Speed of decision-making controlling for judicial characteristics: Cox proportional hazard estimates
| Explanatory Variable . | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Court validated agency decision | 0.281** (0.061) | 0.278** (0.058) | 0.274** (0.065) | 0.293** (0.064) | 0.293** (0.062) | 0.276** (0.057) |
| (Ideologically mixed panel) × (agency decision aligned) | −0.247 (0.189) | −0.252 (0.175) | −0.194 (0.154) | −0.284 (0.187) | −0.276 (0.180) | −0.248 (0.159) |
| Agency decision aligned with panel majority’s presumed preference | 0.158 (0.158) | 0.152 (0.134) | 0.093 (0.112) | 0.175 (0.170) | 0.162 (0.165) | 0.157 (0.148) |
| Ideologically mixed panel | 0.228 (0.145) | 0.200 (0.140) | 0.171 (0.132) | 0.244 (0.158) | 0.244* (0.148) | 0.234* (0.134) |
| Judicial characteristics | ||||||
| Age | 0.002 (0.003) | −0.005 (0.004) | −0.005 (0.003) | −0.004 (0.011) | −0.006 (0.011) | −0.0001 (0.0126) |
| Years on the Bench | −0.005 (0.010) | −0.001 (0.010) | 0.0003 (0.0108) | 0.009 (0.015) | 0.008 (0.014) | 0.008 (0.012) |
| Sitting by designation | −0.124 (0.280) | −0.152 (0.303) | −0.180 (0.314) | 0.583** (0.281) | 0.598* (0.293) | 0.657** (0.284) |
| Senior status | 0.166 (0.234) | 0.180 (0.209) | 0.272 (0.281) | 0.035 (0.345) | 0.011 (0.327) | −0.088 (0.322) |
| Prior experience in private practice | – | 0.351** (0.128) | 0.354** (0.151) | – | 0.308 (0.376) | 0.405 (0.455) |
| Prior experience as a prosecutor | – | 0.037 (0.108) | 0.056 (0.091) | – | −0.174 (0.116) | −0.203 (0.112) |
| Prior experience as a judge | – | 0.101 (0.135) | 0.042 (0.116) | – | 0.133 (0.139) | 0.079 (0.123) |
| Attended an elite law school | – | 0.128 (0.111) | 0.167 (0.123) | – | 0.270 (0.205) | 0.272 (0.196) |
| Female | – | – | 0.272 (0.281) | – | – | −0.377 (0.321) |
| Minority | – | – | 0.228 (0.231) | – | – | 0.639* (0.347) |
| Judicial characteristics of: | Author of majority opinion | Author of majority opinion | Author of majority opinion | Average panel member | Average panel member | Average panel member |
| Explanatory Variable . | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Court validated agency decision | 0.281** (0.061) | 0.278** (0.058) | 0.274** (0.065) | 0.293** (0.064) | 0.293** (0.062) | 0.276** (0.057) |
| (Ideologically mixed panel) × (agency decision aligned) | −0.247 (0.189) | −0.252 (0.175) | −0.194 (0.154) | −0.284 (0.187) | −0.276 (0.180) | −0.248 (0.159) |
| Agency decision aligned with panel majority’s presumed preference | 0.158 (0.158) | 0.152 (0.134) | 0.093 (0.112) | 0.175 (0.170) | 0.162 (0.165) | 0.157 (0.148) |
| Ideologically mixed panel | 0.228 (0.145) | 0.200 (0.140) | 0.171 (0.132) | 0.244 (0.158) | 0.244* (0.148) | 0.234* (0.134) |
| Judicial characteristics | ||||||
| Age | 0.002 (0.003) | −0.005 (0.004) | −0.005 (0.003) | −0.004 (0.011) | −0.006 (0.011) | −0.0001 (0.0126) |
| Years on the Bench | −0.005 (0.010) | −0.001 (0.010) | 0.0003 (0.0108) | 0.009 (0.015) | 0.008 (0.014) | 0.008 (0.012) |
| Sitting by designation | −0.124 (0.280) | −0.152 (0.303) | −0.180 (0.314) | 0.583** (0.281) | 0.598* (0.293) | 0.657** (0.284) |
