less contestable | ||
| Pre-quota | 8 | 8 |
| Post-quota | 39 | 32 |
| Δ quota | +31 | +24 |
| . | (1) . | (2) . |
|---|---|---|
| . | |$\%$| Female candidates . | |$\%$| Females elected . |
| Panel A: data | ||
| Pre-quota | 10 | 7.5 |
| Post-quota | 35 | 20 |
| Δ quota | +25 | +12.5 |
| Panel B: baseline simulation | ||
| Pre-quota | 8 | 8 |
| Post-quota | 34 | 28 |
| Δ quota | +26 | +20 |
| Panel C: counterfactual: more contestable | ||
| Pre-quota | 8 | 8 |
| Post-quota | 29 | 23 |
| Δ quota | +21 | +15 |
| Panel D: counterfactual: less contestable | ||
| Pre-quota | 8 | 8 |
| Post-quota | 39 | 32 |
| Δ quota | +31 | +24 |
Notes: This table presents the share of women among both candidates and elected politicians in the data (panel A), in our calibrated model (panel B), and in counterfactual simulations of our model with more (panel C) and less (panel D) electoral competition among the two main parties.
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