TitleAbstract
How Business is Done in the Developing World: Deals versus RulesWhat happens in the developing world when stringent regulations characterizing the investment climate meet weak government willingness or capability to enforce those regulations? How is business actually done? The Doing Business project surveys experts concerning the legally required time and costs of regulatory compliance for various aspects of private enterprise—starting a firm, dealing with construction permits, trading across borders, paying taxes, getting credit, enforcing contracts, and so on—around the world. The World Bank’s firm-level Enterprise Surveys around the world ask managers at a wide array of firms about their business, including questions about how long it took to go through various processes like obtaining an operating license or a construction permit, or bringing in imports. This paper compares the results of three broadly comparable indicators from the Doing Business and Enterprise Surveys. Overall, we find that the estimate of legally required time for firms to complete a certain legal and regulatory process provided by the Doing Business survey does not summarise even modestly well the experience of firms as reported by the Enterprise Surveys. When strict de jure regulation and high rates of taxation meet weak governmental capabilities for implementation and enforcement, we argue that researchers and policymakers should stop thinking about regulations as creating ‘rules’ to be followed, but rather as creating a space in which ‘deals’ of various kinds are possible.
The white-man effect: How foreigner presence affects behaviour in experimentsWe experimentally vary white foreigner presence in dictator games across 60 villages in Sierra Leone, and find that the simple presence of a white foreigner increases player contributions by 19 percent. To separate the impact of the white foreigner’s race and nationality from other characteristics, we test additional predictions. First, the white foreigner’s presence may heighten demand effects, prompting players to try to impress the white foreigner by being more generous. This should make behaviour in the game less indicative of true generosity. Consistent with this, we find that game contributions are no longer predicted by real-world public good contributions when the white foreigner is present. Second, those more familiar with aid may perceive the games as a form of means-testing, and therefore give less to signal that they are poor. Consistent with this, in the presence of the white foreigner, players in more aid-exposed villages give less, and are more likely to believe that the games are testing them for aid suitability. Together, these results suggest that players’ giving decisions respond to the white foreigner’s race and nationality. Behavioural measures are increasingly used to infer cross-national differences in social preferences or to assess aid effectiveness—our results suggest that we should be cautious in these uses. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V.
West African Ebola crisis and orphansEvery health crisis creates orphans, but Ebola causes disproportionate mortality among working-age adults, who are also the most likely to have young children. Across Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, individuals aged between 15 and 44 years make up 2.85 times as many of the Ebola patients as individuals under 15 years of age. Parent mortality has the potential to multiply the effects of Ebola by leading to poorer health and education outcomes in future generations.
TitleAbstract
How Business is Done in the Developing World: Deals versus RulesWhat happens in the developing world when stringent regulations characterizing the investment climate meet weak government willingness or capability to enforce those regulations? How is business actually done? The Doing Business project surveys experts concerning the legally required time and costs of regulatory compliance for various aspects of private enterprise—starting a firm, dealing with construction permits, trading across borders, paying taxes, getting credit, enforcing contracts, and so on—around the world. The World Bank’s firm-level Enterprise Surveys around the world ask managers at a wide array of firms about their business, including questions about how long it took to go through various processes like obtaining an operating license or a construction permit, or bringing in imports. This paper compares the results of three broadly comparable indicators from the Doing Business and Enterprise Surveys. Overall, we find that the estimate of legally required time for firms to complete a certain legal and regulatory process provided by the Doing Business survey does not summarise even modestly well the experience of firms as reported by the Enterprise Surveys. When strict de jure regulation and high rates of taxation meet weak governmental capabilities for implementation and enforcement, we argue that researchers and policymakers should stop thinking about regulations as creating ‘rules’ to be followed, but rather as creating a space in which ‘deals’ of various kinds are possible.
The white-man effect: How foreigner presence affects behaviour in experimentsWe experimentally vary white foreigner presence in dictator games across 60 villages in Sierra Leone, and find that the simple presence of a white foreigner increases player contributions by 19 percent. To separate the impact of the white foreigner’s race and nationality from other characteristics, we test additional predictions. First, the white foreigner’s presence may heighten demand effects, prompting players to try to impress the white foreigner by being more generous. This should make behaviour in the game less indicative of true generosity. Consistent with this, we find that game contributions are no longer predicted by real-world public good contributions when the white foreigner is present. Second, those more familiar with aid may perceive the games as a form of means-testing, and therefore give less to signal that they are poor. Consistent with this, in the presence of the white foreigner, players in more aid-exposed villages give less, and are more likely to believe that the games are testing them for aid suitability. Together, these results suggest that players’ giving decisions respond to the white foreigner’s race and nationality. Behavioural measures are increasingly used to infer cross-national differences in social preferences or to assess aid effectiveness—our results suggest that we should be cautious in these uses. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V.
West African Ebola crisis and orphansEvery health crisis creates orphans, but Ebola causes disproportionate mortality among working-age adults, who are also the most likely to have young children. Across Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, individuals aged between 15 and 44 years make up 2.85 times as many of the Ebola patients as individuals under 15 years of age. Parent mortality has the potential to multiply the effects of Ebola by leading to poorer health and education outcomes in future generations.
