Dependent variable: Nonbank Share|$_{it}$| . | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Robustness test: . | Syndicate aggregation . | . | Capital measurement . | ||||
Syndicate aggregation: . | VW . | Median . | Dominant . | Lead . | . | EW . | EW . |
. | [1] . | [2] . | [3] . | [4] . | . | [5] . | [6] . |
Tier 1 Capital/RWA|$_{t-1}$| | -4.323*** | -0.962*** | -2.083*** | -0.563*** | |||
(0.548) | (0.438) | (0.410) | (0.169) | ||||
Tier 1 Gap|$_{t-1}$| | -1.830*** | ||||||
(0.452) | |||||||
Total Capital/RWA|$_{t-1}$| | -1.349*** | ||||||
(0.304) | |||||||
Bank controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
Loan controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
Year fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
Observations | 29,121 | 29,121 | 29,121 | 29,121 | 29,121 | 29,121 | |
(R2) | 0.542 | 0.545 | 0.549 | 0.540 | 0.419 | 0.419 |
Dependent variable: Nonbank Share|$_{it}$| . | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Robustness test: . | Syndicate aggregation . | . | Capital measurement . | ||||
Syndicate aggregation: . | VW . | Median . | Dominant . | Lead . | . | EW . | EW . |
. | [1] . | [2] . | [3] . | [4] . | . | [5] . | [6] . |
Tier 1 Capital/RWA|$_{t-1}$| | -4.323*** | -0.962*** | -2.083*** | -0.563*** | |||
(0.548) | (0.438) | (0.410) | (0.169) | ||||
Tier 1 Gap|$_{t-1}$| | -1.830*** | ||||||
(0.452) | |||||||
Total Capital/RWA|$_{t-1}$| | -1.349*** | ||||||
(0.304) | |||||||
Bank controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
Loan controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
Year fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
Observations | 29,121 | 29,121 | 29,121 | 29,121 | 29,121 | 29,121 | |
(R2) | 0.542 | 0.545 | 0.549 | 0.540 | 0.419 | 0.419 |
This table shows robustness checks for the effects of bank regulatory capital for loan acquisition by nonbanks. The unit of observation in each regression is a loan-year. The dependent variable is the fraction of the loan held by nonbanks. Columns [1] to [4] use alternative methods to aggregate independent variables—bank controls shown in Table 3—up to the loan syndicate level. In particular, we consider the loan share value-weighted average, the median value, the simple average among the three (“dominant”) banks with the largest loan shares, and the lead arranger’s bank characteristics. Columns [5] and [6] examine alternative measures of bank regulatory capital as independent variables. The sample period is from 1993 to 2014. Where indicated, the columns include controls for bank, loan, and year fixed effects, and loan controls (a regulatory pass/fail dummy and the natural logarithm of loan maturity). All variables are defined in Table A1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the year level. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.
Dependent variable: Nonbank Share|$_{it}$| . | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Robustness test: . | Syndicate aggregation . | . | Capital measurement . | ||||
Syndicate aggregation: . | VW . | Median . | Dominant . | Lead . | . | EW . | EW . |
. | [1] . | [2] . | [3] . | [4] . | . | [5] . | [6] . |
Tier 1 Capital/RWA|$_{t-1}$| | -4.323*** | -0.962*** | -2.083*** | -0.563*** | |||
(0.548) | (0.438) | (0.410) | (0.169) | ||||
Tier 1 Gap|$_{t-1}$| | -1.830*** | ||||||
(0.452) | |||||||
Total Capital/RWA|$_{t-1}$| | -1.349*** | ||||||
(0.304) | |||||||
Bank controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
Loan controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
Year fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
Observations | 29,121 | 29,121 | 29,121 | 29,121 | 29,121 | 29,121 | |
(R2) | 0.542 | 0.545 | 0.549 | 0.540 | 0.419 | 0.419 |
Dependent variable: Nonbank Share|$_{it}$| . | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Robustness test: . | Syndicate aggregation . | . | Capital measurement . | ||||
Syndicate aggregation: . | VW . | Median . | Dominant . | Lead . | . | EW . | EW . |
. | [1] . | [2] . | [3] . | [4] . | . | [5] . | [6] . |
Tier 1 Capital/RWA|$_{t-1}$| | -4.323*** | -0.962*** | -2.083*** | -0.563*** | |||
(0.548) | (0.438) | (0.410) | (0.169) | ||||
Tier 1 Gap|$_{t-1}$| | -1.830*** | ||||||
(0.452) | |||||||
Total Capital/RWA|$_{t-1}$| | -1.349*** | ||||||
(0.304) | |||||||
Bank controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
Loan controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
Year fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
Observations | 29,121 | 29,121 | 29,121 | 29,121 | 29,121 | 29,121 | |
(R2) | 0.542 | 0.545 | 0.549 | 0.540 | 0.419 | 0.419 |
This table shows robustness checks for the effects of bank regulatory capital for loan acquisition by nonbanks. The unit of observation in each regression is a loan-year. The dependent variable is the fraction of the loan held by nonbanks. Columns [1] to [4] use alternative methods to aggregate independent variables—bank controls shown in Table 3—up to the loan syndicate level. In particular, we consider the loan share value-weighted average, the median value, the simple average among the three (“dominant”) banks with the largest loan shares, and the lead arranger’s bank characteristics. Columns [5] and [6] examine alternative measures of bank regulatory capital as independent variables. The sample period is from 1993 to 2014. Where indicated, the columns include controls for bank, loan, and year fixed effects, and loan controls (a regulatory pass/fail dummy and the natural logarithm of loan maturity). All variables are defined in Table A1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the year level. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance, respectively.
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