Table 16.

Payoffs of players by network position in Experiments I and III, experienced games.

Game 15Game 25Game 30
B (C)A (D)B (C)A (D)B (C)A (D)
All final matches
 Experiment I10.0 (0.03)10.0 (0.03)4.5 (0.25)11.8 (0.10)2.4 (0.11)14.2 (0.05)
 Experiment III9.8 (0.12)9.8 (0.09)6.2 (0.35)12.3 (0.16)3.6 (0.05)14.8 (0.15)
Efficient final matches
 Experiment I10.0 (0.03)10.0 (0.03)8.8 (0.10)11.2 (0.10)7.7 (0.09)12.3 (0.09)
 Experiment III10.0 (0.03)10.0 (0.03)7.5 (0.18)12.3 (0.08)4.9 (0.18)15.0 (0.14)
Game 15Game 25Game 30
B (C)A (D)B (C)A (D)B (C)A (D)
All final matches
 Experiment I10.0 (0.03)10.0 (0.03)4.5 (0.25)11.8 (0.10)2.4 (0.11)14.2 (0.05)
 Experiment III9.8 (0.12)9.8 (0.09)6.2 (0.35)12.3 (0.16)3.6 (0.05)14.8 (0.15)
Efficient final matches
 Experiment I10.0 (0.03)10.0 (0.03)8.8 (0.10)11.2 (0.10)7.7 (0.09)12.3 (0.09)
 Experiment III10.0 (0.03)10.0 (0.03)7.5 (0.18)12.3 (0.08)4.9 (0.18)15.0 (0.14)

Notes: We report average payoffs of players by their network positions, with the corresponding robust standard errors in the parentheses, where observations are clustered at the session level.

Table 16.

Payoffs of players by network position in Experiments I and III, experienced games.

Game 15Game 25Game 30
B (C)A (D)B (C)A (D)B (C)A (D)
All final matches
 Experiment I10.0 (0.03)10.0 (0.03)4.5 (0.25)11.8 (0.10)2.4 (0.11)14.2 (0.05)
 Experiment III9.8 (0.12)9.8 (0.09)6.2 (0.35)12.3 (0.16)3.6 (0.05)14.8 (0.15)
Efficient final matches
 Experiment I10.0 (0.03)10.0 (0.03)8.8 (0.10)11.2 (0.10)7.7 (0.09)12.3 (0.09)
 Experiment III10.0 (0.03)10.0 (0.03)7.5 (0.18)12.3 (0.08)4.9 (0.18)15.0 (0.14)
Game 15Game 25Game 30
B (C)A (D)B (C)A (D)B (C)A (D)
All final matches
 Experiment I10.0 (0.03)10.0 (0.03)4.5 (0.25)11.8 (0.10)2.4 (0.11)14.2 (0.05)
 Experiment III9.8 (0.12)9.8 (0.09)6.2 (0.35)12.3 (0.16)3.6 (0.05)14.8 (0.15)
Efficient final matches
 Experiment I10.0 (0.03)10.0 (0.03)8.8 (0.10)11.2 (0.10)7.7 (0.09)12.3 (0.09)
 Experiment III10.0 (0.03)10.0 (0.03)7.5 (0.18)12.3 (0.08)4.9 (0.18)15.0 (0.14)

Notes: We report average payoffs of players by their network positions, with the corresponding robust standard errors in the parentheses, where observations are clustered at the session level.

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