. | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Panel A: candidates’ selection | Female candidate? | |||||
Contestable | −0.053*** | −0.066*** | −0.050*** | −0.042** | −0.040** | −0.033** |
(0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.013) | |
Election × party fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Presidential party vote share | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Age, education, occupation | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Incumbent, first run, government exp., local mandate | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Gender earnings gap | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
District fixed effects | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
Observations | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 |
R2 | 0.047 | 0.073 | 0.130 | 0.175 | 0.178 | 0.377 |
Panel B: local pool of candidates | Gender gap high-skill occupation—local politicians | |||||
Contestable | −0.006 | −0.005 | −0.003 | −0.002 | −0.001 | 0.001 |
(0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.002) | |
Election × party fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Presid. party vote share | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Age, education, occupation | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Incumbent, first run, government exp., local mandate | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Gender earnings gap | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
District fixed effects | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
Observations | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 |
R2 | 0.051 | 0.056 | 0.071 | 0.075 | 0.093 | 0.502 |
. | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Panel A: candidates’ selection | Female candidate? | |||||
Contestable | −0.053*** | −0.066*** | −0.050*** | −0.042** | −0.040** | −0.033** |
(0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.013) | |
Election × party fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Presidential party vote share | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Age, education, occupation | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Incumbent, first run, government exp., local mandate | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Gender earnings gap | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
District fixed effects | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
Observations | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 |
R2 | 0.047 | 0.073 | 0.130 | 0.175 | 0.178 | 0.377 |
Panel B: local pool of candidates | Gender gap high-skill occupation—local politicians | |||||
Contestable | −0.006 | −0.005 | −0.003 | −0.002 | −0.001 | 0.001 |
(0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.002) | |
Election × party fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Presid. party vote share | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Age, education, occupation | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Incumbent, first run, government exp., local mandate | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Gender earnings gap | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
District fixed effects | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
Observations | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 |
R2 | 0.051 | 0.056 | 0.071 | 0.075 | 0.093 | 0.502 |
Notes: This table presents estimates from regressions of candidates’ gender (panel A) and of the gender skill gaps among local politicians (panel B) on a proxy for contestable districts, and control variables. When both the Right and Left parties reached the runoff of the previous Presidential election, we define as contestable districts for which the vote margin between both parties in the runoff of the Presidential election was between −3 and +3 percentage points. For 2002 and 2017, we instead use Left and Right candidates’ scores in the first round of the presidential election (and again define as contestable a district in which vote shares were between −3 and +3 percentage points). In panel A, the dependent variable indicates whether the candidate is a woman. In panel B, the dependent variable is the gender gap in the share of municipal council members with high-skill occupation (over all municipalities in the district). Regressions include election × party fixed effects. Columns (2)–(6) include the vote share obtained by the candidate’s party in the previous Presidential election. Columns (3)–(6) include candidates’ age, and dummies for elite university education and high-skill occupations. Columns (4)–(6) include dummies for incumbents, first-time candidates, former government members, and local mandate as additional controls. Columns (5) and (6) also control for residualized gender earnings gaps in the same district in the year before the election. Column (6) also includes district fixed effects.The sample is restricted to candidates from the main Left and Right party coalitions. Regressions are at the candidate–electoral district level over the Parliamentary elections between 2002 and 2017. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered at both the candidate and district–election levels. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
. | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Panel A: candidates’ selection | Female candidate? | |||||
Contestable | −0.053*** | −0.066*** | −0.050*** | −0.042** | −0.040** | −0.033** |
(0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.013) | |
Election × party fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Presidential party vote share | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Age, education, occupation | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Incumbent, first run, government exp., local mandate | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Gender earnings gap | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
District fixed effects | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
Observations | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 |
R2 | 0.047 | 0.073 | 0.130 | 0.175 | 0.178 | 0.377 |
Panel B: local pool of candidates | Gender gap high-skill occupation—local politicians | |||||
Contestable | −0.006 | −0.005 | −0.003 | −0.002 | −0.001 | 0.001 |
(0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.002) | |
Election × party fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Presid. party vote share | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Age, education, occupation | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Incumbent, first run, government exp., local mandate | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Gender earnings gap | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
District fixed effects | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
Observations | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 |
R2 | 0.051 | 0.056 | 0.071 | 0.075 | 0.093 | 0.502 |
. | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Panel A: candidates’ selection | Female candidate? | |||||
Contestable | −0.053*** | −0.066*** | −0.050*** | −0.042** | −0.040** | −0.033** |
(0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.013) | |
Election × party fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Presidential party vote share | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Age, education, occupation | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Incumbent, first run, government exp., local mandate | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Gender earnings gap | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
District fixed effects | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
Observations | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 |
R2 | 0.047 | 0.073 | 0.130 | 0.175 | 0.178 | 0.377 |
Panel B: local pool of candidates | Gender gap high-skill occupation—local politicians | |||||
Contestable | −0.006 | −0.005 | −0.003 | −0.002 | −0.001 | 0.001 |
(0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.002) | |
Election × party fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Presid. party vote share | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Age, education, occupation | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Incumbent, first run, government exp., local mandate | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Gender earnings gap | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
District fixed effects | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
Observations | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 | 3,880 |
R2 | 0.051 | 0.056 | 0.071 | 0.075 | 0.093 | 0.502 |
Notes: This table presents estimates from regressions of candidates’ gender (panel A) and of the gender skill gaps among local politicians (panel B) on a proxy for contestable districts, and control variables. When both the Right and Left parties reached the runoff of the previous Presidential election, we define as contestable districts for which the vote margin between both parties in the runoff of the Presidential election was between −3 and +3 percentage points. For 2002 and 2017, we instead use Left and Right candidates’ scores in the first round of the presidential election (and again define as contestable a district in which vote shares were between −3 and +3 percentage points). In panel A, the dependent variable indicates whether the candidate is a woman. In panel B, the dependent variable is the gender gap in the share of municipal council members with high-skill occupation (over all municipalities in the district). Regressions include election × party fixed effects. Columns (2)–(6) include the vote share obtained by the candidate’s party in the previous Presidential election. Columns (3)–(6) include candidates’ age, and dummies for elite university education and high-skill occupations. Columns (4)–(6) include dummies for incumbents, first-time candidates, former government members, and local mandate as additional controls. Columns (5) and (6) also control for residualized gender earnings gaps in the same district in the year before the election. Column (6) also includes district fixed effects.The sample is restricted to candidates from the main Left and Right party coalitions. Regressions are at the candidate–electoral district level over the Parliamentary elections between 2002 and 2017. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered at both the candidate and district–election levels. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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