TitleAbstract
How Business is Done in the Developing World: Deals versus RulesWhat happens in the developing world when stringent regulations characterizing the investment climate meet weak government willingness or capability to enforce those regulations? How is business actually done? The Doing Business project surveys experts concerning the legally required time and costs of regulatory compliance for various aspects of private enterprise—starting a firm, dealing with construction permits, trading across borders, paying taxes, getting credit, enforcing contracts, and so on—around the world. The World Bank’s firm-level Enterprise Surveys around the world ask managers at a wide array of firms about their business, including questions about how long it took to go through various processes like obtaining an operating license or a construction permit, or bringing in imports. This paper compares the results of three broadly comparable indicators from the Doing Business and Enterprise Surveys. Overall, we find that the estimate of legally required time for firms to complete a certain legal and regulatory process provided by the Doing Business survey does not summarise even modestly well the experience of firms as reported by the Enterprise Surveys. When strict de jure regulation and high rates of taxation meet weak governmental capabilities for implementation and enforcement, we argue that researchers and policymakers should stop thinking about regulations as creating ‘rules’ to be followed, but rather as creating a space in which ‘deals’ of various kinds are possible.
The white-man effect: How foreigner presence affects behaviour in experimentsWe experimentally vary white foreigner presence in dictator games across 60 villages in Sierra Leone, and find that the simple presence of a white foreigner increases player contributions by 19 percent. To separate the impact of the white foreigner’s race and nationality from other characteristics, we test additional predictions. First, the white foreigner’s presence may heighten demand effects, prompting players to try to impress the white foreigner by being more generous. This should make behaviour in the game less indicative of true generosity. Consistent with this, we find that game contributions are no longer predicted by real-world public good contributions when the white foreigner is present. Second, those more familiar with aid may perceive the games as a form of means-testing, and therefore give less to signal that they are poor. Consistent with this, in the presence of the white foreigner, players in more aid-exposed villages give less, and are more likely to believe that the games are testing them for aid suitability. Together, these results suggest that players’ giving decisions respond to the white foreigner’s race and nationality. Behavioural measures are increasingly used to infer cross-national differences in social preferences or to assess aid effectiveness—our results suggest that we should be cautious in these uses. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V.
West African Ebola crisis and orphansEvery health crisis creates orphans, but Ebola causes disproportionate mortality among working-age adults, who are also the most likely to have young children. Across Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, individuals aged between 15 and 44 years make up 2.85 times as many of the Ebola patients as individuals under 15 years of age. Parent mortality has the potential to multiply the effects of Ebola by leading to poorer health and education outcomes in future generations.
TitleAbstract
How Business is Done in the Developing World: Deals versus RulesWhat happens in the developing world when stringent regulations characterizing the investment climate meet weak government willingness or capability to enforce those regulations? How is business actually done? The Doing Business project surveys experts concerning the legally required time and costs of regulatory compliance for various aspects of private enterprise—starting a firm, dealing with construction permits, trading across borders, paying taxes, getting credit, enforcing contracts, and so on—around the world. The World Bank’s firm-level Enterprise Surveys around the world ask managers at a wide array of firms about their business, including questions about how long it took to go through various processes like obtaining an operating license or a construction permit, or bringing in imports. This paper compares the results of three broadly comparable indicators from the Doing Business and Enterprise Surveys. Overall, we find that the estimate of legally required time for firms to complete a certain legal and regulatory process provided by the Doing Business survey does not summarise even modestly well the experience of firms as reported by the Enterprise Surveys. When strict de jure regulation and high rates of taxation meet weak governmental capabilities for implementation and enforcement, we argue that researchers and policymakers should stop thinking about regulations as creating ‘rules’ to be followed, but rather as creating a space in which ‘deals’ of various kinds are possible.
The white-man effect: How foreigner presence affects behaviour in experimentsWe experimentally vary white foreigner presence in dictator games across 60 villages in Sierra Leone, and find that the simple presence of a white foreigner increases player contributions by 19 percent. To separate the impact of the white foreigner’s race and nationality from other characteristics, we test additional predictions. First, the white foreigner’s presence may heighten demand effects, prompting players to try to impress the white foreigner by being more generous. This should make behaviour in the game less indicative of true generosity. Consistent with this, we find that game contributions are no longer predicted by real-world public good contributions when the white foreigner is present. Second, those more familiar with aid may perceive the games as a form of means-testing, and therefore give less to signal that they are poor. Consistent with this, in the presence of the white foreigner, players in more aid-exposed villages give less, and are more likely to believe that the games are testing them for aid suitability. Together, these results suggest that players’ giving decisions respond to the white foreigner’s race and nationality. Behavioural measures are increasingly used to infer cross-national differences in social preferences or to assess aid effectiveness—our results suggest that we should be cautious in these uses. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V.
West African Ebola crisis and orphansEvery health crisis creates orphans, but Ebola causes disproportionate mortality among working-age adults, who are also the most likely to have young children. Across Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, individuals aged between 15 and 44 years make up 2.85 times as many of the Ebola patients as individuals under 15 years of age. Parent mortality has the potential to multiply the effects of Ebola by leading to poorer health and education outcomes in future generations.
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