| Senior status | 0.166 (0.234) | 0.180 (0.209) | 0.272 (0.281) | 0.035 (0.345) | 0.011 (0.327) | −0.088 (0.322) |
| Prior experience in private practice | – | 0.351** (0.128) | 0.354** (0.151) | – | 0.308 (0.376) | 0.405 (0.455) |
| Prior experience as a prosecutor | – | 0.037 (0.108) | 0.056 (0.091) | – | −0.174 (0.116) | −0.203 (0.112) |
| Prior experience as a judge | – | 0.101 (0.135) | 0.042 (0.116) | – | 0.133 (0.139) | 0.079 (0.123) |
| Attended an elite law school | – | 0.128 (0.111) | 0.167 (0.123) | – | 0.270 (0.205) | 0.272 (0.196) |
| Female | – | – | 0.272 (0.281) | – | – | −0.377 (0.321) |
| Minority | – | – | 0.228 (0.231) | – | – | 0.639* (0.347) |
| Judicial characteristics of: | Author of majority opinion | Author of majority opinion | Author of majority opinion | Average panel member | Average panel member | Average panel member |
Note: N = 848. All equations include fixed effects for circuits and years. Standard errors are clustered by circuits. The regressions also include controls for whether the case involves an application of Chevron, whether it is an appeal from an EPA decision, whether the agency decision was liberal, whether Democratic appointees were a majority of the panel, the length of the opinion, whether the opinion was per curiam, the presence of a separate opinion, the circuit caseload per judge, and the number of judges in the circuit. These estimates are not reported in order to conserve space. An * denotes coefficients statistically significant at the 10% level, and ** denote coefficients statistically significant at the 5% level.
Speed of decision-making controlling for judicial characteristics: Cox proportional hazard estimates
| Explanatory Variable . | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Court validated agency decision | 0.281** (0.061) | 0.278** (0.058) | 0.274** (0.065) | 0.293** (0.064) | 0.293** (0.062) | 0.276** (0.057) |
| (Ideologically mixed panel) × (agency decision aligned) | −0.247 (0.189) | −0.252 (0.175) | −0.194 (0.154) | −0.284 (0.187) | −0.276 (0.180) | −0.248 (0.159) |
| Agency decision aligned with panel majority’s presumed preference | 0.158 (0.158) | 0.152 (0.134) | 0.093 (0.112) | 0.175 (0.170) | 0.162 (0.165) | 0.157 (0.148) |
| Ideologically mixed panel | 0.228 (0.145) | 0.200 (0.140) | 0.171 (0.132) | 0.244 (0.158) | 0.244* (0.148) | 0.234* (0.134) |
| Judicial characteristics | ||||||
| Age | 0.002 (0.003) | −0.005 (0.004) | −0.005 (0.003) | −0.004 (0.011) | −0.006 (0.011) | −0.0001 (0.0126) |
| Years on the Bench | −0.005 (0.010) | −0.001 (0.010) | 0.0003 (0.0108) | 0.009 (0.015) | 0.008 (0.014) | 0.008 (0.012) |
| Sitting by designation | −0.124 (0.280) | −0.152 (0.303) | −0.180 (0.314) | 0.583** (0.281) | 0.598* (0.293) | 0.657** (0.284) |
| Senior status | 0.166 (0.234) | 0.180 (0.209) | 0.272 (0.281) | 0.035 (0.345) | 0.011 (0.327) | −0.088 (0.322) |
| Prior experience in private practice | – | 0.351** (0.128) | 0.354** (0.151) | – | 0.308 (0.376) | 0.405 (0.455) |
| Prior experience as a prosecutor | – | 0.037 (0.108) | 0.056 (0.091) | – | −0.174 (0.116) | −0.203 (0.112) |
| Prior experience as a judge | – | 0.101 (0.135) | 0.042 (0.116) | – | 0.133 (0.139) | 0.079 (0.123) |
