. | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
. | |$\Delta {\textit {CustPD}}_{c(i)}$| . | |$\Delta {\textit {Sales}}_{c(i)}$| . | |$\Delta {\textit {Sales}}_{c(i)}^{IV}$| . | |$\Delta {\textit {SumInj}}_i$| . | |$\Delta {\textit {NoInj}}_i$| . |
|${\textit {Crisis}}_t \cdot \hat{\tau }_i^{07} \cdot \mathbb {1} \lbrace T_i^{\textit {High}}=0 \rbrace$| | 0.016 | 0.393*** | 0.367*** | 0.218*** | 0.210*** |
(0.1) | (4.5) | (4.3) | (2.7) | (2.7) | |
|${\textit {Crisis}}_t \cdot \hat{\tau }_i^{07} \cdot \mathbb {1} \lbrace T_i^{\textit {High}}=1 \rbrace$| | 0.515*** | −0.011 | 0.029 | 0.429** | 0.547** |
(3.4) | (−0.1) | (0.2) | (2.1) | (2.4) | |
p-value for difference | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.020 | 0.168 | 0.083 |
R2 | 0.285 | 0.257 | 0.255 | 0.250 | 0.250 |
No. firms | 887/792 | 1,980/663 | 2,090/553 | 2,300/343 | 2,316/327 |
No. observations | 21,091 | 21,091 | 21,091 | 21,091 | 21,091 |
. | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
. | |$\Delta {\textit {CustPD}}_{c(i)}$| . | |$\Delta {\textit {Sales}}_{c(i)}$| . | |$\Delta {\textit {Sales}}_{c(i)}^{IV}$| . | |$\Delta {\textit {SumInj}}_i$| . | |$\Delta {\textit {NoInj}}_i$| . |
|${\textit {Crisis}}_t \cdot \hat{\tau }_i^{07} \cdot \mathbb {1} \lbrace T_i^{\textit {High}}=0 \rbrace$| | 0.016 | 0.393*** | 0.367*** | 0.218*** | 0.210*** |
(0.1) | (4.5) | (4.3) | (2.7) | (2.7) | |
|${\textit {Crisis}}_t \cdot \hat{\tau }_i^{07} \cdot \mathbb {1} \lbrace T_i^{\textit {High}}=1 \rbrace$| | 0.515*** | −0.011 | 0.029 | 0.429** | 0.547** |
(3.4) | (−0.1) | (0.2) | (2.1) | (2.4) | |
p-value for difference | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.020 | 0.168 | 0.083 |
R2 | 0.285 | 0.257 | 0.255 | 0.250 | 0.250 |
No. firms | 887/792 | 1,980/663 | 2,090/553 | 2,300/343 | 2,316/327 |
No. observations | 21,091 | 21,091 | 21,091 | 21,091 | 21,091 |
Notes: This table reports results for estimations of equation (5) on various subsamples of firms for the period 2006–2009. More specifically, the different columns report results for sample splits based on the change in buyer PDs (column 1); the change in sales in buyer industries (column 2); the change in sales in buyer industries instrumented using the precrisis export share of each industry (column 3); the change in the sum of the claims underlying the injunctions issued on behalf of each seller (column 4); and the change in the number of injunctions issued on behalf of each seller (column 5). The changes are from 2007 to 2009 in all cases. In column (1), |$T_i^{\textit {High}}$| is equal to zero for firms in the bottom three deciles of the |$\Delta {\textit {CustPD}}_{j(c)}$| distribution, and to one for firms in the top three deciles. In remaining columns, |$T_i^{\textit {High}}$| is equal to zero if Ti ≤ 0 and equal to one if Ti > 0. Reported p-values correspond to one-sided tests, where the null hypothesis is that the estimates of β are equal in each pair and the alternative hypothesis that the coefficients are larger for firms with |$T_i^{\textit {High}}=1$| in columns (1), (4), and (5), and for firms with |$T_i^{\textit {High}}=0$| in columns (2) and (3). The number of firms refer to the numbers of firms for which |$T_i^{\textit {High}}=0$| and |$T_i^{\textit {High}}=1$|, respectively. t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level are reported in parentheses. **Significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
. | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
. | |$\Delta {\textit {CustPD}}_{c(i)}$| . | |$\Delta {\textit {Sales}}_{c(i)}$| . | |$\Delta {\textit {Sales}}_{c(i)}^{IV}$| . | |$\Delta {\textit {SumInj}}_i$| . | |$\Delta {\textit {NoInj}}_i$| . |
|${\textit {Crisis}}_t \cdot \hat{\tau }_i^{07} \cdot \mathbb {1} \lbrace T_i^{\textit {High}}=0 \rbrace$| | 0.016 | 0.393*** | 0.367*** | 0.218*** | 0.210*** |
(0.1) | (4.5) | (4.3) | (2.7) | (2.7) | |
|${\textit {Crisis}}_t \cdot \hat{\tau }_i^{07} \cdot \mathbb {1} \lbrace T_i^{\textit {High}}=1 \rbrace$| | 0.515*** | −0.011 | 0.029 | 0.429** | 0.547** |
(3.4) | (−0.1) | (0.2) | (2.1) | (2.4) | |
p-value for difference | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.020 | 0.168 | 0.083 |
R2 | 0.285 | 0.257 | 0.255 | 0.250 | 0.250 |
No. firms | 887/792 | 1,980/663 | 2,090/553 | 2,300/343 | 2,316/327 |
No. observations | 21,091 | 21,091 | 21,091 | 21,091 | 21,091 |
. | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
. | |$\Delta {\textit {CustPD}}_{c(i)}$| . | |$\Delta {\textit {Sales}}_{c(i)}$| . | |$\Delta {\textit {Sales}}_{c(i)}^{IV}$| . | |$\Delta {\textit {SumInj}}_i$| . | |$\Delta {\textit {NoInj}}_i$| . |
|${\textit {Crisis}}_t \cdot \hat{\tau }_i^{07} \cdot \mathbb {1} \lbrace T_i^{\textit {High}}=0 \rbrace$| | 0.016 | 0.393*** | 0.367*** | 0.218*** | 0.210*** |
(0.1) | (4.5) | (4.3) | (2.7) | (2.7) | |
|${\textit {Crisis}}_t \cdot \hat{\tau }_i^{07} \cdot \mathbb {1} \lbrace T_i^{\textit {High}}=1 \rbrace$| | 0.515*** | −0.011 | 0.029 | 0.429** | 0.547** |
(3.4) | (−0.1) | (0.2) | (2.1) | (2.4) | |
p-value for difference | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.020 | 0.168 | 0.083 |
R2 | 0.285 | 0.257 | 0.255 | 0.250 | 0.250 |
No. firms | 887/792 | 1,980/663 | 2,090/553 | 2,300/343 | 2,316/327 |
No. observations | 21,091 | 21,091 | 21,091 | 21,091 | 21,091 |
Notes: This table reports results for estimations of equation (5) on various subsamples of firms for the period 2006–2009. More specifically, the different columns report results for sample splits based on the change in buyer PDs (column 1); the change in sales in buyer industries (column 2); the change in sales in buyer industries instrumented using the precrisis export share of each industry (column 3); the change in the sum of the claims underlying the injunctions issued on behalf of each seller (column 4); and the change in the number of injunctions issued on behalf of each seller (column 5). The changes are from 2007 to 2009 in all cases. In column (1), |$T_i^{\textit {High}}$| is equal to zero for firms in the bottom three deciles of the |$\Delta {\textit {CustPD}}_{j(c)}$| distribution, and to one for firms in the top three deciles. In remaining columns, |$T_i^{\textit {High}}$| is equal to zero if Ti ≤ 0 and equal to one if Ti > 0. Reported p-values correspond to one-sided tests, where the null hypothesis is that the estimates of β are equal in each pair and the alternative hypothesis that the coefficients are larger for firms with |$T_i^{\textit {High}}=1$| in columns (1), (4), and (5), and for firms with |$T_i^{\textit {High}}=0$| in columns (2) and (3). The number of firms refer to the numbers of firms for which |$T_i^{\textit {High}}=0$| and |$T_i^{\textit {High}}=1$|, respectively. t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level are reported in parentheses. **Significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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