Table 5.

Ex-post tight races and selection of male/female candidates—1997 versus 2002.

(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)
Panel A: 1997 election (pre-quota)Female candidate?
Ex-post tight race−0.004−0.001−0.001−0.009−0.010
(0.026)(0.026)(0.028)(0.027)(0.027)
Election × party fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYes
Candidate vote shareNoYesYesYesYes
Age, education, occupationNoNoYesYesYes
Incumbent, first run, government exp., local mandateNoNoNoYesYes
Gender earnings gapNoNoNoNoYes
Observations928928928928928
R20.0440.0590.1020.1600.160
Panel B: 2002 election (post-quota)Female candidate?
Ex-post tight race−0.104***−0.116***−0.102***−0.110***−0.109***
(0.030)(0.030)(0.031)(0.031)(0.030)
Election × party fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYes
Candidate vote shareNoYesYesYesYes
Age, education, occupationNoNoYesYesYes
Incumbent, first run, government exp., local mandateNoNoNoYesYes
Gender earnings gapNoNoNoNoYes
Observations824824824824824
R20.0270.1290.1890.2420.243
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)
Panel A: 1997 election (pre-quota)Female candidate?
Ex-post tight race−0.004−0.001−0.001−0.009−0.010
(0.026)(0.026)(0.028)(0.027)(0.027)
Election × party fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYes
Candidate vote shareNoYesYesYesYes
Age, education, occupationNoNoYesYesYes
Incumbent, first run, government exp., local mandateNoNoNoYesYes
Gender earnings gapNoNoNoNoYes
Observations928928928928928
R20.0440.0590.1020.1600.160
Panel B: 2002 election (post-quota)Female candidate?
Ex-post tight race−0.104***−0.116***−0.102***−0.110***−0.109***
(0.030)(0.030)(0.031)(0.031)(0.030)
Election × party fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYes
Candidate vote shareNoYesYesYesYes
Age, education, occupationNoNoYesYesYes
Incumbent, first run, government exp., local mandateNoNoNoYesYes
Gender earnings gapNoNoNoNoYes
Observations824824824824824
R20.0270.1290.1890.2420.243

Notes: This table presents estimates from regressions of candidates’ gender on an ex-post proxy for contestable districts, and control variables. Races are ex-post tight when the vote margin between parties in the runoff of the Parliamentary election was between −3 and +3 percentage points. In panel A (respectively, B), we analyze the 1997 election (respectively, 2002 election). Regressions include election × party fixed effects. Columns (2)–(5) include the vote share obtained by the candidate in the runoff. Columns (3)–(5) include candidates’ age, and dummies for elite university education and high-skill occupations. Columns (4) and (5) include dummies for incumbents, first-time candidates, former government members, and local mandate as additional controls. Column (5) also controls for residualized gender earnings gaps in the same district in the year before the election. The sample is restricted to candidates from the main Left and Right party coalitions. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered at both the candidate and district–election levels. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 5.

Ex-post tight races and selection of male/female candidates—1997 versus 2002.

(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)
Panel A: 1997 election (pre-quota)Female candidate?
Ex-post tight race−0.004−0.001−0.001−0.009−0.010
(0.026)(0.026)(0.028)(0.027)(0.027)
Election × party fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYes
Candidate vote shareNoYesYesYesYes
Age, education, occupationNoNoYesYesYes
Incumbent, first run, government exp., local mandateNoNoNoYesYes
Gender earnings gapNoNoNoNoYes
Observations928928928928928
R20.0440.0590.1020.1600.160
Panel B: 2002 election (post-quota)Female candidate?
Ex-post tight race−0.104***−0.116***−0.102***−0.110***−0.109***
(0.030)(0.030)(0.031)(0.031)(0.030)
Election × party fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYes
Candidate vote shareNoYesYesYesYes
Age, education, occupationNoNoYesYesYes
Incumbent, first run, government exp., local mandateNoNoNoYesYes
Gender earnings gapNoNoNoNoYes
Observations824824824824824
R20.0270.1290.1890.2420.243
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)
Panel A: 1997 election (pre-quota)Female candidate?
Ex-post tight race−0.004−0.001−0.001−0.009−0.010
(0.026)(0.026)(0.028)(0.027)(0.027)
Election × party fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYes
Candidate vote shareNoYesYesYesYes
Age, education, occupationNoNoYesYesYes
Incumbent, first run, government exp., local mandateNoNoNoYesYes
Gender earnings gapNoNoNoNoYes
Observations928928928928928
R20.0440.0590.1020.1600.160
Panel B: 2002 election (post-quota)Female candidate?
Ex-post tight race−0.104***−0.116***−0.102***−0.110***−0.109***
(0.030)(0.030)(0.031)(0.031)(0.030)
Election × party fixed effectsYesYesYesYesYes
Candidate vote shareNoYesYesYesYes
Age, education, occupationNoNoYesYesYes
Incumbent, first run, government exp., local mandateNoNoNoYesYes
Gender earnings gapNoNoNoNoYes
Observations824824824824824
R20.0270.1290.1890.2420.243

Notes: This table presents estimates from regressions of candidates’ gender on an ex-post proxy for contestable districts, and control variables. Races are ex-post tight when the vote margin between parties in the runoff of the Parliamentary election was between −3 and +3 percentage points. In panel A (respectively, B), we analyze the 1997 election (respectively, 2002 election). Regressions include election × party fixed effects. Columns (2)–(5) include the vote share obtained by the candidate in the runoff. Columns (3)–(5) include candidates’ age, and dummies for elite university education and high-skill occupations. Columns (4) and (5) include dummies for incumbents, first-time candidates, former government members, and local mandate as additional controls. Column (5) also controls for residualized gender earnings gaps in the same district in the year before the election. The sample is restricted to candidates from the main Left and Right party coalitions. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered at both the candidate and district–election levels. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

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