| Attended an elite law school | – | 0.128 (0.111) | 0.167 (0.123) | – | 0.270 (0.205) | 0.272 (0.196) |
| Female | – | – | 0.272 (0.281) | – | – | −0.377 (0.321) |
| Minority | – | – | 0.228 (0.231) | – | – | 0.639* (0.347) |
| Judicial characteristics of: | Author of majority opinion | Author of majority opinion | Author of majority opinion | Average panel member | Average panel member | Average panel member |
| Explanatory Variable . | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Court validated agency decision | 0.281** (0.061) | 0.278** (0.058) | 0.274** (0.065) | 0.293** (0.064) | 0.293** (0.062) | 0.276** (0.057) |
| (Ideologically mixed panel) × (agency decision aligned) | −0.247 (0.189) | −0.252 (0.175) | −0.194 (0.154) | −0.284 (0.187) | −0.276 (0.180) | −0.248 (0.159) |
| Agency decision aligned with panel majority’s presumed preference | 0.158 (0.158) | 0.152 (0.134) | 0.093 (0.112) | 0.175 (0.170) | 0.162 (0.165) | 0.157 (0.148) |
| Ideologically mixed panel | 0.228 (0.145) | 0.200 (0.140) | 0.171 (0.132) | 0.244 (0.158) | 0.244* (0.148) | 0.234* (0.134) |
| Judicial characteristics | ||||||
| Age | 0.002 (0.003) | −0.005 (0.004) | −0.005 (0.003) | −0.004 (0.011) | −0.006 (0.011) | −0.0001 (0.0126) |
| Years on the Bench | −0.005 (0.010) | −0.001 (0.010) | 0.0003 (0.0108) | 0.009 (0.015) | 0.008 (0.014) | 0.008 (0.012) |
| Sitting by designation | −0.124 (0.280) | −0.152 (0.303) | −0.180 (0.314) | 0.583** (0.281) | 0.598* (0.293) | 0.657** (0.284) |
| Senior status | 0.166 (0.234) | 0.180 (0.209) | 0.272 (0.281) | 0.035 (0.345) | 0.011 (0.327) | −0.088 (0.322) |
| Prior experience in private practice | – | 0.351** (0.128) | 0.354** (0.151) | – | 0.308 (0.376) | 0.405 (0.455) |
| Prior experience as a prosecutor | – | 0.037 (0.108) | 0.056 (0.091) | – | −0.174 (0.116) | −0.203 (0.112) |
| Prior experience as a judge | – | 0.101 (0.135) | 0.042 (0.116) | – | 0.133 (0.139) | 0.079 (0.123) |
| Attended an elite law school | – | 0.128 (0.111) | 0.167 (0.123) | – | 0.270 (0.205) | 0.272 (0.196) |
| Female | – | – | 0.272 (0.281) | – | – | −0.377 (0.321) |
| Minority | – | – | 0.228 (0.231) | – | – | 0.639* (0.347) |
| Judicial characteristics of: | Author of majority opinion | Author of majority opinion | Author of majority opinion | Average panel member | Average panel member | Average panel member |
Note: N = 848. All equations include fixed effects for circuits and years. Standard errors are clustered by circuits. The regressions also include controls for whether the case involves an application of Chevron, whether it is an appeal from an EPA decision, whether the agency decision was liberal, whether Democratic appointees were a majority of the panel, the length of the opinion, whether the opinion was per curiam, the presence of a separate opinion, the circuit caseload per judge, and the number of judges in the circuit. These estimates are not reported in order to conserve space. An * denotes coefficients statistically significant at the 10% level, and ** denote coefficients statistically significant at the 5% level.
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